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This thesis details the purchase of liberal internationalism on elite and public opinion between 
1945 and 1975 by examining two of its bastions, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
better known as Chatham House, and the United Nations Association, the successor 
organisation to the League of Nations Union. It reveals how liberal internationalism survived 
the collapse of the League of Nations and the Second World War by exploring the 
relationships Chatham House and UNA had with the public, media, Whitehall and the main 
political parties. Chatham House and UNA had a significant impact upon these groups, acting 
as democratising agents in foreign policy by extending debate over international affairs 
beyond Whitehall. Nonetheless, although elite and popular liberal internationalism survived 
past 1945, it struggled to do so and in order to fully appreciate how, it is necessary to 
simultaneously assess the confines they and their fellow NGOs worked within. Chatham 
House and UNA’s impact upon the politics of foreign policy must also be understood in 
connection with the formal and informal political structures that restricted their attempts to 
democratise foreign policy; structures that promoted the illusory bifurcation of domestic and 
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Beyond The Twenty Years’ Crisis 
 
In twentieth century Britain, foreign policy became less foreign. Not only did the quickening 
pace of globalisation blur the boundaries between the external and the internal, but the 
simultaneous and interdependent rise of a mass society placed what was the sole preserve of 
the aristocracy in the nineteenth century within the reach of the newly empowered citizens of 
the twentieth. This process of democratisation was spurred on by liberal internationalists who 
sought to improve international understanding between peoples so that they might check 
anarchic nationalism in their peers and their governments, and promote the cause of 
international integration, even the formation of a world government. Political integration 
would accompany and bring to heel untamed economic interdependence so that it might be 
worked to secure the interests of the people rather than those of rapacious dictators and greedy 
corporations; that peace and prosperity might be secured for all.  
They were E.H. Carr’s ‘utopians’. Their ideas had their roots in the nineteenth century 
– and further back – but the horrors of the First World War and the new opportunities (and 
complications) presented to them by the Fourth Reform Act stirred in them a new fervour to 
popularise their cause to impose order upon the global chaos. The international organisation 
that came to epitomise their hopes was the League of Nations. A League of Nations Union 
(LNU) was created, with equivalents dotted around the world, to promote its achievements 
and endeavours. Within Britain they rallied hundreds of thousands to their cause, obtained 
millions of signatures in support of collective security and opened up new participatory spaces 





Another body was also established by the ‘utopians’ that was far less convinced of the 
merits of sustaining a mass membership, but was similarly certain that elite and public 
opinion had to be educated in the benefits to be gained from international integration. This 
body was the British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs, better known as Chatham 
House. The formation of the League of Nations represented to them an important practical 
step towards the recognition of the necessity of international integration. However, they also 
held faith in another form of integration, that which would lead to supranational federal 
unions. Buoyed by the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, they looked to the 
British Empire to enact their experiment. The Institute provided a valuable forum, tucked 
away in London clubland, where academics, politicians, diplomats, businessmen and trade 
unionists could exchange ideas and deliberate on international affairs. This high citadel of 
‘utopianism’, home to and frequented by great intellectuals of the age, disseminated a bi-
monthly journal and an annual survey, and kept a library that contained an unsurpassed 
collection of international relations literature and press cuttings from newspapers all over the 
world.  
However, in the late 1930s, the hopes of the ‘utopians’ crumbled before them as a 
second world war appeared increasingly inevitable. Carr, whose seminal work The Twenty 
Years’ Crisis was published in the same month as war was declared, concluded that the 
‘utopians’ had been fooled and, in turn, had fooled the public and policy-makers alike.1 The 
nation-state was the supreme unit in human relations and however heartfelt the pleas for peace 
made by individuals and existing international edifices, cold hard power politics would win 
out. In the aftermath of war, disillusioned Britons looked to the Hitlerite foreign policy that 
had fuelled it and the Cold War power politics that succeeded it and came to similar 
                                                             
1 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (1st 





conclusions. The interwar period was recalled as one that saw both the birth and death of 
popular liberal internationalism. It represented the last delirious gasp of liberal Britain before 
the plunge; before Britain’s imperial decline and the sentiment behind the creation of the 
welfare state diverted attention away from external affairs to the deserving problems at home. 
In this new less innocent age, the foreign policy making process might have been within the 
reach of those newly empowered citizens of the twentieth century, but few cared enough or 
saw little point in clasping it. If liberal internationalism was not dead already, it and its agents 
were old, doddery and best ignored. Any stories worth retelling belonged to their good old 
days long behind them, before the Second World War had proved them wrong.  
Of course, this is a romanticised version of events and one that in a study that begins 
in 1945 is naturally considered with some scepticism here. Nevertheless, it is a compelling 
version of events and one that is not without some elements of truth. Unsurprisingly then it 
has largely seized the popular and, as will be detailed here, the academic imagination. 
However, this thesis argues that liberal internationalism in Britain not only survived the 
Second World War, but was also significantly influential both among the foreign policy 
making elite and the general public. However, in order to show the extent of its purchase 
among these groups, it recognises the need to avoid a narrow focus on ‘the traditional 
apostolic succession of “great thinkers”’.2 It seeks to not just understand liberal international 
ideas, but also assess their impact. It thus analyses the activities of two of its most important 
advocates, Chatham House and the LNU’s successor, the United Nations Association (UNA). 
Both organisations sought to shape public and elite opinion. Both remained democratising 
agents after the Second World War, helping to extend debate over international affairs beyond 
                                                             
2 M. Freeden, Liberal Languages: Ideological Imaginations and Twentieth Century Progressive Thought 
(Pinceton NJ, 2005), 8. See also M. Freeden, The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford, 1978); 
P. Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats (Cambridge, 1978); P.F. Clarke, The Keynesian Revolution and its 
Economic Consequences (Cheltenham, 1998); Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, 





the confines of Whitehall, while retaining contacts within. Combined, the think-tank and the 
pressure group provide a valuable barometer of the changing fate of liberal internationalism.  
Nonetheless, although elite and popular liberal internationalism survived past 1945, it 
struggled to do so and in order to fully appreciate how, it is also necessary to assess the 
confines they and their fellow NGOs worked within. Chatham House and UNA’s impact upon 
the politics of foreign policy must also be understood in connection with the formal and 
informal political structures that restricted their attempts to democratise foreign policy; 
structures that promoted the illusory bifurcation of domestic and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, 
despite the problems that Chatham House and UNA endured in promoting international 
integration, this thesis will show that analysis of liberal internationalism, liberalism more 
generally and the limitations imposed upon them provides an integral dimension to the study 
of British postwar political culture.  
 
 
THE STRANGE SURVIVAL OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM 
Scholars have increasingly been putting to bed the argument made by George Dangerfield in 
his classic polemic The Strange Death of Liberal England; that British liberalism had 
effectively met its demise in 1914.3 It has been recognised that although the number of 
Liberal Party MPs certainly dwindled, liberal ideas had a long life past the First World War. 
Historians have demonstrated that there was ‘Liberalism without the Liberals’.4 Such 
historians have evaded the presumption that, contrary to other European countries, British 
politics was uniquely limited in its ideological scope and was essentially pragmatic. Ideas 
mattered and they operated beyond a simplistic two-party polarisation around a Labour-
                                                             
3 G. Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York NY, 1935). For an excellent, detailed 
analysis of the riposte, see E.H.H. Green and D.M. Tanner, ‘Introduction’ in E.H.H. Green and D.M. Tanner 
(eds.) The Strange Survival of Liberal England: Political Leaders, Moral Values and the Reception of Economic 
Debate (Cambridge, 2007). 
4 J. Campbell, ‘The Renewal of Liberalism: Liberalism without the Liberals’ in G. Peele and C. Cook, The 





Conservative paradigm.5  Recognising the reverberating distinction between classical 
liberalism (revisited in neoliberalism) and new liberalism (also known as social liberalism), 
many historians have revealed the impact that liberalism has had on British political, social 
and economic thought. They have traced liberalism’s reconciliation of individualism with 
collectivism through John Stuart Mill, the American Progressives, the Oxford and Scottish 
idealists and the socially orientated liberals at Cambridge.6  
However, much less attention has been paid to the impact made by new liberalism on 
international thought and activism, especially after 1945.7 This may be the result of the liberal 
contribution to international thought being, as Cecelia Lynch has argued, too often understood 
within the hegemonic theoretical framework of realism – to which Carr’s critique of interwar 
liberal internationalism significantly contributed – that ignored social agency in the founding 
of the United Nations. This in turn ‘reinforced theoretical tendencies that label social agency 
as “idealist” as opposed to “realist,” implying that it is dangerous, simplistically liberal, or 
unworthy of serious consideration’.8 Michael Freeden, who has done much to reveal the 
permeation of new liberalism through social democratic thought, quickly dismissed its 
contribution to international thought for it ‘simply extended their domestically focused 
                                                             
5 See Green and Tanner, ‘Introduction’, 1-2.  
6 Although large, this list is not exhaustive: M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age 
(London, 1964); P.F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971); Campbell, ‘The Renewal 
of Liberalism’; Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats; Freeden, The New Liberalism; S. Collini, Liberalism and 
Sociology (Cambridge, 1979); J. Harris, ‘Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual 
Framework for British Social Policy’, Past and Present, 135 (1992), 116-141; S. Pedersen and P. Mandler (eds.), 
After the Victorians: Private Conscience and Public Duty in Modern Britain (London, 1994); J. Harris, 
‘Labour’s Political and Social Thought’, in D. Tanner, P. Thane and N. Tiratsoo, Labour’s First Century 
(Cambridge, 2000); E.H.H. Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford, 2002), 42-71; H. Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England Since 1880 (Oxford, 2002), 
123-141; M. Carter, T.H. Green and the Development of Ethical Socialism (Exeter, 2003); D. Leighton, The 
Greenian Moment: T.H. Green, Religion and Political Argument in Victorian Britain (Exeter, 2004); S. 
Pedersen, Eleanor Rathbone and the Politics of Conscience (New Haven CT, 2004); Green and Tanner (eds.), 
The Strange Survival of Liberal England; W. Mander, British Idealism: A History (Oxford, 2011). 
7 See C. Lynch, Beyond Appeasement: Interpreting Interwar Peace Movements in World Politics (Ithaca NY, 
1999); J. Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Oxford, 2004); D. 
Long and P. Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years’ Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reassessed (Oxford, 1995); 
D. Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J.A. Hobson (Cambridge, 1996); 
C. Navari, Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century (London, 2000), ch.13; I. Hall, Dilemmas of 
Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945-1975 (Berkeley CA, 2012), esp. ch.4. 





concepts and analyses to the relations among peoples...here, as elsewhere, their unease and 
naïveté when confronted with the realities of political power were unmistakeable’.9 Donald S. 
Birn’s institutional history of the LNU sympathised with Carr’s observation that public 
opinion ‘was almost as often wrong-headed as it was impotent’.10 Birn faulted the Union for 
not equipping the British public during the 1930s with a ‘sober realistic perspective...They 
glossed over the League’s inadequacies and submerged all other considerations to building 
mass support.’11 One historian attributed the decline of British global power to the work of ‘a 
constellation of moralising internationalist cliques’.12 Liberal internationalism during the 
interwar period, exemplified in the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the Second 
World War, has been represented and understood as the inevitable failure of an 
embarrassingly childlike experiment. Its results were produced as the ultimate attestation of 
liberal naiveté and the rule that the twin forces of nationalism and power politics would 
inexorably continue to divide human society however hard individual citizens tried to counter 
them. The Second World War thus appears to constitute a natural end to the study of liberal 
internationalism.  
The British experience of the Cold War provided further testament. In those postwar 
international crises that received the greatest media and political attention, the United Nations 
often appeared to be sidelined as a sweet-natured but ultimately weak referee. Martin Ceadel 
in his seminal study of the British peace movement from 1854 to 1945 very rightly notes how 
the UNA struggled to sustain its membership amid the Cold War’s naked ‘realist’ power 
politics.13 So too does Helen McCarthy in her excellent monograph on the League movement 
                                                             
9 M. Freeden, Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939 (Oxford, 1989), 363-364. 
10 E.H. Carr quoted in D.S. Birn, The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford, 1981), 2. The full quotation 
is found in Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 38.  
11 Birn, The League of Nations Union, 229. 
12 Corelli Barnett quoted in Birn, The League of Nations Union, 226. 
13 M. Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854-1945 





in Britain, which also naturally ends in 1945. However, McCarthy concisely looks beyond 
1945 and credits UNA for remaining  
 
a centrist force in British politics and society, preserving a place for liberal-internationalist 
values in post-war associational life, albeit on a far less remarkable scale than in earlier 
times...Yet there can be no question that the UNA, like the League movement before it, 
belonged to and greatly enriched a pluralist, liberally orientated civil society in Britain.14  
 
The danger of presuming the weakness, even death, of liberal internationalism in 1945 
is that this important dimension of postwar democratic debate over British international policy 
is ignored. 1945 did not spell the end of liberal internationalism in Britain or of its adherents’ 
provision of participatory spaces to extend debate over foreign policy beyond Whitehall. 
Today UNA and Chatham House still live and breathe. As do the organisations that their staff 
helped form, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU).  
In the late 1930s, British liberal internationalist intellectuals and activists reacted 
swiftly to the evident collapse of the League of Nations. There was, however, one liberal 
internationalist group whose reaction was looked upon somewhat sceptically by senior 
members of the LNU. This group was enjoying the revival of a concept that had been 
substantially developed by new liberal thought, federalism. Historians have detailed how 
during the interwar period, many liberals who were disturbed by the worsening international 
situation and disappointed by the League’s inability to deal with it turned towards federalism 
for the answer. This was especially the case between 1938, amid the growing Sudeten Crisis, 
and 1940 when there was much talk of an Anglo-French union, even in Whitehall. In the 
summer of 1938 the pressure group Federal Union was formed and the following year would 
see the publication of Clarence Streit’s Union Now and Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s 
Europe Must Unite. Unsurprisingly, the federalists at Chatham House were highly involved. 
                                                             
14 H. McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and Internationalism, 





Three of the Institute’s principal founders, Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr and Arnold J. Toynbee 
were among Federal Union’s most senior intellectuals, along with the likes of Barbara 
Wooton, William Beveridge and Lionel Robbins. Kerr’s Burge Memorial Lecture in 1935 
Pacifism is not Enough, nor Patriotism Either, which argued national sovereignty led to 
international anarchy and war, was one of the Federal Union’s seminal texts and remains so 
today.15 Chatham House also established a study group to address the need to establish a 
European federal union and how it was to be formed. In the long run, the influence of these 
British federalists on British opinion was limited. However, their ideas on how a European 
federal union should be created and made to work had a highly significant impact upon 
intellectuals and policy makers on the continent where they were known as the ‘Anglo-Saxon 
Federalist School’.16 As will be shown throughout this thesis, Chatham House staff would 
continue to advocate that Britain take a leading role in a union of Western Europe long past 
1945. During and after the Second World War, British liberal international thought was alive 
and well. It even survived in the seemingly unlikeliest of places.  
Although the enduring legacy of The Twenty Years’ Crisis has helped to obscure the 
examination of liberal international thought past 1945, it would be unfair to portray its author 
as the bogeyman of this piece. His famous treatise written in 1939 did not represent the final 
maturation of his ideas. As Charles Jones writes, by 1945 Carr was ‘more optimistic, more 
                                                             
15 Ceadel, Semi-Detached Idealists, ch.11; R. Mayne and J. Pinder, Federal Union: The Pioneers, A History of 
Federal Union (London, 1990); A. Bosco, ‘Lothian, Curtis, Kimber and the Federal Union Movement (1938-
1940)’ Journal of Contemporary History, 23:3 (1988), 465-502; C. le Dreau, ‘Un européisme britannique 
conquérant: les tentatives d'implantation de la New Commonwealth Society et de Federal Union sur le continent 
(1938-1940)’, Les cahiers Irice, 1:1 (2008), 33-48; J. Pinder and A. Bosco (eds.), Pacifism is not Enough: 
Collected Lectures and Speeches of Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) (London, 1990); Federal Union, ‘Pacifism is not 
enough’, http://www.federalunion.org.uk/pacifism-is-not-enough/ (accessed 10 Apr 2015).  
16 See J. Pinder, ‘Federalism in Britain and Italy: Radicals and the English Liberal Tradition’ in P.M.R. Stirk 
(ed.), European Unity In Context: The Interwar Period (London, 1989); Bosco, ‘Lothian, Curtis, Kimber and the 
Federal Union Movement’; M. Burgess, The British Tradition of Federalism (London, 1995); L. Levi, ‘Alteiro 






elaborate and more liberal’.17 The apparent inevitability of war in 1939 did not entirely 
destroy Carr’s faith that one day – with the right safeguards, allowances for the power of 
nation-states and the adoption of a gradualist considered pace – international organisations 
could flourish and be beneficial. In his preface to the 1945 edition of The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis, Carr noted how his book was written to counteract ‘the almost total neglect of the 
factor of power’ that he understood had come to define both academic and popular thought in 
the interwar period. However, Carr believed that ‘[t]o-day this defect...has been to a 
considerable extent overcome’ and he had thus since departed from ‘a rather one-sided 
emphasis which no longer seems as necessary or appropriate today as it did in 1939’. 
Furthermore, ‘the main body of the book too readily and too complacently accepts the 
existing nation-state, large or small, as the unit of international society’. He went on to say 
that his book published that year Nationalism and After more accurately reflected his present 
views.18  
By means of examining such works, his wartime leaders for The Times and his 
experiences during the Second World War, including when he headed a study group on 
nationalism at Chatham House, Jones argues that Carr was a functionalist.19 In international 
relations, functionalism is aptly described through the work of another associate of Chatham 
House, David Mitrany. In 1943, Mitrany produced a pamphlet for the Institute entitled A 
Working Peace System, the thesis of which is best described as international integration 
“pieces by pieces”. Mitrany, who was highly influenced by the new liberal John A. Hobson, 
argued that nation-states should pool their sovereignty into international agencies to deal with 
transnational problems which any one of them could not deal with alone. He modelled this 
                                                             
17 C. Jones, ‘E.H. Carr Through Cold War Lenses: Nationalism, Large States and the Shaping of Opinion’ in A. 
Bosco and C. Navari (eds.), Chatham House and British Foreign Policy 1919-1945: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs During the Interwar Period (London, 1994), 178.  
18 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, x. See also E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London, 1945).  





process on Roosevelt’s “New Deal” in which he perceived each problem that it had 
encountered (such as unemployment or the collapse of the banking system) to have been 
treated separately as an issue in itself. The treatments (functions of the state) arose in an ad 
hoc fashion; no general theory or system of government was related to them. ‘Each function’, 
Mitrany wrote, ‘was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of 
organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of 
actual performance’.20 Similarly, Carr promoted the establishment of functional (technical) 
organisations. He understood them as a necessary counterweight to the caprice of the large 
nation states. He welcomed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and its 
successor the European Economic Community (EEC) in addition to supporting the 
continuation of the League’s technical organisations, including the International Labour 
Organisation.21 He also advocated the construction of an international structure for Keynesian 
macro-economic planning to address the root cause of war, the discord between the “haves” 
and the “have-nots”.22 As Jones observes, ‘it is striking to see the extent to which his vision of 
the future was realised in the international regime of managed liberalism which prevailed 
between 1945 and 1974’.23  
Ian Hall has revealed how liberal internationalism persisted in international thought 
past 1945. It was helped by the absence of many rivals on the scene.24 The collapse of the 
League of Nations did not induce a plethora of British intellectuals to trip over themselves to 
line up underneath the realist banner. The realist tradition, that Carr helped ignite, struggled to 
seize the imagination of British thinkers and practitioners until at least the mid-1960s. Carr, 
the most obvious candidate to champion a British school of realism had, as detailed above, 
                                                             
20 Quoted in Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, 78. On the influence of J.A. Hobson on David Mitrany, see Long, 
Towards a New Liberal Internationalism, 187-188. 
21 Jones, ‘E.H. Carr Through Cold War Lenses’, 172-173. 
22 Hall, Dilemmas of Decline, 81. 
23 Jones, ‘E.H. Carr Through Cold War Lenses’, 173. 





somewhat departed from The Twenty Years’ Crisis and retreated from the field of 
international relations to write his history of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, realism in Britain 
yielded a bitter taste that served as an uncomfortable reminder of the appeasement of Hitler. 
In the 1930s, both appeasement and totalitarian foreign policy had been labelled as ‘realist’.25 
Indeed in his famous revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Second World War, A.J.P. 
Taylor, one of the few British scholars in the period to come under realism’s spell, referred to 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis as ‘a brilliant argument in favour of appeasement’.26 Postwar liberal 
thought thus endured little competition and ‘remained by far the strongest tradition among 
British intellectuals until well into the 1960s’.27  
However, liberal internationalism did not simply persist for want of imagination 
among its rivals. In order to survive past the Second World War, it adjusted itself to 
contemporary international politics. In many ways it got wiser.28 As this thesis will 
demonstrate the change was apparent in the activities of both Chatham House and UNA. 
Functionalism, as promoted by Carr and Mitrany, emerged from the Second World War as 
one of the evolutionary changes to liberal international thought. It agreed with past liberal 
internationalism’s ends, but not its means.29 Functionalism met the disapproval of some of 
Chatham House’s old guard; not least Lionel Curtis who feared that the geological pace of 
integration would fail to actually bring about federalism. However, it did attract members of 
the new guard. Kenneth Younger was the Institute’s Director between 1959 and 1971. Like all 
of the postwar Directors, Younger, a former Labour Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was 
broadly liberal. Yet Younger’s conception of the pace of international integration had more in 
common with the functionalists than Curtis. To articulate his own position, he quoted the 
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second Secretary General of the United Nations Dag Hammarskjold’s response to the concept 
of world federalism:  
 
I think it is wise to avoid talking of this or that kind of ultimate political target and to realize 
that the development [of international organisation] is still in an early stage of institutional 
evolution...What seems imperative is to push forward institutionally and, eventually, 
constitutionally all along the line, guided by current needs and experiences, without 
preconceived ideas of the ultimate form.30 
 
Chatham House’s growing acceptance of functionalism also had important 
implications for its motivations to further democratise foreign policy and shape public 
opinion. Curtis argued that Britain’s political leaders should form and join a federal union of 
Western Europe post-haste and lead British public opinion with it.31 In contrast, 
‘functionalism announces itself publicly, yet also declares itself in some measure dependent 
on advance by stealth’.32 Younger argued for the necessity of instilling in the public the 
importance of keeping in mind a general objective – however ill-defined – of international 
integration.33 However, when integration proceeded at such a slow pace, reminding the public 
of the virtues of that general objective became highly difficult. One might also question the 
need to involve the public at all. If power over foreign policy could be kept in the hands of the 
elites, covert advances towards international integration were much more manageable. 
Younger’s functionalism retained the liberal paternalism of Curtis’s federalism. Both relied 
upon the abilities of elites to bring the public with them. Furthermore, confidence in 
functionalism rested upon the assumption that economic progress and greater international 
integration were indivisible. As Jones writes, functionalism thus ultimately depended upon 
faith in material progress and Keynesian macro-economic management. The end of the 
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postwar boom in the mid-1970s shattered that faith.34 It was no coincidence that one of 
functionalism’s principal critics was Friedrich Hayek who characterised Carr’s support for the 
Bretton Woods system as a compromise with his ‘realism’.35 
There were other important changes at Chatham House and UNA that came with 
important implications. The senior staff at Chatham House transferred their hopes for an 
imperial federation to a European one. UNA also underwent changes to its thinking, which 
departed it from its former (LNU) stance. It too adapted in recognition of the changing global 
order and Britain’s place within it. Whereas the League and the LNU did little to question or 
threaten British sovereignty, many within UNA immediately recognised that the spirit, if not 
the letter, of the UN Charter and soon after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
spelled out the end of empire. Having come to the conclusion sooner than much of public, the 
media, Westminster and Whitehall, UNA was presented with a problem as to how to convince 
these sections of opinion otherwise, while maintaining a mass membership.36 As McCarthy 
observes, the subsequent attention drawn to the British administration of its colonies, 
combined with immigration from the Commonwealth through the 1940s and 1950s, also 
drove many members of UNA to ponder the previously neglected question of race relations.37 
It shared this new interest with Chatham House whose Board of Studies on Race Relations 
created in 1952 later became the independent Institute of Race Relations in 1958. Toynbee 
would question the West’s assumed superiority over the “Rest”.38  
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Both organisations in the postwar period would also be dynamised by the sheer scale 
of what came under the purview of international affairs and the people involved. The contents 
of Chatham House’s postwar publications and the subjects of its lectures continued to provide 
testament to the ever quickening pace of globalisation. Adapting to the changing world 
around them, they explored further beyond questions of diplomacy and defence and 
scrutinised with greater fervour and frequency issues surrounding economics, race relations, 
humanitarianism, migration and the environment. The Institute thus provided politicians and 
civil servants with a valuable sounding board of broadly informed opinion. Opinion may not 
have been as diverse as some of the Institute’s challengers both from within and outside 
would have liked, but it did reflect the growing number of Britain’s unofficial diplomats who 
took the guise of academics, businesspeople and the staff of NGOs. Ideas voiced and sourced 
at the Institute were referenced in parliament and the press; some even elicited the interest of 
party research departments and Whitehall. Furthermore, with Britain’s days of gunboat 
diplomacy well and truly behind it, Chatham House became a valuable channel for the 
Foreign Office to exercise soft power, one which entertained foreign dignitaries and organised 
international academic exchanges with friend and foe alike.  
For UNA the multiplicity of issues that could now be considered international was 
both a blessing and a curse. The proliferation of international agencies developed to realise 
the UN’s ambitious mission of promoting ‘social progress and better standards of life in larger 
freedom’ announced in the UN Charter’s Preamble, enabled UNA to diversify the range of its 
campaigns.39 This was especially important when Cold War realpolitik appeared to be 
sidelining the UN’s impact on international politics. In the early 1950s, UNA discovered for 
itself the huge public appetite for humanitarian causes when it coordinated the British 
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responses to the work of UN agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
However, there was considerable concern within UNA, from the local branches up, that too 
much focus on humanitarian relief diverted the Association and the public away from the 
underlying international political problems that prevented workable long-term solutions for 
which the UN, however debilitated it was with the mutual antagonism of the superpowers, 
still provided the best hope.  
While international affairs grew ever more relevant to the everyday lives of citizens, 
UNA continued to attempt to democratise foreign policy. It put great effort into the 
celebration of UN Day and coordinated support from a variety of civil organisations and trade 
unions. It pressured the press to give greater coverage to the UN and international affairs in 
general and grappled with the new powerful medium of television. During general election 
campaigns, its branches organised all-party meetings in their constituencies in which 
parliamentary candidates were provided a platform to debate foreign policy. Ministers and 
civil servants received UNA deputations and took them into their confidence. Furthermore, 
UNA may have struggled to attract the number of young people it desired – and indeed 
needed to maintain its influence – but its United Nations Student Association (UNSA) 
became the largest student body outside of the National Union of Students. Just as it is unwise 
to preach the strange death of liberalism in 1914, so it is to assume that liberal 
internationalism departed Britain with the collapse of the League of Nations.  
 
 
LOUD AND QUIET ACTORS 
On the other hand, the postwar march of liberal internationalism was hardly triumphal. By the 
1970s, both Chatham House and UNA were incurring large budget deficits and thus, to their 





reach the heights of popularity its predecessor secured. It reached its zenith in 1948 when its 
membership briefly stood at 87,969 and its branches numbered 805. In 1931 the LNU peaked 
with 406,868 members and 3,036 branches.40 The UNA made its last attempt to reach its 
desired target of 100,000 members in the late 1960s, but it failed and the Association rapidly 
lost members through the 1970s. In 1976, UNA’s total membership stood at 24,754.41 By 
1988, it had been further reduced to approximately 11,000.42  
In 1973, eighteen years after Lionel Curtis’s death, Britain finally became a member 
of the EEC and the public voted to remain so in 1975. In those eighteen years, Chatham 
House staff had worked hard to inform elite and public opinion of the benefits to be gained 
from EEC membership. However, politicians presented membership to the public as an 
economic necessity that would be accompanied by renewed strategic benefits. It was not an 
impassioned positive appeal to further the internationalist cause. Britain was to join the 
common market, not a federal United States of Europe. Much of the public were largely 
ignorant of what membership entailed and public sentiment in favour of membership rapidly 
declined after the referendum. During the 1983 general election campaign, Labour’s 
manifesto promised to remove Britain from the EEC and in 1988 Margaret Thatcher, the 
leader of the party that had brought Britain into the EEC, delivered her famous speech in 
Bruges rejecting participation in the European exchange rate mechanism.43 Today the F-word 
still remains a dirty word.  
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The rise of neoliberalism that revisited the classical liberalism, which new liberals had 
struggled successfully to transform, caused further alarm among liberal internationalists due 
to its breakup of the Bretton Woods system and the rejection of Keynesian international 
macro-economic controls. The economist Andrew Shonfield, a great defender of 
Keynesianism and Chatham House’s Director between 1971 and 1977, lamented the 
infiltration of the new doctrines that appeared to be gaining consensus among Western 
governments of both Left and Right well before Thatcher had entered stage right.  Shonfield 
was left bewildered as ‘international independence grows while the notion of international 
management of the world economy moves into disrepute’. A new mood was established in the 
West ‘which expresses the conviction that there must be some remediable defect in a system 
which makes “us”, whoever we are, quite so dependent on the views and actions of 
foreigners’. Shonfield and his fellow liberal internationalists saw no such defect. Allies of the 
welfare state, both Left and Right, had neglected its basis in international coordination. 
Shonfield argued:  
 
There is either a way forward towards greater international co-ordination of the day-to-day 
management of our economic affairs, that is of macro-economic policy, or a decisive move 
backwards towards the dismantling of the welfare state and of its concomitant in Western 
society – the mixed economy.44    
 
Worse still for the liberal internationalist cause was the rise of a rival ideology that 
preceded that of neoliberalism and had plenty to say on international affairs, the New Left. 
When seeking to explore British attitudes to international affairs in the postwar period and its 
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impact upon British political culture, scholars have naturally gravitated towards examining 
new social movements, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). CND is of 
special interest, because not only did it result from international tensions but also from the 
rejection of orthodoxies within the labour movement and in this they provided an important 
embodiment of the New Left. Another reason why the CND earns the attention of scholars is 
the same reason why they troubled UNA. They made a lot of noise. CND was highly 
accomplished at drawing attention to itself and its simple, singular message: the need for 
unilateral nuclear disarmament. It did this by developing new political spaces beyond 
Westminster. This reinvigoration of political participation was especially attractive to the 
growing young middle class, a demographic that UNA was relying upon for its long-term 
retention of a mass membership. To exacerbate matters further, CND was also capable of 
drawing widely across the ideological spectrum, from pacifists, practitioners of Gandhian 
non-violent direct action, international socialists, and indeed liberal internationalists such as 
Bertrand Russell.45  
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It was not that UNA disagreed with the aims of CND or indeed that of other new 
social movements, or the New Left. UNA campaigned against anti-apartheid, the Vietnam 
War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, just like CND, UNA wished to 
democratise foreign policy. Its disagreement lay with method. In line with much liberal 
thought, UNA wished to democratise foreign policy through existing – parliamentary – 
institutions and did not wish to risk its all-party status and insider privileges within Whitehall. 
They wished to educate citizens so that they would make an informed decision in the “proper” 
place to exercise one’s democratic rights (and responsibility), at the ballot box. Similarly, at 
an international level, they were obviously wedded to the UN that sought to institutionalise 
moral and democratic diplomacy. Unilateral disarmament, unlike multilateral disarmament, 
was understood to pay insufficient attention to the UN. The liberal faith in institutions was 
alive and well, while the New Left distrusted centres of power and interest.  
Furthermore, the majority within UNA understood CND and the New Left’s concept 
of positive neutralism as lacking in a serious analysis of international politics. New Left 
thinkers argued that Britain should equalise its relations with the Cold War superpowers and 
take moral leadership; unilaterally disarm, leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) and support the developing world’s resistance to neocolonialism.46 For UNA this 
was a dangerous example of non-sequitur logic that inflated British influence, bypassed the 
UN – thereby encouraging precarious power politics – and if implemented would help tip the 
balance of power against the West and make a global nuclear war more likely; the devastation 
of which had no respect for artificial borders however neutral those behind them professed to 
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be.47 The UNA’s General Council, made up of representatives from UNA branches and 
corporate subscribers, thus voted in favour of banning CND from corporate membership. 
However, individual membership was allowed. There were UNA members who belonged to 
CND.  
But why should historians, who quite rightly examine the CND, a loud, muscular 
social movement that helped define the ‘long sixties’, also pay attention to UNA, a quiet, 
dwindling organisation whose best days were behind it in the thirties, before it was even 
born? Or for that matter, why should they pay attention to Chatham House, another quiet actor 
whose broadly liberal outlook appears to have inspired little public enthusiasm even if the 
think-tank had chosen to directly engage with the general public? Neither the LNU nor 
Chatham House were included in A.J.P. Taylor’s time-honoured 1956 Ford Lectures that 
chronicled British foreign policy’s dissenters between the French Revolution and the Second 
World War.48 The LNU and Toynbee were considered by Taylor to be ‘the high-minded, not 
the Dissenters...heirs of Gladstone maybe, but certainly not of Bright, still less of the 
Chartists’.49 Toynbee was one of those ‘men who knew their way to the Athenaeum, not to 
the derelict premises of the 1917 Club’.50 For Taylor, who was uncomfortable with his own 
membership of the Athenaeum, being part of the ‘Establishment’ disqualified one from being 
a ‘trouble maker’.51  
Historians since have made similar assumptions. Studies of the postwar British peace 
movement have focussed their attention on those actors who were understood to operate 
outside of the establishment. When reference has been made to UNA and liberal 
internationalists, scholars have tended to treat them as one of the ‘minority sects’ of the 
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British peace movement.52 When they have conceded that postwar liberal internationalists did 
exist, often reference has only been made to compare them unfavourably with their interwar 
antecedents. ‘It is sobering to note’, observed Peter van den Dungen (in a parenthesis), ‘the 
insignificant role played in today’s Peace Movement by the United Nations Association 
compared with that of its counterpart of the interwar period, the LNU.’53  
More broadly, since when did quiet actors bring about meaningful change? In an 
extremely valuable work, Geoff Eley informs us: ‘Let there be no mistake: democracy is not 
“given” or “granted.” It requires conflict, namely, courageous challenges to authority, risk-
taking and reckless exemplary acts, ethical witnessing, violent confrontations, and general 
crises in which the given socio-political order breaks down.’54 None of these descriptions can 
be neatly applied to either UNA or Chatham House whose programme of democratisation 
involved educating elites and public alike so that they might be better equipped to make the 
“right” decision within the existing socio-political order. Eley’s forgers of democracy belong 
to the Left, not the Centre. A number of scholarly works give the impression that socialism 
monopolised concern for socio-political justice. Those liberal and conservative thinkers and 
policy-makers – and their supporters – who did concern themselves with such injustices, are 
treated briefly or their motivations are dismissed as mere attempts to offset the rise of 
socialism rather than being derived from any sense of ideological conviction.55 So, again, why 
should historians pay attention to such quiet and centrist actors as Chatham House and UNA? 
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Rightly or wrongly, Chatham House and UNA would have disagreed with Eley. For 
them, consensus, rarely conflict, brought about effective change. The two organisations 
belonged to Arthur Marwick’s middle opinion that during the 1930s shored up cross-party 
support for collective security abroad and collectivism at home.56 They continued to play this 
role after the war, attempting to establish a hegemony of thought by means of building 
consensus and normalising internationalism. They were also supporters and often 
beneficiaries of Harold Perkin’s rising professional society.57 Indeed the founders of Chatham 
House, with the exception of Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), were the sons of the rising 
professional classes. Consistent with its roots in Oxford idealism and new liberalism, 
Chatham House was also unconvinced of the merits of social conflict to enact change and the 
use of class as an analytic category in foreign policy.58 This separated them from its 
contemporary the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), one of A.J.P. Taylor’s ‘trouble 
makers’.59 Chatham House ‘believed in the essential soundness of established society’.60 This 
had benefits. Firstly, it strengthened the Institute’s claim to impartiality and thus in turn its 
intellectual legitimacy. Secondly, it enabled the Institute to act as an insider group; it had 
access to Whitehall and maintained strong contacts within it. In 1965, D.C. Watt, a previous 
employee of the Institute, identified Chatham House as one of the foreign policy ‘unofficial 
elite’ that was able to exchange views with and receive privileged information from the 
‘official elite’, a small tight group consisting only of senior officials in the Foreign Office and 
of other relevant departments, senior officers of the armed services and their intelligence 
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staffs, members of government and leading members of the Opposition.61 However, this did 
not make Chatham House the state’s stooge. Indeed its existence rested upon its independence 
from government. Its role was, as Cornelia Navari observes, ‘the counter-establishment within 
the establishment, the keeper of its conscience and a critic from within.’62 This was not a 
position the UDC could enjoy.63  
Helen McCarthy has demonstrated the same strategy was apparent in the LNU that, 
despite Taylor’s neglect, provided ‘the respectable face of troublemaking’. ‘By cultivating 
allies in the political parties, peace societies, churches, schools and an array of civic 
associations, the League’s champions in Britain mobilised broad sections of the population in 
support of a collective system of international relations.’64 UNA continued the same strategy 
and reaped the same rewards. Writing in 1976, William Wallace, Chatham House’s Director 
of Studies 1978-1990, noted that since D.C. Watt’s categorisation of the foreign policy elite, 
the number and variety of informed and influential participants in foreign policy debates had 
expanded significantly to include not only the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial elite’, but also the 
UNA’s policy advisory committees and other respected voluntary bodies, businesspeople, 
university academics and research institutes.65  As this thesis will show, UNA enjoyed close 
contact with Whitehall and senior politicians throughout the period.  
UNA’s largely uncontroversial support for multilateral nuclear disarmament, for 
instance, also enabled it to draw on a large section of opinion. During CND’s first wave 
(1957-1963), 16 Gallup Polls were conducted to ascertain support for nuclear disarmament, 
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especially unilateral disarmament.66 The highest level of support that unilateral disarmament 
ever received was 33% in May 1960.67 In August 1959, on the one occasion in which pollsters 
included both a specific option for multilateral disarmament and another to not disarm, 49% 
supported UNA’s multilateral policy and 11% supported CND’s unilateral policy.68 
Furthermore, although UNA’s membership is usually compared unfavourably with its 
predecessor the LNU, a more synchronic comparison with the CND, as shown in figure 1.1, 
demonstrates that it was still capable of mobilising significant opinion and at a comparable 
scale. Unfortunately, there are no records of CND membership before 1967 and so CND’s 
first wave is neglected. However, CND’s estimated peak membership of 100,000, reached 
briefly in 1984, was not significantly higher than that of the UNA peak membership of 87,969 
in 1948.69 Figure 1.2 displays the two organisations’ visibility within a range of newspapers 
and again reveals their comparability. Both graphs are, of course, crude illustrations. 
However, they do demonstrate that UNA’s ability to reach out to public opinion should not be 
underestimated and should not be obscured by either the LNU or CND. 
Nevertheless, both graphs also indicate that liberal internationalism was losing its 
popular purchase. However, even amid CND’s rise in popularity during its second wave 
(1980-1989), its historian and activist Richard Taylor, was worried. 
 
The persistent and fundamental problem of the movement since its inception has been its 
inability to translate its undoubted popular appeal into real, tangible achievement. Although 
the movement has had a very considerable impact upon public opinion, and thus, arguably, 
indirectly upon formal political structures and policies, it is quite clear that its central  
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Figure 1.1. Total individual membership of UNA and CND, 1945-1988. 
Source: UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports, 1945-1976; ‘Landfall, windfall or awful for the UNA?’, The Guardian, 10 
Apr 1982, 11; Lord Ennals, ‘The United Nations Association: The People’s Voice’ in E. Jensen and T. Fisher (eds.), The 
United Kingdom – the United Nations (Basingstoke, 1990), 265; NGO UK, ‘Figures from A History of NGOs in Britain: 
Chapter 4, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’, 
http://www.ngo.bham.ac.uk/appendix/Campaign_for_Nuclear_Disarmament.htm (accessed 22 May 2015). 
Figure 1.2. Total number of mentions received by UNA and CND in a range of newspapers, 1945-
1975. 























































































































































objectives have not been achieved...The problem then is essentially political: how to articulate 
with effect the peace movement's dynamism and strength.70  
 
It was one thing to gain public support, it was quite another to actually fulfil central 
objectives. UNA shared the same problem. UNA had a comparably large membership to 
CND, had extensive contacts within Westminster and Whitehall and was arguing for a much 
less controversial foreign policy that garnered support form a broader section of opinion. 
Even though there was a declining faith in the UN’s effectiveness, Gallup Polls consistently 
observed popular acceptance of the necessity of the UN’s existence and of ensuring its 
success.71 Yet the UN did not become the central component of British foreign policy. The 
UNA’s old hands knew the problem well. In June 1935 the results of the LNU’s Peace Ballot 
were published, in which an estimated 38% of the UK population over 18 had taken part, the 
vast majority of which supported the League of Nations.72 Six months later, it was followed 
by the Hoare-Laval Pact. Perhaps the staff at Chatham House had the right idea to focus on 
educating elites so that they would voluntarily bring about international integration, bringing 
the public with them. Britain did enter the EEC and Chatham House staff helped. But rapidly 
after the referendum in 1975, the public grew hostile to EEC membership, helped to hold 
Britain back from playing a leading role and perhaps one day soon the public may even force 
a British withdrawal.73  
How do you square ideals with a democratic foreign policy? Richard Taylor was right, 
the problem was political, but both “high” and “low”. Neither was the problem restricted to 
NGOs concerned with international affairs. NGO influence has always had to coincide with 
other factors. Popular campaigns were not enough. They also required ‘willing backbench 
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champions, an accommodating government, and a broader social acceptance of the need for 
reform’.74 Nicholas Crowson reveals how homelessness NGOs helped frame the debate from 
which the 1977 Housing Act arose, and were even in consultation with the civil service during 
its drafting. However, ultimately they had little power to bear on the creation and amendment 
of the legislation, which rested in the hands of political players within Westminster and 
Whitehall.  Crowson concludes that some of pressure groups’ limitations are self-imposed; 
they have flaws. But some limitations are structural.75 This was where Richard Taylor was 
closest to the nub of the problem as to how NGOs could influence foreign policy, but it went 
beyond the need for effective articulation. Crucially, the problem was also structural.  
In order to fully appreciate the postwar denouement of liberal internationalism, it is 
necessary to concurrently establish the extent of the democratisation of British foreign policy. 
We must understand the extent to which formal and informal structures prevented foreign 
policy innovation beyond the corridors of power. We must assess the politics of foreign 
policy. For this purpose, the combined activities of Chatham House and UNA represent a 
valuable analytical framework. The higher echelons of each body were part of the elite and 
had influence and insider insights on the formulation of foreign policy. UNA educated the 
public directly, held a mass membership and sought to secure it by making itself and the UN 
as visible as possible. Chatham House largely only reached out to the public indirectly, but it 
also debated whether it should try to reach out directly and over the problems inherent with 
such a policy.  Both bodies were also naturally aware of the interdependence of domestic and 
international policy. Indeed it largely fuelled their desire for international integration. Both 
were very well versed in international thought and policy. Chatham House, of course, needed 
to be in order to earn its daily bread. However, UNA also commanded a wide-ranging 
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understanding of international affairs through its policy committees – containing thinkers and 
practitioners alike – and through the attention it paid to the expansive activities of the UN.  
Subsequently both Chatham House and UNA were well-equipped to comment and 
propose alternative foreign policy. Arguably, this was not an area in which the postwar 
radicals, among them the New Left and CND, excelled. ‘Like [A.J.P.] Taylor’s dissenters’, 
Ian Hall writes, ‘they were united in a nagging sense that in an ideal world foreign policy 
would not be necessary. As a consequence, they devoted little time to setting out exactly what 
they would have preferred.’76  As a historian of CND and its equivalent West German protest 
movements concludes, ‘[t]heir internationalist rhetoric was...part of their reinterpretation of 
national identity, rather than an expression of idealist internationalism.’77 In contrast, 
Chatham House and UNA not only had a deep idealist internationalist motivation to 
understand the foreign policy process, but due to the insider status afforded to them as a result 
of their quiet respectability, they played a part in it, or at the very least had ringside seats.  
 
 
THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
Postwar Chatham House and UNA have received very little scholarly attention. However, the 
literature that exists on the two organisations before the Second World War is a valuable 
resource in informing their postwar direction. Furthermore, many of the same people 
remained active within the organisations long past the war had ended. Old hands at Chatham 
House, such as Lionel Curtis, Waldorf Astor, Arnold J. Toynbee and Ivison Macadam played 
important roles within the Institute into the 1950s. Some of the LNU’s old hands such as 
Kathleen Courtney and Phillip Noel-Baker remained active in the 1960s and 1970s.  
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 Despite the fact that Chatham House receives mentions in many international histories 
and within numerous biographies and memoirs of policy makers, no institutional history 
exists beyond two brief official accounts. The first was written in 1937 by one of the 
Institute’s Councillors and future founder of the Hansard Society, Stephen King-Hall. The 
second was written by the Institute’s Professor of Commonwealth Relations Charles 
Carrington in 1959 and was later updated by the deputy librarian Mary Bone in 2004. Both 
works provide useful outlines of some of the changes at the Institute and the motivations 
behind them. Being brief, however, they are lacking in detail; being official, they are naturally 
somewhat self-congratulatory.78 The closest works on Chatham House to represent a detailed 
institutional history are a collection of essays brought together by Andrea Bosco and Cornelia 
Navari concerning the Institute’s influence and thinking on British foreign policy between 
1919 and 1945 and Inderjeet Parmar’s comparative account of Chatham House with its 
American sister institute the Council for Foreign Relations (CFR).  The former is a highly 
valuable collection detailing the origins of the Institute, its attitudes to aspects of foreign 
policy and the role played by its protagonists in establishing the Institute and shaping the field 
of international relations.79 Parmar’s insightful account reveals the important role played by 
Chatham House in helping to improve Anglo-American relations during the Second World 
War, noting the influence of a wartime section of Chatham House seconded to the Foreign 
Office, the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) later made the Foreign Office 
Research Department (FORD).80 
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 In addition to these works there have also been a variety of essays, chapters and 
articles written, further detailing its origins, research and its role as an unofficial diplomat.81 
There have also been articles produced in anniversary issues of the Institute’s regular 
publications that provide general histories written by the Institute’s staff.82 The extent to 
which the Institute influenced the Foreign Office provides a consistent theme within much of 
the literature. Indeed this issue occupies the most famous essay Elie Kedourie’s ‘The 
Chatham House Version’ in which Kedourie argued that the Institute, especially Toynbee, 
largely influenced the Foreign Office’s Middle Eastern policy.83 Chatham House has also 
been included in analyses of the influence of think-tanks on foreign policy formulation.84 Few 
works comment on the Institute past 1945.85 It is worthy of note that all four of the works that 
have concertedly done so have been written within the past ten years and three of them relate 
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to unofficial diplomacy. This may be a result of increasing interest in transnationalism among 
scholars, enabling new appreciation of alternative avenues of influence beyond the impact the 
Institute’s work made on the formulation of foreign policy at the Foreign Office.86  
 There are only two brief works written on UNA. Both are written by former staff 
members of the Association. The first was written by David Ennals, Secretary of the UNA 
1953-1957, in an edited collection concerned with the British relationship with the UN. It 
provides a whistle-stop tour of the body’s campaigns and tribulations and praises the UNA for 
playing a ‘vital role’, out of proportion to its total membership and income, in sustaining 
support for the UN among large sections of public opinion.87 The second work, a booklet 
written by Frank Field, Director of UNA 1973-1976, is a largely promotional piece written for 
the Association’s sixtieth anniversary in 2006. It again details some of UNA’s principal 
campaigns and provides some personal insights on some of its leading protagonists at the 
national level. Field concludes that although the previous sixty years could not be described 
as ‘glorious’, in them the Association had shown ‘a greater grasp of issues and a greater 
vision than have successive governments’.88 Again far more work has been done on the 
UNA’s pre-1945 form, the LNU.  
There are three principal works concerned with the LNU. The first is Donald Birn’s 
institutional history published in 1981, which is largely placed within the analytical 
framework of interwar foreign policy debates, namely rearmament and appeasement. The 
volume focuses on the LNU’s executive and their relations with senior individuals within 
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Whitehall and Westminster.89  The LNU also features prominently in Martin Ceadel’s study 
of the British peace movement, in which Ceadel casts his net a little further to assess the role 
played by the LNU on international thought as well as on policy.90 The third work is that of 
Helen McCarthy’s on the League movement. McCarthy broadens the empirical base further, 
and examines the LNU’s impact upon interwar political culture at both a local and national 
level. It mainly departs from foreign policy debates and instead examines the LNU as part of 
the transformation of political life in the wake of the extended franchise. It thus provides an 
especially valuable analysis of the manner in which the LNU opened up new participatory 
spaces and helped democratise foreign policy.91   
For those desiring to assess the structures inherent in the foreign policy process in 
order to more definitely assess the extent of such democratisation, there are a number of 
works largely produced by international historians, political scientists and international 
relations scholars. D.C. Watt’s aforementioned essay on elites and Paul Kennedy’s Realities 
of Diplomacy have shown the variety of actors involved in the formulation of foreign policy 
in addition to the diplomats and government ministers.92 These works have been recently 
revisited and the broader influences on foreign policy have been explored by examining the 
wider circles in which its policy makers mixed.93 Further attention has been paid to 
deconstructing the assumptions, perceptions and symbolic practices of diplomats, especially 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century enhancing existing useful histories of the 
Foreign Office.94 Other studies have explored the erosion of the Foreign Office’s stranglehold 
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over foreign policy in the twentieth century.95 Less, but important, attention has been paid to 
the impact of public opinion and the mechanics of the party political machine on British 
foreign policy.96 The increasing number of influences on foreign policy makers being 
discovered by such works has challenged old debates over the primacy of foreign or domestic 
policy, especially when transposed on the twentieth century.97  
Of course, the work of political scientists and international relations scholars have also 
made highly valuable contributions to the study of foreign policy processes and these will be 
referred to frequently throughout the thesis. Tellingly, a number of these works were 
produced by associates of Chatham House and lamented how formal and informal structures 
hindered public engagement with international affairs in Britain and made the task of 
democratising foreign policy especially difficult.98 Overall, although little has been written on 
Chatham House, UNA and their impact upon the politics of foreign policy after 1945, the 
works above provide firm foundations.  
 
 
SQUARING THE CIRCLE 
Combining Chatham House, UNA and the broader politics of foreign policy into one analytic 
framework inevitably necessitates some reflection upon the methodological and conceptual 
challenges. Chatham House and UNA are brought together in this work for their broadly 
liberal internationalist agenda, and their shared origins, networks and methods. They shared 
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similar concerns over the visibility of and engagement with international affairs within Britain 
among elites and the public. They also shared similar problems attracting new members and 
in relation to finances. Despite there being important distinctions between the two 
organisations, they had much in common.  
Of course, the most obvious distinction was that Chatham House was a think-tank 
with a limited membership and UNA was a pressure group with a mass membership. 
However, there is a danger even here in distinguishing the two in such categories. Definitions 
of both categories have changed significantly over time, reflecting the changing nature of the 
activities and reach of non-state actors.99 Furthermore, as will become apparent in chapter 
two, there were a number within UNA who were uncomfortable with being described as a 
‘pressure group’. This thesis thus avoids detailed, potentially exclusionary, definitions of the 
two categories to avoid conceptual entanglements down the line and clouding the 
commonalities between Chatham House and UNA, and those they shared with other non-state 
actors. Instead the two organisations are both considered here under the umbrella term of 
NGO. To avoid even further complications, this thesis adopts the minimal definition of NGOs 
provided by the Database of Archives of UK Non-Governmental Organisations which reads 
as follows: ‘An NGO is a non-violent organisation that is both independent of government 
and not serving an immediate economic interest, with at least some interest in having socio-
political influence.’100 This definition is appropriate for both Chatham House and UNA.  
 The issue of independence ought to also be addressed. This is not so much the case 
with regards to the two organisations’ relations with government. Chapter three will show that 
they both were sufficiently independent of government to earn non-governmental status. 
Rather the issue of independence should be addressed in relation to the party political 
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persuasion of both NGOs. Although Chatham House and UNA were (and are) all-party 
organisations, they adopt a broadly liberal, centrist outlook. It is important to especially 
emphasise this with regards to Chatham House. Diane Stone rightly notes in relation to both 
Chatham House and CFR that after the Second World War, ‘although an epistemic 
community did exist, it was diluted or dissolved by competing paradigms as the number of 
participants in the study and practice of international relations increased’.101 Some basic 
positions were not universally held. For example, the aforementioned Charles Carrington was 
a prominent critic of European integration.102 However, although Chatham House did not 
possess the same ideological cohesiveness as it had done during the interwar period, it 
remained fundamentally internationalist and the direction of its executive was liberal 
internationalist. As Ian Hall observes, the Directors who replaced the old guard, Christopher 
Montague Woodhouse (1955-1959) and Kenneth Younger (1959-1971) were both broadly 
liberal.103 Younger’s successor, Andrew Shonfield (1971-1977), can be added to the list as 
could his successor David Watt (1978-1983).104 The first three had also held the position of 
Director of Studies and thus managed the Institute’s research agenda. Importantly, all of the 
above were strong supporters of Britain joining the EEC.  
 Nevertheless, although both UNA and Chatham House had a broadly liberal, centrist 
outlook, it should be made clear that that does not necessarily mean that they were aligned to 
the Liberal Party. Both organisations held supporters of the Labour, Liberal and Conservative 
parties. Nor should it be understood that liberal internationalists who belonged to either the 
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Labour or Conservative parties were necessarily less committed to its tenets than supporters 
of the Liberal Party, or indeed less politically motivated to be seen to be. The results of 
general elections under the first-past-the-post electoral system offer crude reflections of the 
breadth of the British ideological spectrum on which liberal internationalism appealed widely 
across the centre ground. It should not be assumed either that Chatham House did not offer a 
platform or membership to non-liberal internationalists; to have not done so would have been 
decidedly illiberal. To avoid confusion, unless rendered otherwise within quotations, the 
Liberal Party and its politicians are referred to here with a capital ‘L’, whereas the philosophy 
of liberalism and its values are referred to with a small ‘l’.  
 The assessment of impact and its relation to source material also needs addressing. 
This thesis abides with the assumption that in order to fully appreciate the reach of non-state 
actors in foreign policy, it is necessary to assess the extent of its democratisation. Not only 
was the democratisation of foreign policy in itself an aspiration of many liberal 
internationalists, but in an entirely interrelated fashion, the less democratised foreign policy 
was, the less influence non-state actors had as their avenues of influence through the 
electorate, through the media and through parliament became restricted. Democratisation is 
understood here to be in a state of constant flux. It is not enough to have accountability and 
transparency; there must also be willing participation and knowledge to maintain both. 
Apathy hinders democratisation.  Subsequently, it is important to assess structures – both 
formal and informal – that often discouraged accountability, transparency, interest and 
knowledge in international affairs. However, Susan Pedersen demonstrates how the methods 
and approaches used by both high political and new political historians do not lend 
themselves readily to ‘serious study of what we call governance or rule – of the structure, 
reach and practices and the state’. The focus paid by both schools of thought on the language 





surroundings can divert attention away from how structures, which formed part of those 
surroundings, helped instruct that meaning, and how structures ultimately achieved or stunted 
certain ends. This is not to say that the focus on language, which in part results from the 
highly beneficial linguistic turn, is unfruitful, quite the contrary.105 It would be crudely 
instrumentalist to suggest that UNA or Chatham House – or indeed CND – were wholly 
unsuccessful merely because they had not achieved their ends in changing aspects of foreign 
policy. The meaning actors attached to these organisations helped shape political culture and 
the structures that existed within it. However, by analysing such meaning in relation to 
structures (not all of which are necessarily erected by the state), this thesis aims to be able to 
more definitely assess the reach of Chatham House and UNA, and the impact they made 
within their confines.  
 Subsequently, this thesis has its empirical basis not just in the comprehensive archives 
of both Chatham House and UNA and private papers of those associated with the 
organisations. It is also based in the archives of those institutions that erected the structures 
that helped determine the politics of foreign policy. As Rodney Lowe writes in relation to the 
records of government, which has likely erected the largest collection of those structures, their 
sheer scope represents an important resource for attaining a balanced analysis of impact.  
 
The great advantage of government records – properly used – is that, in their fullness, they 
reveal not only the complete range of influences to which government was subjected at any 
given time but also what did not change. They permit in other words, greater contextualisation 
and balance...a vital counterweight to an inherent danger in all contemporary history: the 
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‘tyranny’ of relevance or the seeking – and recognition – in the past only that which is 
relevant to the present.106  
 
 This thesis seeks to avoid exaggerating the purchase of liberal internationalism or a 
simplistic narrative of decline. It also seeks to gain an understanding of the politics of foreign 
policy with further implications for the study of British politics more generally. Subsequently, 
it refers to the records of government, parliament, political party headquarters, psephological 
and social research organisations, media outlets and trade unions. This work also draws upon 
contemporary publications by political scientists, sociologists, international relations scholars, 
educational scientists and economists. By approaching the topic with a breadth of sources, the 
thesis seeks to better recognise and challenge the implicit assumptions made within these 
epistemic communities (in addition to mine own assumptions) and gain a more secure 
understanding of what is not recorded. Committee minutes often gloss over controversy; 
important decisions are often made where there are no records; public announcements are 
sanitised; and no historical subject’s views can be representative of all opinion and neither can 
they enjoy complete cognisance of their surroundings. Of course, no historian can be truly 
objective nor hope to ever fill in all of the pieces of the jigsaw. However, developments in 
research practices resulting from digitisation and internet resources, although certainly not 
without their own methodological problems, enable the twenty-first century historian to 
explore their topic not just in-depth but with a greater breadth than has been possible 
before.107 
  Finally, problems arise relating to periodisation in a work that examines organisations 
midway through their lives. The period examined here is circa 1945 to 1975. The operative 
word here is ‘circa’. This is especially the case with Chatham House. Although UNA was for 
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all intents and purposes the continuation of the LNU, there were significant differences 
between the two organisations they promoted, the League and the UN. This impacted upon 
UNA’s activities and thus the founding of the UN in 1945 provides a reasonably neat 
chronological break. The year 1945 also saw the end of a Chatham House section’s 
secondment to the Foreign Office. However, in order to contextualise the Institute’s 
relationship with the public, political parties and of course Whitehall, it is necessary to look 
back into the Second World War. In the interests of further contextualisation, the second 
chapter also provides a brief account of the intellectual origins of Chatham House and the 
LNU/UNA.  
The year 1975 has been chosen as this study’s end as it was the mid-point in a decade 
in which it was highly apparent that liberal internationalism was under threat. In 1971 the 
Bretton Woods system came to an ignoble end with the Nixon Shock. The Oil Crisis (1973-
1974) signalled the end of US economic hegemony and the depth of economic globalisation. 
However, the reaction was not Keynesian macro-economics. Instead, deregulation, with little 
international coordination, swept the Western world.108 Chatham House and UNA were also 
suffering from the worsening economic situation. Both were forced to accept grants from the 
Foreign Office. UNA’s membership went into continual decline while it complained about the 
dismal lack of attention given to international affairs by the media and politicians as the 
global was being shown to be becoming ever more important. 1975 would also, of course, see 
the referendum which decided that Britain would remain a member of the EEC which it had 
joined two years before. However, as covered earlier, it was hardly a vindication of the 
popularity of liberal internationalism. Indeed the year 1975 contained within it ominous signs 
of what was to come. Firstly, there was the Labour Party’s lacklustre campaign during the 
referendum, which did little to mask the underlying divisions within the party over the issue. 
                                                             





Eight years later, the party would campaign to take Britain out of the EEC and to begin 
unilateral disarmament.  Secondly, 1975 also saw the election of Margaret Thatcher as leader 
of the Conservative Party. Ten years later she boycotted the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO). Her postwar predecessors would never have 
dared to have offended liberal opinion by leaving a UN agency. In 1975 Labour would soon 
move Left and the Conservatives would soon move Right. The centre ground was becoming a 
little too quiet for comfort and liberal internationalism was in for a rough ride. 
 
 
ARGUMENT AND ORGANISATION 
This thesis will argue that liberal internationalism lived past the expiry date imposed upon it 
by historians. By examining the relationships Chatham House and UNA had with the public, 
Whitehall and the party political machine, it will show that the ideology had purchase both 
among elites and the general public. It will demonstrate that these organisations were 
influential in themselves and acted as democratising agents in foreign policy, extending 
debate over international affairs beyond Whitehall. Nevertheless, they proved resistant to 
shaking off an elitist paternalism that clouded their judgement. They found themselves 
gravitating too close to the corridors of power, even entangling themselves in its machinations 
and they generally struggled to stage sufficient dynamism to fend off new rivals that 
competed for their memberships and who provided attractive alternatives to new potential, 
especially young, supporters.  
However, this thesis will also argue that the extent of the democratisation of foreign 
policy was severely limited. Formal and informal structures erected by the state, political 
parties and the media prevented a considerable amount of participation in the foreign policy 
process beyond Whitehall that jealously guarded its domain. It will become apparent that 





benefited from the innovation that such participation could have procured. Ministers and civil 
servants too readily understood change to mean merely decline. Rather than timely adapting 
to decolonisation and the subsequent proliferation of newly empowered independent states 
that swelled the UN’s General Assembly, they dithered over where Britain’s future lay. 
Politicians often ignored foreign policy and failed to understand just how intimately involved 
the domestic and the international were becoming; others promoted the illusion that they were 
not. Many within the media were also guilty of the same misjudgement and doubted the 
public’s ability to understand international affairs and their desire to do so. The politics of 
foreign affairs in Britain encouraged a reactionary, often directionless foreign policy.  
This argument is structured thematically. The next chapter will address Chatham 
House and UNA’s appreciation of the public understanding of international affairs. It will 
outline how the two organisations’ intellectual lineages informed the communication 
strategies they adopted and the internal debates that surrounded them that went to the very 
heart of their raison d’être. It will explore the relationship between the organisations and the 
media, and how the latter’s practices proved ill-suited to presenting the extent of global 
interdependence, the principal motivation for international organisation and integration. 
Finally, the chapter will provide an interpretation on the actual public understanding of 
international affairs in postwar Britain and why liberal internationalism struggled to retain 
popular purchase.  
Chapter three will detail how Chatham House and UNA as insider organisations with 
close contacts with ministers and officials worked to maintain their independence from 
government. It will demonstrate how they influenced thinking, and more often rhetoric, 
among policy makers, but also the dangers they risked as Whitehall attempted to influence 
them in return. It will show that liberal internationalist opinion was by no means treated as 





public forums for commentary and activism relating to foreign policy and the subsequent 
government interest they aroused. The chapter will also outline how both Chatham House and 
UNA were forced into the unenviable position of having to request government grants to 
maintain their activities.  
Chapter four will demonstrate why it was important for Chatham House and UNA to 
maintain their all-party status and how they sought to internationalise political discourse in 
Britain and fought for a consensus over the need for a liberal internationalist foreign policy. It 
will detail how party politics encouraged politicians to avoid drawing attention to 
international affairs and global interdependence. The chapter will also examine the 
relationships the organisations held with the three main parties, how they contributed to their 
policy directions and how they struggled to turn words into action and persuade politicians to 
put what Chatham House and UNA perceived to be the national and world’s interest before 
party loyalty.  
Chapter five, the conclusion, will determine what happened to liberal internationalism 
and its advocates in postwar Britain. It will review the flawed approaches made by Chatham 
House and UNA to promote the cause of liberal internationalism among elites and the public, 
but it will also deliberate on their successes and comment on the directions they took after the 
1970s. It will bring together the findings of the preceding chapters to interpret the extent of 
British foreign policy’s democratisation. The chapter will also ruminate on the wider 
implications of the thesis for the study of British politics more generally. Ultimately, it will 










Cultivating Public Opinion: Understanding the  
Public Understanding of International Affairs 
 
What does Chatham House exist for? Just to research? Or to educate the public here and 
elsewhere? If so how? 
Robert Brand to Ivison Macadam, 1 May 19541 
 
There are those who think of us as a second Chatham House – and at the other end, those who 
think we should be marching down Whitehall every other weekend. Those of us who would 
have us spend time on political issues alone, and those whose concern is almost entirely 
“charitable”. 
William Barnes to Humphry Berkeley, 10 Aug 19682 
 
In postwar Britain, liberal internationalism struggled to win over many hearts. Both Chatham 
House and UNA were established to inform public opinion. Both encountered great 
difficulties in reaching it. The various communication strategies they experimented with and 
employed made a highly significant impact upon how the bodies were modelled and their 
very raison d’être. The question of which strategy to select also stimulated much controversy. 
For the Director of Chatham House, Ivison Macadam, the answer to Robert Brand’s question 
was simple. Chatham House was first and foremost a research institute. He had sympathy 
with the idea of reaching out beyond elite opinion, but, via a zero-sum calculation, he very 
much doubted that the Institute was capable of doing so while simultaneously conducting 
serious research. Even Macadam’s mentor, Lionel Curtis, who was most anxious that ill-
informed public opinion could lead Britain astray and had founded the Institute ‘to cultivate’ 
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it, objected to Chatham House attempting to reach out to the public directly.3 From its 
foundation, Curtis advocated that Chatham House ought to focus its attention on educating 
elite opinion, which in turn would educate public opinion; that it should educate the 
educators. This model was later described in 1935 by Stephen King-Hall, a member of the 
Institute’s Council and future founder of the Hansard Society: Chatham House ‘helps the man 
who reads the leading article by helping the man who writes it. It helps the voter by helping 
the MP’.4 During and after the Second World War Curtis maintained that the King-Hall model 
was usually the most effective means for reaching the public. In 1944, Curtis believed that the 
two most significant influences on public opinion were Winston Churchill and The Times.5 
However, not everyone within Chatham House shared Curtis’s faith in such an elite-centric 
model.  In the same year, following a successful experiment whereby the Institute educated 
service personnel, a committee was tasked to assess the future of Chatham House and 
establish whether the Institute should engage directly with the public.  
For the UNA it was much less a question of whether it should or should not engage 
directly with the public, but how. The LNU and UNA’s model involved coordinating public 
opinion to check the British government’s impulses to veer away from an internationalist 
foreign policy. It was another elite-centric model that did little to threaten the structures 
inherent in the politics of foreign policy. However, the UNA’s claim to represent public 
opinion began to come undone as it struggled to maintain a gradually dwindling mass 
membership. UNA subsequently searched, often vainly, for new methods to inspire public 
faith in the United Nations and the liberal internationalist cause. It was no easy task. Large 
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sections of the British public were first disillusioned with the death of the League of Nations 
and then Cold War power politics. They became grimly fatalistic and disengaged. What could 
the individual do against the superpowers? As William Barnes noted, there were those within 
UNA who advocated that the Association should shy away from dismal international politics 
and focus on the good the UN could do in terms of providing humanitarian relief. The British 
public could be relied upon to respond to such campaigns; humanitarianism was ‘big 
business’.6 There were also those within UNA, especially the young, who looked on with 
envy at the glamour and the attention afforded to the direct action espoused by new social 
movements, especially of course CND. There were even those, like the UNA Chairman in the 
early 1960s Nigel Nicolson, who felt that the Association should accept defeat, abandon its 
mass membership and become a second Chatham House. ‘Prejudice and misunderstanding 
about the United Nations’, Nicolson argued, ‘could be dispelled by informed argument better 
than by emotional appeals’.7  
This chapter explores the internal debates that occurred within both Chatham House 
and UNA as to how to best reach the public and convert them to the internationalist cause. It 
will reveal how the often flawed methods employed by the two bodies prevented them from 
making greater progress. However, the chapter also examines the climate in which they 
operated and outlines the great difficulties the two organisations had to surpass. The two 
organisations’ relations with the media will thus be explored so as to demonstrate how media 
practices tended to skew limited international coverage to only those issues that were 
perceived to be of interest to the British public. Aspects of international affairs that liberal 
internationalists wished to stress such as international cooperation were deemed too dull. 
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Finally, the chapter examines the public understanding of international affairs itself. It shows 
the impact of the media, but also that of increasingly apathetic attitudes towards political 
elites in general and the institutions that housed them, whether they were domestic or 
international. It brings together the chapter’s findings and ultimately demonstrates why 
Chatham House and UNA experienced such difficulties when attempting to cultivate public 
opinion. However, it is first necessary to provide a brief intellectual history of the foundations 
of both organisations in order to appreciate how they understood the public understanding of 
international affairs, what they wished the public to understand, and their elite-centricity – one 




A TALE OF TWO MODELS 
On the 30 May 1919, during the Paris Peace Conference, a consequential meeting took place 
between British, Dominion and American delegates at the Hotel Majestic, a short walk from 
the Arc de Triomphe. It was not a cheery gathering. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles had 
been drafted and the general direction of the peace settlements was becoming clear. There 
existed at the time two polar-opposite conceptions of the postwar world order: ‘new 
diplomacy’ and ‘old diplomacy’. New diplomacy was epitomised by the Covenant of the 
League of Nations that was intended to regulate the relations of its member states with open 
treaties, collective agreements and the widest possible publicity. In contrast, old diplomacy, 
was epitomised by the bilateral alliances that preceded the First World War that thrived upon 
closed treaties with secret clauses and the narrowest possible concealment. It would be wrong 
to suggest that there were many hard and fast advocates of each among the delegates attached 





belonged to the new diplomacy half of the spectrum.8 It was here that Chatham House was 
conceived. The delegates included Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr, but it also included one of 
the principal actors involved with the LNU established in the previous year, Robert Cecil, and 
his protégé also soon to be an important LNU actor Philip (later Noel-) Baker. 
 ‘There is no single person in this room’, Cecil lamented, ‘who is not disappointed with 
the terms we have drafted.’9 Harold Nicolson, also in attendance, referred to the treaty as a 
‘bloody bullying peace’.10 The hopes of these delegates, that the peace settlements would be 
forged in the spirit of Woodrow Wilson’s fourteen points, were dashed. Their political leaders 
had betrayed them; the Treaty of Versailles was deemed unwisely punitive and the League of 
Nations was hindered by it being associated with it.11 However, although attendees such as 
Nicolson were hardly complementary of the three ‘ignorant and incompetent’ premiers, 
Wilson, David Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, the meeting was more concerned 
with changing the attitudes of the public rather than those of the elites.12 Curtis, who 
dominated the meeting, contended that ‘the settlements being made in Paris were mainly the 
resultant of the public opinions of various countries concerned’.13 In Britain the Forth Reform 
Act had just ushered in mass enfranchisement amid nationalistic fervour and the delegates 
feared that Lloyd George, in common with Wilson, had put the favour of his constituents 
before the future peace of Europe. Impressed by the seeming power of public opinion, Curtis 
argued that the ‘future moulding of these settlements would depend upon how far public 
opinion...would be right or wrong’.14 Cecil wrote in similar terms later that year: ‘In a 
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democratic age, everything depends on public opinion. This means that the public must have 
an opinion of international affairs, and that its opinion must be right.’15 However, both 
Chatham House and the UNA employed different models to cultivate ‘right’ opinion.  
 The desire of Chatham House’s founders to mould public opinion was not new. Their 
motivation stemmed from the same philosophy that inspired their federalism, Oxford 
idealism. Oxford idealism was one of the dominant schools of thought at Oxford University at 
the turn of the century when the Institute’s principal founders Curtis, Kerr, Arnold J. Toynbee 
and Alfred Zimmern were in attendance. The best known of the Oxford idealists was its 
ideological father, T.H. Green, whose work was couched in Hegelian organicism and 
evolving social Christianity. Green’s work challenged the habitual liberal antithesis between 
the individual and the state and proclaimed the virtues of an active citizenship in which 
individuals would reach self-realisation by acts of altruism for the common good. Green 
lauded public service and loathed individualism for selfish gain, which he understood to be an 
inevitable prerequisite for social atomism.16 Green and the Oxford idealists were part of the 
wider intellectual movement that sought the reconciliation of political liberalism with social 
responsibility that would later help usher in new liberalism and underpinned collectivism. 
 The founders’ federalism was predicated on Oxford idealism in part simply as a result 
of the influence of Green’s disciple Alfred Milner who brought them into his Kindergarten 
that helped establish the federal Union of South Africa. Curtis and Kerr became the principal 
founders of the Round Table movement, which aimed to extend their federal project to the 
rest of the British Empire.17 Toynbee, Zimmern and other founders of the Institute became 
associated with the movement. Moreover, Oxford and Scottish idealism’s reconciliation of the 
individual with the community was developed by the seminal new liberal Leonard T. 
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Hobhouse’s interpretation of social evolution. Hobhouse held that advanced societies could be 
identified by the extent of personal and institutionalised harmony between individuals and 
groups. From this perspective, the Round Tablers perceived the British Empire as an 
advanced product of the natural evolution of society as it connected diverse cultures and 
societies into one supposedly peaceful polity.18  
Oxford idealism helped inspire the founders’ desire to inform the general public due to 
its emphasis on the importance of civic education and its resultant contribution to the 
settlement movement. Curtis became heavily involved with the settlement movement and was 
particularly well-known for his researches of the poor while posing as a tramp in London 
slums.19 Kerr lectured at Toynbee Hall and Zimmern became a luminary at the Workers 
Educational Association (WEA).20 The WEA was founded in 1903 at Toynbee Hall, the first 
university settlement house that was founded as a memorial to Arnold J. Toynbee’s uncle and 
namesake Arnold Toynbee, perhaps Green’s most faithful disciple.21 The settlement 
movement and the WEA reflected an optimism fuelled by the ideas of Green but also those of 
Matthew Arnold, especially his concept of ‘common culture’. Class conflict would be 
mollified by the simple act of bringing university teachers together with working people. The 
former would impart nonpartisan education to the latter to properly equip them for their 
democratic responsibilities. But teacher and student would also learn of their social 
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obligations to one another and thus education would bind citizens together, regardless of their 
socio-economic backgrounds. Social harmony, not social conflict, was the name of the 
game.22   
However, at the turn of the twentieth century, this optimism was counterbalanced with 
growing fears among new liberals such as Hobhouse, Graham Wallas and John A. Hobson 
who voiced concerns that universal suffrage might beckon a tyranny of a volatile ‘mob mind’ 
susceptible to the sensationalism of the likes of the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook press. 
Subsequently, Hobhouse called for an alliance between ‘Science and Democracy’ based upon 
new knowledge of the social sciences. New liberals began to entrench normative values 
espousing the concept of the intellectual as an authoritative carrier of objective knowledge 
and truth in the hope that well-known intellectuals might provide guidance to the increasingly 
enfranchised “masses”.23  
Kerr, Zimmern and Curtis were keen to help provide such guidance. In 1911, under 
the auspices of the Round Table movement, they fashioned a ‘principal of the 
commonwealth’ that sought to articulate the movement’s conception of the proper roles of the 
state and the citizen. Here they envisioned a citizenship in Greenian terms based upon 
obligation and duty towards the community as a whole, rather than one based upon privilege 
or rights. However, it also stipulated that before citizens were entrusted with the vote, they 
ought to have the intellectual capacity for judging just what the common good was and the 
moral capacity to put it before their own selfish desires. It was thus imperative that they 
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prepare as many people as possible for the exercise of their political responsibilities.24 
Subsequently, during the First World War, Zimmern tasked himself with putting the Round 
Table view before working class opinion through the WEA and was later assisted by Arnold 
J. Toynbee. Out of the WEA, Zimmern in collaboration with Arthur Greenwood and Ramsay 
Muir established the Council for the Study of International Relations, which, in a sign of 
things to come, devoted itself to the study of international affairs.25   
Nevertheless, if we return to the conception of Chatham House in 1919, we find that 
Curtis did not advocate that the role of the new institute should include directly mediating 
knowledge to the public. ‘Right public opinion’, Curtis told his fellow delegates, ‘was mainly 
produced by a small number of people in real contact with the facts who had thought out the 
issues involved.’26 This was likely due to the founders own unsatisfactory experiences of 
attempting to engage mass opinion through the WEA and similar organisations.27 By this 
point many new liberals had lost faith in the power of public intellectuals and were convinced 
that the First World War had created a new political, social and cultural context in which they 
felt unable to compete in.28 Sensing that their cultural authority among mass opinion was 
limited, the founders turned to those who they perceived as the most effective public 
mediators of knowledge – journalists and politicians.  
Chatham House subsequently focussed on securing its intellectual legitimacy in order 
to influence these mediators. By 1919, the intellectual legitimacy of the Round Table 
movement was proving difficult to maintain as it gained a reputation for being merely 
propagandist. Curtis would later write that the establishment of Chatham House ‘was a 
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necessary tactical change to effect the same strategic object’.29 The new British Institute of 
International Affairs, established in 1920, did much to gain a reputation for being a centre of 
objective truth that was above the political fray. It was independent of government, precluded 
from expressing any opinion and promoted the idea that it was possible to study international 
affairs scientifically.30 Symbolic capital was secured by means of obtaining the actual 
property of Chatham House, the former home of three prime ministers, along with the 
successful petition for a Royal Charter just five years into its existence. Special efforts were 
made to attain the prefix ‘Royal’ in the title of the Institute, which was not an automatic 
benefit bestowed by the Charter.31 Chatham House also created a famous rule of non-
attribution in 1927 so that politicians and official experts might inform debate without fear of 
political repercussion.32 By such means, Chatham House would attempt to educate the elites 
so that they in turn would educate public opinion. This was the King-Hall model and it would 
largely go unchallenged until the Second World War.  
 The LNU and its own communication strategy owed its origins to a wider, less 
cohesive community. Nevertheless, the Union shared, albeit more broadly, a liberal trajectory. 
It was also influenced by a liberal emphasis on civic education and optimism in the public’s 
essential rationality and ability to comprehend international affairs if the message was put 
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clearly.33 They differed from Chatham House in that they generally considered themselves to 
have sufficient cultural authority to engage directly with the public. The optimism among its 
founders may have been steeled by the same late nineteenth century idealism that had such an 
impact on Chatham House, but it is less clear. For example, Robert Cecil’s brothers, Hugh 
and William, were involved with the settlement movement, but it is not apparent whether he 
was himself.34 Oxford idealism certainly influenced the international thought of another key 
figure within the LNU, Gilbert Murray who was also involved with WEA along with his 
friend Zimmern.35 However, there were those within the LNU who, like many within 
Chatham House, partook in the new liberal anxieties that the public were in fact largely 
inclined to act irrationally and uncritically submit to the sensationalist press and the emotional 
appeals made by politicians.36 Tensions between those who held such anxieties within the 
LNU and those who belonged to the more optimistic school of thought persisted through the 
interwar period, exacerbated by alarm over perceived threats to traditional cultural hierarchies 
– epitomised in American imports – and the popularity of fascism across Europe.37 However, 
there was also a more practical element behind the LNU’s strategy to target the public directly 
than just a liberal optimism over their essential reasonableness that would come under 
increasing doubt during the interwar period. The LNU and its founders were worldlier than 
how E.H. Carr and other contemporaries portrayed them.38  
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 As demonstrated by Cecil’s support of Chatham House, the LNU shared its concerns 
that nationalist outrage in Britain directed at Germany had forced a potentially 
counterproductive peace settlement. Indeed the LNU was the amalgamation of divisions 
within the British League movement during the First World War largely concerned with 
whether Germany should be a member of the League of Nations.39 However, as a result of the 
First World War, LNU’s leaders were also highly suspicious of the governing classes across 
Europe including politicians such as Lloyd-George and the arch-purveyor of the old 
diplomacy, the Foreign Office.40 The Fourth Reform Act was thus to be welcomed if public 
opinion could be coordinated to keep the government in check and maintain them on the path 
to internationalism. The more members the LNU had, the more convincing its claim to 
represent a large section of opinion was and this gave them more clout with elected 
governments.  
It went further than the membership total alone though, which amounted to a small 
percentage of the electorate. It was important to be at least seen to represent a broad section of 
opinion across the centre ground, whose supporters provided significant constituent elements 
of the main political parties. The perceived command of the centre ground of public opinion 
that the LNU and to a lesser extent UNA enjoyed ensured that governments did not take them 
lightly.41 This was especially the case with the LNU that operated within a period where the 
understanding of public opinion was new and largely unsophisticated. It would not be until 
the late 1930s that there would be Mass Observation and British Gallup Polls that sought to 
understand public opinion as it was, rather than as interpreted through NGOs.42 The LNU thus 
played up to its centrist position in the political spectrum. Being seen to veer off to the Left or 
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the Right was very dangerous as it risked giving the impression that the LNU – and UNA – no 
longer represented a cohesive body of opinion.43 Arguably, it may have given the LNU and 
UNA greater influence than some NGOs whose supporters were more disparately located 
across the political spectrum or grouped together at either of the mutually antagonistic ends of 
the Left or the Right.  
However, in order for this model to work, it was necessary that on international 
affairs, the centre ground was populated. Education of the public was necessary so that their 
support could be coordinated through the LNU and UNA apparatus and passed on through its 
policy resolutions to the deputations in Whitehall. Through the LNU and its counterparts in 
the rest of the world, the peoples of the world, who were naturally understood not to wish any 
harm to one another, would keep in check their governments. Furthermore, the faith that was 
held in this model precluded the need to argue for adapting the structures inherent in the 
politics of foreign policy. The LNU differed from the UDC, for example, in that it sought to 
strengthen the existing League Covenant and did not argue for the popular election of British 
representatives to the League. It respected existing parliamentary and constitutional structures 
and UNA continued to do so.44  
 In combination, Chatham House and UNA acted as a pincer movement on public 
opinion. While Chatham House aimed to educate elite opinion formers who would in turn 
educate the general public, the LNU wished to educate the public directly but provide a 
moderating influence by encouraging them to engage with international affairs within its own 
apparatus. Both democratised foreign policy, albeit in limited ways. They both held faith in 
the structures inherent in the politics of foreign policy and believed that they could indeed use 
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them for their benefit. One provided elitism from above and the other elitism from below. 
However, during and after the Second World War these models were not without their critics. 
 
THE KING-HALL MODEL CHALLENGED 
During the interwar period, a growing number within Chatham House questioned the 
Institute’s effectiveness at informing public opinion. Shortly after the start of the Second 
World War, Curtis noted two schools of thought at Chatham House. One held that Chatham 
House should attempt to reach out directly to ‘the man in the street’. The other school, of 
which Curtis belonged to, feared that the Institute would ‘spread ourselves too thin if we 
attempt to deal with film and lectures to Women’s Institutes, etc’.45 The former school 
questioned in particular the Institute’s especial focus on elite opinion formers and advocated 
that the Institute should reach out to a wider, more diverse, array of people who could also 
influence public opinion. The King-Hall model was deemed too elite-centric. They sought the 
influence of other opinion formers, namely other NGOs and educators. By such means, it was 
hoped that the Institute would make an impact not just on a wider middle-class audience, but 
also on working-class opinion. Previous efforts to reach out to a wider audience were not 
considered to be sufficiently effective. In 1938, Ivison Macadam, made Director of the 
Institute in 1929, was instrumental in establishing a branch for Manchester and another in 
Scotland with groups in Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow. However, these “provincial” 
ventures, although laudable, were aimed more at encouraging interest in international affairs 
among those who were prevented by geography from the use of Chatham House’s facilities, 
rather than by socio-economics. Nevertheless, a wartime experiment championed by the 
Institute’s chairman Waldorf Astor provided hope for change.  
                                                             





Waldorf Astor will forever be tarnished with the Cliveden Set, a label that made good 
copy but had little basis in fact.46 As Thomas Jones, a member of the “Set”, remarked, the 
group had ‘as much unity as the passengers in a railway train’.47 Rather than being at the 
centre of a Right-wing conspiracy in league with Hitler, Astor had liberal inclinations and was 
devoted to public service and social reform. In conversations with his close friend Nancy 
Astor, George Bernard Shaw often teasingly referred to her husband as ‘that Commie’.48 Like 
Curtis, Astor hoped that the Second World War would provide an opportunity to develop a 
federal Europe and was convinced that mobilising public opinion to support it was essential to 
future peace. In 1942, Waldorf wrote: 
 
The British public...must realise that what happened in Europe is of vital concern to them and 
to their existence...Should we now begin to mould public opinion to favour active and 
permanent association...? 
 
Astor certainly thought so and presciently posited that after the war Britain would only 
have a small window of opportunity to lead this federal project.49 He made the same argument 
when advising on the foreign policy stance of his newspaper, the Observer.50 He was 
supported by his son David Astor who was soon to be the paper’s editor and who increasingly 
influenced Waldorf’s politics. Like his father, David was influenced by Kerr’s federalist 
teachings. David held Kerr’s 1935 Burge Memorial Lecture, Pacifism is not Enough, nor 
Patriotism Either, to be one of the most important texts of his life.51 Although authored 
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anonymously, a piece entitled ‘Nationalism is not Enough’ that featured in the Observer in 
1942 can most probably be attributed to David. It argued that a sustainable European federal 
system would rely upon ‘the wills of the peoples’.52 Contrast this with Curtis who felt that 
such a system would rely upon politicians leading opinion rather than following it.53  
David, however, had reason to be optimistic. The Second World War appeared to stir 
in the public an appetite for information on international affairs. In 1944, a Mass Observation 
report found that in comparison with studies of public attitudes from 1938, ‘foreign policy 
means something far less vague and incomprehensible’. The public also appeared sanguine 
about the future. The report noted the prevalent attitude was that ‘[f]oreign affairs will be a 
positive matter of keeping the peace and building the future, not just negative [sic] keeping 
out of war and averting disaster. This is at least the present mood.’54 Indeed, there was a surge 
of internationalism among working class opinion. Wartime experiences reoriented 
perspectives, connecting the local with the international. Furthermore, socialist 
internationalism had grown popular. The wartime alliance with the USSR had inspired hopes 
that the perceived champions of ordinary people would play a positive role in international 
relations.55 The alliance also contributed to optimism and interest in the future effectiveness 
of the UN. It is significant that the UN was born in 1942 and not, as commonly misconstrued, 
in 1945. Between those years, the term "United Nations" was used to describe the anti-Axis 
fighting alliance that included the USSR.56  
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The new public interest in international affairs had not gone by unnoticed at Chatham 
House. It received a number of requests from groups who hoped that the Institute might 
facilitate discussions.57 By 1944, Macadam noted a ‘remarkable growth in the public 
concern’.58 It coincided with a more general interest in current affairs. Sonya Rose notes how 
the active citizenship preached by the idealists flowered in the Second World War. 
Citizenship ‘was linked with “social responsibility” and participation in civil society or in 
public affairs’. Self-sacrifice was deemed imperative for national survival.59  
Subsequently there was an increased demand for adult education.60 In 1941, 
responding to concerns over morale and ignorance of war aims within the armed forces, W.E. 
Williams, the Editor-in Chief of Penguin Books and Secretary of the British Institute of Adult 
Education, devised the Army Bureau for Current Affairs (ABCA).61 ABCA organised a 
scheme whereby units underwent weekly discussion sessions led by regimental officers who 
were assisted by bulletins concerned with both domestic and international issues. Not only did 
this improve participants’ understanding of international affairs, it also encouraged question 
and debate. A journalist within the army observed that ‘ABCA is the reversal of the idea that 
the soldier must not think for himself, let alone talk for himself or be interested in politics or 
world affairs’.62 Indeed, a new habit of reasoning aloud had the potential to feature in 
unexpected scenarios: ‘Don’t you try to ABCAize me!’ remarked one service woman as her 
soldier lover itemised the grounds of his affection.63 The BBC panel programme The Brains 
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Trust, which also began in 1941, helped sate the public appetite. Only news bulletins and J.B. 
Priestley’s Postscripts drew more listeners.64 
Chatham House sought to capitalise on this new state of affairs. In 1941, 
bibliographies were produced for the WEA and a member of staff was specifically appointed 
to present information in a popular form, known as the Information Notes.65 However, the 
most significant and lasting contribution that the Institute was to make began in September 
1942, when at the request of ABCA, Chatham House began a series of specialist courses and 
became ABCA’s only civilian attachment. These weekend-courses were composed of around 
seven lectures followed by discussion. Their principal object was to provide information to 
officers that they could pass on in their weekly ABCA discussions. Approximately 300 
attended each course.66 By the end of the war, 12,000 officers had attended.67 The subjects of 
the courses – unsurprisingly – often occupied themselves with the war and its actors, but they 
also centred on the postwar international order, the Commonwealth and postwar plans for the 
United Nations.68 Macadam hailed the first course in 1942 as ‘an historic moment in the 
annals of Chatham House’.69 Williams was pleased too: ‘we can trace a good deal of the 
recent progress of A.B.C.A. back to Chatham House’.70 A memorandum written by the 
Institute in 1943 examining the impact of the courses boasted that numerous letters of thanks 
had been received. It noted a stimulated interest in the Institute’s publication Information 
Notes and that the only common criticism was that the courses were too short. Furthermore, it 
remarked that the courses were welcomed by Chatham House’s Council, since they enabled 
the Institute ‘to carry out its primary function in disseminating objective information on 
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international affairs’. It recalled that at the Paris Peace Conference the architects of the 
Institute had ‘found that the hands of the statesmen who had to formulate terms of peace were 
tied by the ignorance and parochialism of public opinion in their respective countries’. 
Finally, it predicted that Britain’s postwar responsibilities would make claims on every citizen 
who would subsequently require an informed understanding of international affairs.71  
It was this that most occupied Waldorf Astor. He hoped that the younger officers – 
‘the civilians of the future’ – would turn to the Institute ‘as the natural centre from which to 
obtain information upon international affairs’.72 He also wished to expand the Institute’s 
educational activities beyond the armed forces and envisioned that Chatham House might 
provide information and run courses for educational settlements (like Toynbee Hall), the 
WEA, universities, Local Educational Authorities and MPs.73  
Astor’s plans did not end there. In 1944 Williams began to devise a peacetime ABCA, 
what would become the Bureau of Current Affairs (BCA). Similarly to ABCA, the BCA 
would provide institutions with publications for study groups and run courses for those 
leading them. It differed, however, in that the BCA’s target audience was now also civilian. 
Subscribers to the BCA included schools, adult education bodies, industry, religious 
organisations, libraries and the press.74  From an early stage, Williams discussed his plans 
with Astor who was extremely receptive. Naturally, Astor felt that Chatham House should 
provide the factual material for the future BCA on matters of international affairs, but he went 
further. Astor’s ‘wildest dream’ consisted of the Institute buying the property adjacent to 
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Chatham House and renting out space for BCA’s headquarters.75 A neighbouring BCA, Astor 
concluded, would fit well with plans to continue Chatham House’s courses and to provide 
information in a more popularised form.76 Eventually, the short-lived BCA did not take 
residence in St James’s Square but close by at Carnegie House on Piccadilly.  
Crucially, Astor’s vision of postwar Chatham House differed significantly from King-
Hall’s communication strategy. Under Astor’s system, the Institute would still use mediators 
in order to transfer their knowledge to the public – it would still be educating the educators. 
However, these educators were in direct contact with wide sections of the public and there 
was sufficient confidence in Chatham House’s cultural authority to reach them. When seeking 
to attain funding from the York Trust – founded by David Astor and directed by Coleg 
Harlech founder Thomas Jones – the Institute argued for an extension of its work into ‘the 
direct educational field’ on the grounds that it was time for the Institute to enter a new stage 
of development. 
 
Public acceptance of the Institute in this field was made possible by a recognition of its 
standards and of the resources of knowledge and experience amassed during the first twenty 
years of existence, thus justifying the contention of the Council that the Institute must 
establish itself as the national centre of study and research in international problems before it 
could afford to extend its activities on a wider basis.77  
 
The wartime success of the courses appeared to vindicate the calls of those within 
Chatham House who felt that the Institute should engage more directly with the public. In 
1944, nine members of the Council tabled a resolution recommending that a planning 
committee be tasked with reviewing the future direction of Chatham House, particularly over 
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whether the Institute should engage with the public more directly.78 Chatham House had 
reached a crossroads.  
The proposal that Chatham House should play a more active role in informing public 
opinion was met with considerable support within the Institute. The planning committee first 
invited members and staff to submit memoranda recommending future policy. Of the 
memoranda that made reference to public engagement, 82% were in favour of efforts to reach 
out to a wider public, albeit with varying degrees of zeal.  The remaining 18% adhered to the 
policy hitherto practised of ‘helping to educate the educators’.79 The concerns of those 
seeking more active public engagement were reminiscent of those held by the founders of the 
Institute after the end of the First World War. There were fears that the public were too 
readily persuaded by party-political slogans and tabloid headlines. One Chatham House 
member blamed the origins of the war in part on the ignorance and apathy of the public.80 
Viscountess Rhondda, editor of Time and Tide, welcomed the prospect of the continuation of 
Chatham House’s educational activities, believing that they were narrowing ‘the gulf of 
understanding’ between ordinary citizens and policy makers.81  
There were three principal methods recommended in the memoranda to help narrow 
the gulf. Firstly, a popular one was to encourage a more diverse membership. ‘Chatham 
House is pervaded’, wrote Freda White a prolific author for the LNU, ‘by a mixture of social 
and intellectual snobbery...The effect of the atmosphere of near-official influence is to make 
the feeling of the meetings pompous and empty.’82 The sentiment was shared by William 
Waldorf Astor, Waldorf Astor’s eldest son, who complained of a ‘heavy backlog of bores, 
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fools, cranks and persons who come to pass the time of day, and people who, after retirement, 
have nothing else to do but clutter up places like Chatham House’.83 The thirty year-old 
historian Max Beloff also complained of the predominance of grey-haired members and 
expressed the need for the Institute to attract the younger generation.84 The solutions offered 
for this lack of diversity included: the creation of a much larger category of membership for 
people attached to the Institute’s educational activities; the establishment of new branches in 
more cities and groups within schools; and encouraging Rotary Clubs, community centres and 
secondary schools to become corporate members.85 The second method was concerned with 
whether the Institute’s publications could be adapted in order to disseminate its findings more 
widely. Andrew Scotland, Director of Education for Plymouth, suggested that the Institute’s 
publications were too ‘highbrow’, while the publications officer, Edward Osborn, reasoned 
that the Institute was duty-bound to provide educational publications for the general reader.86 
Finally the third method related to the Institute’s courses programme. H.V. Hodson, then 
assistant editor for The Sunday Times, proposed that school teachers be made welcome to the 
courses, while Scotland suggested a Christmas Lecture for children á la the Royal 
Institution.87  
Others doubted the worth of such endeavours. Toynbee had little faith in the 
capabilities of the “masses”; instead societal progress depended on ‘creative minorities’.88 He 
was keen that the Institute avoid public engagement lest it threaten its impartiality. ‘To appeal 
successfully to the masses’, wrote Toynbee, ‘one has to give up being critical and open-
minded and to become partisan and dogmatic’.  The study of international affairs required the 
                                                             
83 CHA: 2/1/9b:  Memorandum by W.W. Astor, 5 May 1944. 
84 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by M. Beloff, 3 May 1944. 
85 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by G. Crowther, 5 May 1944; A. Scotland to W. Astor, 18 Oct 1944; RIIA, 
Future of Chatham House, 12. 
86 CHA: 2/1/9b: Andrew Scotland to W Astor, 18 Oct 1944; Memorandum by E. Osborn, 8 Jul 1944. 
87 CHA: 2/1/9b: Memorandum by H.V. Hodson, 17 May 1944; A. Scotland to Lord Astor, 18 Oct 1944. 
88 I. Hall, Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945-1975 (Berkeley CA, 2012), 71. 
See also K.W. Thompson, ‘Toynbee and World Politics: Democracy and Foreign Policy’, The Review of 





‘judicial and scientific’ approach ‘characteristic of a rather limited circle of people whose 
ability, education and experience is well above the average’. Toynbee preferred the King-Hall 
model; it was not the duty of the Institute to rouse the public appetite for information on 
international affairs, but that of ‘missionaries from the narrower circle’.89 Furthermore, 
Macadam argued that there was little money to be had in public engagement and that the 
Institute’s publications were already disseminating its findings satisfactorily.90  
When eventually published in 1946, the committee’s report acknowledged that there 
were two aspects to the Institute’s primary function: to aid research in international affairs and 
to disseminate the results. However, it also expounded that with limited funds it was desirable 
to devote the greater part of the Institute’s income to research. The report noted that the 
majority of the Committee concluded that it was ‘sounder policy to respond gradually’ to 
public demand for information ‘as it makes itself felt rather than to attempt to stimulate it’. It 
was largely in this vein that Chatham House conducted its future activities. The Committee 
did, however, albeit cautiously, agree that the Institute continue programmes that aimed to 
reach a wider public, such as through the courses and more accessible publications.91 But 
those advocating Astor’s postwar vision of Chatham House had lost their most important 
battle. At the annual general meeting (AGM) in 1949, Astor’s successor Clement Jones used 
his first speech to the membership to suggest that it was wiser ‘that we should concentrate on 
serving the specialist and leave the task of wider education to him’.92 Although it would 
continue to receive challenges, the King-Hall model had survived.  
Indeed, there was little drive to broaden Chatham House’s own membership. Since the 
formation of the Institute in 1920, there had been a limit set upon the number of members 
enrolled.  It then numbered 1,000. The cap was increased at various intervals as the Institute   
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Members, Associates and Corporate Nominees 1945-1949/Members and Associates not
including Corporate nominees 1950-1975
Total Nominated Members of Corporate subscribers 1950-1975
Figure 2.1. Chatham House membership intake and wastage, 1945-1953. 




Figure 2.2. Membership of Chatham House, 1945-1975. 

































Figure 2.3. Total number of Chatham House’s corporate subscribers, 1945-1975. 






Figure 2.4. Proportion of Chatham House’s total income from individual and corporate membership, 
1945-1975.  
Source: CHA: 1/4: Annual Reports 1945-1975. The anomaly in 1956 derives from that year’s annual report accounting for 
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secured additional revenue, and acquired its larger accommodation at Chatham House.93  One 
of the principal reasons for why membership was retained was the importance attributed to 
ensuring a high standard of debate, thus members had to be suitably qualified. Another was 
the limited accommodation for meetings; the main meeting hall held only 320 people.94 At the 
time of the planning committee, the cap was set at 2,500 members.95 However, in anticipation 
of the committee’s report, a new category of member, the associate, was implemented in 
1945. Nevertheless, the reason put before the planning committee by the Chatham House 
Council for establishing this new body of membership was not concerned with greater public 
engagement. Instead, it was concerned with increasing the intellectual quality of Chatham 
House’s membership. Although associates were not required to be experts, they had to have 
some form of experience in international affairs; a general interest was not enough.96 Indeed, 
the new initiative was coupled with an increase in the qualifications required for election to 
become a full member. The aim of the associate class was to cut down the waiting list and 
speed the entry of experts. It would cater for those who under the old standards would have 
been eligible for full membership status and attract those (particularly the young) who showed 
promise, but lacked experience.97 Nor was their subscription cheap. Associates paid £2-2s per 
year (£194 in average earnings in 2012).98  The price tag was hardly going to appeal to ‘the 
man in the street’. As shown in the rapid decline in the number of associates elected in the 
1940s apparent in figure 2.1, the new category of membership did little to expand Chatham 
House’s membership. Between 1945 and 1953, only 391 associates were elected.99 
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The doubling of the annual fee for members – from £2-2s to £4-4s – was hardly 
conducive to reaching out to the general public either. At the 1945 AGM, one member 
expressed her regret about the timing when ‘the case for the support of Chatham House had 
never been so good’ and in light of the desirability of increasing working-class 
membership.100 However, Macadam recognised that ‘two guineas was probably as impossible 
as four’ for working-class members and hoped that such members might attend as nominees 
of trade unions who possessed corporate subscriptions.101 The increased membership fee and 
the difficult economic conditions that followed the war no doubt led to the steep rise in the 
number of resignations and lapses between 1946 and 1947 as shown in figure 2.1. Indeed 
throughout the period 1945 and 1975, there was a general decline in Chatham House’s total 
number of members and associates (see figure 2.2). However, the decline was offset by the 
increase in the number of members nominated by corporate subscribers which naturally 
coincided with the expansion in the number of corporate subscribers themselves (see figure 
2.3). In 1966, the total of corporate nominees even exceeded that of the number of members 
and associates combined. As figure 2.4 shows, the financial incentive to direct resources 
towards increasing individual membership was low when compared to that of increasing the 
number of corporate subscribers.  
Chatham House’s branches outside London also experienced little success at greater 
public engagement. After the Second World War, Waldorf Astor and the planning committee 
had hoped that such operations would expand further into other cities and even onto 
university campuses.102 In 1945 a new group was founded for Newcastle and Durham. 
However, it dissolved in 1954; as did the Manchester Branch in 1963. The Scottish Branch, 
the most successful, met its end in 1982. In a Manchester Guardian editorial that spearheaded 
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a plethora of letters criticising Chatham House in 1954, the Institute was attacked for having 
‘become almost a London club, and though it has two or three groups in the country they are 
maintained with difficulty and little enthusiasm’.103 Although the setting up of branches 
outside of London had a number of influential supporters – like the Astor family – it also had 
its critics. A convenor of the Institute’s meetings, who also felt that engaging in any greater 
public engagement could only be harmful for the Institute, believed that branches could only 
come into existence by ‘spontaneous local initiative. It is not useful to instigate local interest 
then find that it can only be maintained by shots in the arms administered from London.’104 
Shots in the arm certainly proved elusive.  
Following the Manchester Guardian’s criticisms a report was compiled listing reasons 
for why the branches project had been unsuccessful and why plans for further expansion had 
been rejected. One reason was the lack of a permanent headquarters that placed the onus on 
the initiative and drive of the branch secretary. Another reason provided was the difficulty 
obtaining speakers of sufficient quality, especially those with enough time on their hands to 
travel and provide talks. In Scotland, for instance, speakers attended meetings at all three 
Groups in Aberdeen, Glasgow and Edinburgh, thus the whole endeavour occupied the speaker 
for a number of consecutive days. As for the lack of success in establishing groups in 
university centres, it was considered ‘in the light of past experience that the main burden, 
enthusiastic and helpful though local officers might be, would fall on Chatham House’. There 
were also concerns that groups would overlap with existing university societies for the studies 
of international affairs. The main reason provided for the lack of new branches in the 
principal cities and university centres, however, was cost. The average expenditure for 
sending a speaker to Scotland, involving hotel and travel expenses, was £23.105  
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 For many people who lived outside London, there was little incentive to maintain 
membership. Ann Whyte was one ex-member of the Aberdeen Group and one of the many 
who wrote to the Manchester Guardian in the wake of its critical editorial to explain why she 
had let her membership lapse. Whyte noted that £4-4s was  
 
too much to pay for two or three meetings of doubtful interest and four issues of “International 
Affairs”...The group here is undoubtedly moribund. The audiences never exceed thirty and are 
more usually no larger than ten. Even that number is only achieved by the secretary of the 
group frantically telephoning members and imploring them to be sure to attend...I see no 
particular objection to the institute thus becoming virtually a London club.106 
 
It should also be noted that Chatham House’s local branches were not alone in 
suffering from low attendance. This was hardly the golden age of the public meeting. Jon 
Lawrence details that during the 1955 general election campaign political meetings were 
described as ‘poorly attended and wholly unexciting’ at least in urban areas. As opposed to 
30% in the 1951 election, only 12% of the electorate claimed to have attended at least one 
political meeting in 1955 according to a post-election Gallup survey.107 It would appear that 
special innovations were required to attract large audiences and the branches and headquarters 
were not forthcoming with them.  
However, one lasting innovation from the war was made with regards to the Institute’s 
publications. In 1945 a more accessible publication was created to satisfy those members who 
called for a more popular version of the Institute’s journal International Affairs. It was The 
World Today. Published monthly, it was designed to be suitable for both the general reader 
and ‘the specialist who wishes to keep in touch with subjects outside his own particular 
field’.108 Its articles ‘justified themselves as a source of information for readers wishing to 
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acquaint themselves with the historical background of major events’ and were issued in a 
form that was deemed to ‘make them available to a wider public’.109  Furthermore, it was 
envisioned that it would ‘help to meet the demand for factual information on a wide range of 
current international topics, both political and economic’ that the Institute understood had 
grown during the Second World War. The World Today had an excellent reception. It reached 
a circulation of 6,000 by the end of its first year – nearly twice that of the final issue of the 
more austere publication, The Bulletin of International Affairs, that it replaced.110 At the 
Institute’s AGM in 1949, the Middle East specialist and journalist Owen Tweedy sung the 
publication’s praises and argued that it should be widely circulated around Clubs and in the 
messes and canteens of all three Services for it ‘bred understanding, and understanding bred 
peace’.111 Wider circulation of The World Today was certainly a stronger prospect than 
International Affairs. For one thing, whereas International Affairs was priced at 6s-6d an 
issue, The World Today was priced at 1 shilling an issue. Nonetheless, The World Today was 
for the likes of Owen Tweedy, it was not for the general public. It was still too expensive. It 
was hardly the most accessible of publications either. The articles were produced along the 
lines of the Institute’s then traditional faith in the ability to be scientific in the study of 
international affairs. Subsequently, unlike International Affairs and the magazine in its 
present form, The World Today took on an educative tone and avoided the expression of any 
opinion.112 Furthermore, those who desired publications to be specially prepared for use in 
secondary schools were left wanting and arguments by members for inexpensive publications 
such as The Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, priced at two pence a copy, were 
dismissed.113  
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Moreover, despite being designed to inform public opinion on the international aspects 
of reconstruction, the Looking Forward series of nine pamphlets, published between 1944 and 
1946, similarly failed to reach a mass audience. In the final pamphlet, Foreign Affairs and the 
Public, trade unionist John Price eloquently presented the case that every voter should ‘give 
his mind to the affairs of the world no less than to those of his own parish. International 
events will influence his life whether he takes any interest in them or not’.114 Yet given that 
the pamphlet was priced at one shilling, the vast majority of those voters would never have 
read his compelling argument.115  
 Finally, the courses – the jewel in the crown of the Institute’s efforts to engage more 
widely with the public – experienced decline too. Following the wartime success, the 1945/46 
annual report boasted that 28 courses had been held in the last year and that participants no 
longer solely included service personnel. Courses were held for the National Federation of 
Women’s Institutes, the new BCA, the WEA and its Trade Union arm.116 However, by 1948 
they had all ceased attending.117 The courses did continue to feature as a regular event on the 
Chatham House calendar, but were overwhelmingly attended by representatives within the 
armed forces and businesses, predominantly oil companies. In 1972 they stopped altogether. 
Tellingly, the annual report made no reference to the fact that the origins of the courses 
programme lay in the Institute’s past designs to inform public opinion. Over thirty years, the 
courses had spanned topics from ‘Europe Under Hitler’ in 1943 and ‘Food and Population’ in 
1950 to ‘African Nationalism’ in 1960 and ‘Prospects for Europe’ in 1972.118 However, 
defence seminars ran between 1973 and 1987 for high ranking service personnel and staff 
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from the Ministry of Defence.119 Chatham House’s educational activities though now solely 
targeted policy making elites. No specific efforts were made to engage the wider public. 
The senior officials of postwar Chatham House were largely opposed to such 
endeavours. After the planning committee’s conclusions in 1946, the debate over whether the 
Institute should engage more directly with the public did not reach its former fervour, but it 
did continue. Following Astor’s death in 1952, his son David picked up the baton. In 1954, 
now editor of the Observer, he used the paper’s editorial to recount the Institute’s origins in 
much the same way that Chatham House Council had done so during the war under the 
chairmanship of his father and argued for the continued necessity to engage public opinion in 
international affairs.  
 
The interest in international affairs does exist, but the ability to understand their infinite 
complexity, and to see what Britain can and should do, certainly needs to be cultivated. It is 
just here that Chatham House seems to have faltered in its purpose.120  
 
This criticism from the son of a former chairman and editor of perhaps the principal 
British newspaper concerned with international affairs was not well received at the Institute. 
Two stories of the origins of the Institute existed side-by-side. Macadam dismissed the 
editorial as ‘nonsense’ and argued that Chatham House was not then, and never was, under an 
obligation to educate the public directly.121 It was a view that contradicted the Institute’s 
wartime enthusiasm for developing its activities in relation to public education in order ‘to 
perform its most useful national service in the post-war years’.122  
Needless to say the Institute continued to adopt the King-Hall model in spite of 
Astor’s plea otherwise. Its new champion was the Institute’s rising star: Kenneth Younger. At 
an AGM in 1953, Younger, the former Labour Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and then 
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Vice-Chairman of the Institute, reiterated the position that it was the Institute’s responsibility 
to educate the educators. He singled out two such educators within the audience: Lawrence 
Fabunmi – then an LSE student, later the founding Director of the Nigerian Institute of 
International Affairs – and William Clark, a diplomatic correspondent for the Observer.123  
Nonetheless, Younger did flirt with the idea of engaging more directly with the public. 
Just as with Waldorf Astor, the key motivation was the issue of European integration. In the 
wake of Britain’s failed attempt to join the EEC in 1963, Younger, now Director of Chatham 
House, sensed that plans for the second attempt needed to be presented to the public in a 
positive light, as a new world role for Britain after the end of empire. When Chatham House 
was experiencing financial difficulties, Younger attempted to kill two birds with one stone 
and approached the Foreign Office for financial assistance so that the Institute might devote 
more time to informing – and cultivating – public opinion. No money from the Foreign Office 
was forthcoming and again nor did Chatham House abandon the King-Hall model.124 In 1964, 
Younger laid the main responsibility for stimulating public interest in international affairs at 
Parliament’s door, stating that it ought to become an ‘informed middleman between the 
Government and the electorate’.125 However, six years later, on the Institute’s fiftieth 
anniversary, he appeared to have thought that all that could be done was being done. Younger 
approved of the founders’ adoption of the King-Hall model as ‘realistic’ and welcomed the 
‘great increase’ in the coverage of international affairs on television, radio and, to a limited 
extent, in the popular press. ‘If people remain ill-informed’, Younger wrote, ‘it is not because 
the material for judgement is withheld from them, but because they do not choose to receive 
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what they are offered.’126 The King-Hall model was understood to be working sufficiently 
well. UNA might have disagreed.  
 
 
INTERNATIONALISM WITH THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS LEFT IN 
Those among Waldorf Astor’s supporters who sought a large membership for Chatham House 
could only have fantasised about the numbers secured by UNA. UNA would never attain the 
membership heights of the LNU but their number and their claim to represent a large section 
of opinion was not to be dismissed lightly. There were 46,607 tenacious members who 
retained their faith – and subscriptions – during the gloomy days of war. Within eighteen 
months of UNA being formed in May 1945 to replace the LNU, their number would reach 
73,394 (see figure 2.5). UNA retained the LNU model; it concerned itself primarily with 
‘organising public support for policies which it believed this country should pursue in the UN 
and with commending such policies to the government’.127 Nevertheless, UNA troubled itself 
considerably as to how it was to fulfil its aim of securing the ‘support by the British people of 
the United Nations organisation’.128 David Astor was right, interest in international affairs still 
existed. Internationalism survived but many were less optimistic and thus less engaged in the 
prospects of international integration and organisation. It made some aspects of the UN’s 
work an easier sell than others. The UN’s humanitarian work attracted much support. Amid 
Cold War power politics, its seeming irrelevance made its political work a much harder sell 
and yet the UN’s political work was its critical raison d’être. With many more NGOs now 
claiming to represent opinion in Britain, in addition to interpreting and moderating it, the 
public eye was increasingly drawn away from the traditional bastion of internationalism.  
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  However, in the early postwar years there was a revival of internationalist spirit and 
some optimism in the new UN. The rise in UNA’s membership in 1945 and 1946 was initially 
slow, but a swift rise was signalled by the celebrations of what UNA named UN Week in 
October. Over 21,000 members joined in last three months of 1946. A similar trend was noted 
in the number of branches being formed; by the end of the year they had more than doubled 
(see figure 2.6). Furthermore, 980 local (mostly churches in addition to industrial, 
professional, political and educational bodies) and 52 national organisations (such as the 
Young Women’s Christian Association and the Trades Union Congress) became corporate 
members.129  UN Week surrounded the 24 October, UN Day, which owed its origins to a 
proclamation made by President Roosevelt in 1942 that held that the 14 June, the American 
Flag Day, would not only honour the US flag, but also that of the nations who had signed the 
Joint Declaration of the United Nations that year.130 Britain followed suit and a coordinating 
committee of various Whitehall departments was formed which in 1944 ceded its 
responsibilities to an ad hoc committee chaired by Lord Lytton, the chairman of the LNU and 
soon-to-be President of UNA.131 After the war, UNA organised the vast majority of UN Day 
activities around the country with some assistance from the Central Office of Information (the 
Ministry of Information’s successor organisation), the London office of the United Nations 
Information Centre (the UN’s official information body), the Foreign Office and the BBC.  
In the summer of 1946 in preparation for the first UN Day to take place on the 24 
October, the anniversary of the ratification of the UN Charter, UNA tasked itself with putting  
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Figure 2.5. UNA total individual membership, 1945-1975. 
Source: UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports, 1945-1975. Note that the 1975 value is not provided in the corresponding 






Figure 2.6. Total number of branches, 1945-1975. 









































itself ‘on the map’.132 In June UNA brought together representatives from over forty national 
bodies including the three major political parties, trade unions, the National Community 
Centres Association, the Jewish Peace Society and over 20 women’s organisations in order to 
reach the widest possible audience over United Nations Week. Coverage of the week was 
provided by the BBC on the Home and foreign services, featuring talks and quizzes. In 
London, large displays adorned Marks and Spencer, the Lyons Corner House on Coventry 
Street and the Cumberland Hotel. 600,000 colour leaflets featuring a cartoon specially drawn 
by David Low were distributed in addition to 22,000 double crown posters; 7,000 blank 
posters for advertising local events; 120,000 small flags; 50,000 gummed seals for 
correspondence; 40,000 orders of service prepared by the British Council of Churches; and 
30,000 leaflets were circulated to teachers by local education authorities. Arthur Rank, 
Britain’s leading film magnate, produced a five minute trailer for UNA entitled In Our Hands, 
which was shown in 540 cinemas. Over 1,500 events took place up and down the country, 
including a rally in Leicester where 3,000 women representing 46 women’s organisations 
pledged themselves to support the UN Charter in the De Montfort Hall.133  
In order to educate its membership and beyond, the LNU’s journal Headway was 
incorporated into UNA’s International Outlook in 1945 for six months before being renamed 
United Nations News.134 UNA also supplied a monthly bulletin known as Information Notes 
to its speakers, to MPs, teachers and discussion group leaders.135 United Nations News was 
designed to reach a wider public beyond its membership. The thirty-two page journal was 
equipped with a colour front page and contained photographs, infographics and political 
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cartoons and reached a circulation of over 40,000 copies a month and excerpts were reprinted 
in News Chronicle, English Digest and New York Times.136   
There were also reasons for optimism in relation to the popularity of the UN and UNA 
among young people. 1946 saw the creation of the United Nations Student Association 
(UNSA) following a conference held at the University of Birmingham attended by 130 
delegates representing 50 universities, university colleges, training colleges and technical 
colleges.137 The Council for Education in World Citizenship (CEWC), originally the LNU’s 
Education Committee that in 1939 became a self-governing body responsible to the LNU’s 
Executive Committee, vastly improved the delicate relationship it had held with its parent 
body.138 UNA provided CEWC with accommodation, staff and vital financial aid and there 
were strong personal contacts in the form of the first Secretary of UNA Charles Judd, a 
former Secretary of the CEWC and the second Secretary of UNA David Ennals who also 
served successively as the Secretary of the CEWC and then UNA.139  They were auspicious 
beginnings for the postwar CEWC that now rose to the challenge presented by the new 
possibilities that opened up with the 1944 Education Act. By the end of 1946, 506 schools and 
school societies became affiliated with CEWC along with 87 youth clubs, and district 
councils were formed in Birmingham, Sheffield, Edinburgh and Oxford while a constitution 
was drawn up for a Welsh National Council. Three thousand children from all over Britain 
crowded into the Kingsway Hall in London to attend the four day CEWC Christmas holiday 
lecture that had become and would remain an annual event. Speakers included Anuerin 
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Bevan, Arthur Creech Jones and the LNU stalwart and future Chairwoman of UNA’s 
Executive Committee Kathleen Courtney.140 Who said liberal internationalism was dead? 
At its birth, UNA enjoyed its peak. The signs that portended a future struggle were 
already apparent. Judd would later recall that the first five years of UNA was ‘the honeymoon 
period in which everyone paid lip service to the UN’.141 As the following chapters will 
demonstrate wholehearted support for the UN proved elusive. Furthermore, despite successes 
in attracting young people to the UNA, the majority of its membership appeared to be closer 
to the grave than the cradle. Most of the advertisements that featured within United Nations 
News were aimed at those suffering from various ailments; they included promotions of a 
denture cleaner, hearing-aids and remedies for rheumatism.142 Moreover, public cynicism, 
fatalism and apathy plagued the UNA activist. The seeming irrelevance of the individual in 
the face of Cold War politics had its impact.  Even in the heady days of the late 1940s, the 
annual reports complained of encountering, in the words of the UN’s first Secretary General 
Trygve Lie, ‘[c]heap scepticism, based upon ignorance’.143   
By 1952, UNA decided to attempt to help combat such scepticism and ‘the growth of 
materialistic fatalism that too readily shirks all sense of international responsibility’ by issuing 
a manifesto, The Challenge of a New Age, which declared that ‘men must learn to live as one 
community or perish’ and that individuals could meet the challenge through the UN. The next 
year a series of leaflets were circulated from UNA’s headquarters to UNA branches to assist 
them with advice to increase a falling membership. UNA appeared to recognise, as Chatham 
House’s branches would, that the era of the public meeting was coming to an end and 
recommended special activities designed to attract greater numbers to UNA branch events. 
They ranged from discussion meetings on topical, controversial questions and interschool 
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quiz competitions to brain trusts and mock trials. In order to raise money, headquarters 
betrayed the largely middle class audience it was targeting by suggesting bring and buy sales, 
Christmas carol parties, flag days, UNA concerts, garden parties and whist drives.  
Furthermore, the leaflets pressed branch staff that if they could not get people to attend their 
meetings, they must infiltrate the meetings of the local Rotary Club, the Women’s Institute, 
church societies, youth clubs and trades councils.144  
The typical criticisms of the UN that UNA activists encountered among the public are 
revealed in a preparatory document produced in 1957 by headquarters to counter them. The 
majority related to fatalistic attitudes to international politics and concerns over sovereignty. 
They included: ‘The United Nations is bound to fail because you can’t change human nature’; 
‘UN is not new. It has been tried before. It will fail, as the League of Nations failed’; ‘The 
United Nations is dominated by America’; ‘UN is nothing but a talking shop’; ‘The H-Bomb 
has made nonsense of UN’. Others indicated concerns over sovereignty: ‘Why does UN poke 
its nose in the internal affairs of countries such as Britain and France, look what it has done to 
break up the British Empire!’; and ‘UN only provides our enemies with a platform for their 
propaganda’.145 
Amid such complaints, in the 1950s UNA membership swiftly dropped (see figure 
2.5). The issue of how to secure support for the UN and on which aspects of its work it should 
focus on became more pressing. Appreciating public disillusion with Cold War power politics 
and how it had frustrated the UN’s efforts to foster peace and security, UNA became keen to 
publicise that this was but one aspect of the UN’s work and thus shifted the spotlight to areas 
where its successes were more tangible. In the 1950s, UNA discovered for itself the 
popularity of humanitarian causes.  
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In 1952, a number of branches reported that the work of UNICEF had a particularly 
strong appeal both among UNA members and the general public.146 Subsequently, in the next 
year, three UNA regional councils in England organised a special appeal for UNA and 
UNICEF whereby 80% of the net proceeds were designated to UNICEF while UNA retained 
the remaining 20%. The three regions raised nearly £10,000 and the following year UNA 
decided to hold a national campaign along the same lines. Gaining the assistance of 51 
national organisations, including the three major political parties, UNA coordinated a 
campaign in which volunteers visited five million homes. By June 1955, £160,000 had been 
raised. UNA had collected more money from the joint UNICEF/UNA appeal than it would 
normally have done under its singular annual UNA appeal surrounding UN Day. All the 
while, the government was lobbied, especially via MPs in the West Midlands, to increase its 
contribution to UNICEF. Assisted by UNA’s coordination of public pressure, in 1953 the 
British contribution was raised from £50,000 to £100,000 and was doubled again in 1954.147 
UNA also enjoyed some success when it organised a Korean Relief Fund in the wake of the 
Korean War. It acquired over £6,000 and procured medical supplies to the value of £250, all 
of which was distributed to voluntary organisations working in Korea including Save the 
Children, the British Council of Churches and the British Red Cross.148   
Following fast on the heels of the UNICEF and Korean relief campaigns, plans were 
underway in 1955 for the organisation of a UNA Refugee Appeal in 1956/57 for UNHCR.149 
The campaign took on new significance given the media coverage that alerted the public to 
the plight of Hungarian refugees in the wake of the Soviet Union’s suppression of the 
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Hungarian Revolution.150 The appeal raised nearly £450,000; 90% of which was provided to 
the UNHCR and 10% for UNA. Furthermore, UNA latched on to an idea put forward by the 
Conservative Bow Group which recommended that there should a World Refugee Year. UNA 
secured enough influential all-party support for the idea that the government submitted the 
proposal to the UN General Assembly and 1959/60 became World Refugee Year in which 
again UNA branches were highly active.151 In 1961, UNA also played an important part in the 
Freedom from Hunger Campaign, a five-year worldwide campaign by the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organisation. Donald Tweddle, Joint Secretary of UNA, stood down to 
become General Secretary of the UK’s campaign.152 The campaign occupied much of UNA’s 
activities in 1962 and 1963 while it established many local committees to raise money for the 
UK’s fund.153  
Even UNA’s periodicals could not escape the humanitarian bug. While United Nations 
News was experiencing financial difficulties as a result of small circulation, a new periodical 
was released in 1955 in what was proclaimed to be ‘one of the most exciting experiments 
UNA has tried for a long time’, an eight-page monthly illustrated newspaper was launched 
named The World’s News. It was designed ‘to appeal to those who seldom read anything more 
than the mass circulation dailies’ and so illustrated the work of UN and its agencies through 
human interest stories. However, the paper struggled to reach its production costs and in 1958 
was re-launched as New World, which still remains UNA’s principal publication.154 New 
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World sought to capitalise on interest in humanitarianism, to ‘give news that does not appear 
in other papers of the behind-the-scenes stories of the battle against poverty and disease’.155 
However, this focus on humanitarian causes stoked criticism within UNA. A number 
feared that UNA had become so preoccupied with attempting to win the hearts of the public 
through humanitarian campaigns that they had neglected their minds. In 1955 following the 
success of the UNICEF campaign, UNA decided that the celebrations for the tenth 
anniversary of the UN should include a Citizen’s Enquiry. Whereas the UNICEF appeal ‘went 
straight to the heart, and purse strings were opened wide’, the Citizen’s Enquiry sought to 
educate opinion to advocate international action to rid the world of the fundamental 
conditions that UNICEF could only temporarily relieve; ‘to think a little about these bigger 
problems’ and treat the disease rather than the symptom.156  
Rather than acting as an opinion poll or referendum like the LNU’s Peace Ballot, the 
Citizen’s Enquiry was primarily designed to encourage discussion in the groups to which 
people belonged and, like the Peace Ballot, a discussion guide was provided for the purpose. 
The enquiry covered four topics: race relations, international aid and development, 
disarmament, and support for the UN (see table 2.1).157 UNA branches and the local sections 
of more than thirty national organisations were involved and disseminated 50,000 
questionnaire forms and 25,000 copies of the discussion pamphlet. People were invited to 
return their results, but there was little sustained effort to collect them. Only 686 groups did 
return their answers and their responses do not appear to have been collated, with the 
exception of the question that asked whether the UN had justified its existence. Nearly 96% of 
the replies received by UNA expressed the view that the UN had justified its existence in the 
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first ten years. The annual report qualified this with the statement that any smaller percentage 
would have been ‘very discouraging’ as the majority of the groups who replied were 
associated with UNA.158 Nevertheless, the enquiry was effective in receiving media coverage 
and occupied a central part of the celebrations surrounding UN Day, including a discussion of 
the enquiry by a team of four ‘“ordinary citizens”’ on a new BBC television programme Your 
Own Time.159 
In contrast, the next enquiry similarly tasked with stoking interest in the UN and 
international politics was issued by UNA had much more in common with the LNU Peace 
Ballot and was the closest UNA ever came to recreating its success. It followed its 
Disarmament Campaign launched in 1959 in order to educate and organise a body of public 
opinion to encourage the government to arrange multilateral disarmament negotiations. Two 
months after the campaign had begun the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd stimulated 
negotiations for a disarmament programme by balanced stages. UNA would claim credit.160 
Unfortunately, the USA and the USSR failed to come to an agreement.161 In May 1960, keen 
to maintain momentum and in light of the dismal lack of attention paid to disarmament during 
the general election campaign in the previous year, UNA decided to distribute a mass 
questionnaire on disarmament. 
This time, all six questions of the Disarmament Enquiry invited yes or no or no reply 
(see table 2.2) responses. The enquiry was funded from the money Philip Noel-Baker received 
from a Nobel Peace Prize awarded to him in 1959. UNA and associated organisations 
(particularly trade unions) distributed 725,000 copies of the questionnaire and the questions   
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1. Do you believe 
a) That all men and women should not be granted equal rights without distinction as to race; or 
b) That the right of all men and women to equality should be recognised, but that full rights 
should only be granted when certain educational or social standards have been attained; or 
c) That certain races are basically inferior and cannot expect ever to be granted equal rights?  
2. How can local groups help to improve race relations in our own country? [open-ended] 
Better Standards of Life 
1. Do you think that Britain is devoting 
a) Too much of its resources to helping other countries with a lower standard of living than our 
own; or  
b) Not enough; or  
c) A fair proportion? 
2. If your answer was ‘not enough’ would you be prepared to forgo a reduction of 6d. in the standard 
rate of income tax to pay for additional aid? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
The Scourge of War 
1. Which most nearly represents your views 
a) That complete disarmament is the only answer and that this country should carry this out 
regardless of the policy of other nations; or  
b) That we should make renewed efforts thought the United Nations to reach agreement on a 
system of comprehensive and drastic disarmament with inspection and control; or  
c) That it is unrealistic to make any further attempt to reach agreement about world-wide 
disarmament; and that a high level of armaments will remain essential.  
2. If another country has been attacked, ought Britain 
a) To send troops to assist if called on to do so by the United Nations whether or not we like the 
form of Government of the attacked country; or 
b) To send troops only if the country is a close ally; or  
c) To remain neutral at all costs?  
3. Under what circumstances do you feel the use of atomic weapons to be justified 
a) Only if they should be used by an enemy; or  
b) Whether used by the enemy or not; or  
c) Under no circumstances? 
To Unite Our Strength 
1. Has the United Nations justified its existence in its first ten years? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
2. Do you believe that the policy of democratic Governments in the UN can be influenced by the 
opinions of ordinary people? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
3. How can ordinary people best help the United Nations? [open-ended] 
Table 2.1. The questions posed in UNA’s 1955 Citizens’ Enquiry.  
Source: Trade Union Congress Mss, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (hereafter TUC Mss): 
MSS.292/921.9/6: ‘“We the Peoples...”: A Citizens’ Enquiry into the United Nations’, 1955. Note this is a draft copy that 









 All opinion Student opinion 
Question Yes No No 
Reply 
Yes No No 
Reply 
1.  
a) Are you in favour of general world disarmament 
including the total abolition of all nuclear 




















b) If so, would you like our Government to take the 
imitative in drawing up detailed proposals for a 













2. It is generally agreed that it would be impossible 
to establish any system of international 
inspection which would be completely 
watertight; some nations might be able to hide a 
small proportion of their stocks of nuclear 
bombs.  
Would you be prepared to accept this risk as an 



















3. It is believed that the margin of risk would be 
greatly reduced if the “means of delivery” was 
abolished, i.e., the missiles and missile-launching 
sites, as well as all types of submarine, aeroplane, 
or cannon capable of dropping or firing nuclear 
bombs. These are far harder to conceal than the 
nuclear bombs and, by international inspection, it 
should be easier to check that all are destroyed.  
Do you agree that the abolition of these “means 
of delivery” should be one of the first items of 





































4. It is sometimes proposed that this country should 
on its own, abandon all its nuclear weapons, even 
if other countries keep theirs. 



















5. The People’s Republic of China is not yet 
represented in the United Nations but it has a 
population of 600 million and is preparing to 
make its own nuclear weapons. 
Should the People’s Republic of China now be 



















6. Do you think that, as national armaments are cut 
down, the United Nations should begin to build 
up an international force which would be strong 













Table 2.2. The questions and replies to UNA’s 1960 Disarmament Enquiry.  
Source: Trade Union Congress Mss, Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick (hereafter TUC Mss): 
MSS.292B/921.9/1: ‘An Enquiry on Disarmament: Half a Million Answers’, undated. Student opinion (included in the totals 






featured in a number of their periodicals.162 At 495,809, the total number of replies fell far 
short of the 11,640,066 total reached by the LNU in 1935, but like the Ballot, the vast 
majority of the responses supported UNA proposals.163 Arguably the most controversial 
question, at least in Britain, was number four that enquired whether the respondent approved 
of unilateral disarmament. The response to this question was a little more mixed than the 
others: 95,480 (19%) agreed, 398,212 (80%) disagreed. The extent to which the replies to the 
Disarmament Enquiry accurately reflected – or indeed influenced – public opinion requires 
further research, particularly at the local level. However, the results of the enquiry, operating 
between May 1960 and September 1960, shared similarities with other contemporaneous 
surveys of public opinion. A Gallup Poll in May 1960 indicated that 33% advocated unilateral 
disarmament, but in September and October 1960, the figure fell to 21%.164 Nevertheless, 
there were those within UNA who when looking at their declining membership figures were 
envious of the attention that unilateralists, namely CND, received.165  
The success of CND and other internationalist NGOs had demonstrated that there was 
still public interest in the outside world. Yet UNA was struggling to maintain its membership. 
In the 1950s, despite all of the publicity directed towards it as a result of its campaigns, UNA 
had lost nearly 20,000 members. There had been a number of membership campaigns in the 
1950s that had helped stem the loss involving a membership race and ‘Commando Weeks’ in 
which a team of five speakers descended onto several towns addressing local organisations 
and identifying the ‘key people’ in the area. 166 However, it was apparent that much more 
needed to be done. In 1955, a Gallup Poll found that 53% believed that the best way to aid the 
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UN was by taking an active interest in its work. Asked how they might do this, 2% (about 1% 
of those polled) stated they could join UNA. UNA drew two conclusions from this poll. 
Firstly, a favourable opinion of UNA only existed for 1% of the population. Secondly, UNA 
should only be so lucky to possess a membership that amounted to 1% of the population. So 
why was UNA struggling to attract members? In 1961 a future UNA Secretary, Hugh Walker, 
argued that although UNA might not have been impressed by CND’s aims and methods, the 
rapid success of the movement in gaining publicity for itself should encourage the 
Association to consider adopting some of its characteristics. He looked to how CND used 
well-known personalities, such as A.J.P Taylor, Canon John Collins and Kingsley Martin to 
gain media attention along with their apparent lack of caution in attracting controversy.167  
Walker was not alone. In the early 1960s, the question of how to attract public support 
for the UN and UNA came to a head. Many within UNA, especially the branches, blamed 
UNA’s humanitarian campaigns. They argued that although they attracted attention it 
disrupted the process of collecting renewal subscriptions and neglected the UN’s important 
political and economic work. It was an old complaint. Branch staff tended to be small and 
time was in short supply. In 1948, UNA reached its peak membership when it touched 87,969 
in May before slipping to 85,079 at the end of the year. That year, branch collectors had been 
unable to find time to retrieve renewal subscriptions from over 16,000 existing members.168 In 
October 1963, fresh from their efforts in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, the branches 
met at the General Council, in which a motion urged the Executive Committee ‘to be 
constantly mindful’ of the distraction caused by activities that failed to stimulate ‘in 
proportion to the energy and funds expended on them, interest and support for the political 
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and economic as well as the humanitarian activities of the United Nations’.169 UNA needed to 
choose its priorities.  
Later that year a special committee was tasked with considering the motion and more 
broadly the future direction of the Association. John Hodgess-Roper, one of the authors of the 
motion and future Director of Chatham House in the 1990s was invited to the committee and 
explained the problem: ‘We have only limited resources to enable us to attain almost limitless 
objectives’. He outlined four potential futures for the UNA that were being discussed.170 The 
first was that UNA should focus its energies as a pressure group; to, like the LNU, influence 
government by means of reaching the widest public possible and impressing upon them the 
importance of the UN. The second direction involved a more dramatic reorganisation. The 
UNA would look to Chatham House’s model and become a study group containing high-
powered intellectuals. This option had the sympathy of Nicolson, who doubted that the UN 
had the necessary popular support in Britain and the UNA the dynamism necessary for it to 
sustain a mass membership. Nicolson worried that the pressure group route would lead to the 
UNA imitating CND sit-down circles in Whitehall and told his colleagues that if they ‘sat 
down outside the Foreign Office we would not be invited to sit down inside’.171 A model 
along similar lines that was given more attention as it was understood to be compatible with 
having a mass membership was to adopt the characteristics of the Fabian Society and the Bow 
Group in which the UNA would become a forum for the generation of ideas rather than 
producing publications as expressions of collective policy.172 In 1968 this idea was abortively 
explored as a potential function of the Association rather than it being its raison d’être. It was 
proposed that it should be called the Hammarskjold Group to commemorate the former UN 
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Secretary-General.173  The third option was to become a discussion group, an adult education 
organisation along the lines of the WEA. The fourth option was that the UNA should focus its 
efforts towards becoming a humanitarian agency. It was supposed that this could be ‘the line 
of the least resistance’, that it could keep the treasurer happy and, by means of encouraging 
support in the humanitarian aspect of the UN’s work, perhaps develop a general loyalty to the 
UN in all of its activities.174  
However, it was UNA’s humanitarian work that came under the most scrutiny. One of 
the authors of the committee’s report, the former Chairwoman of UNA Kathleen Courtney, 
agreed with the arguments made by the proposers of the motion that had stimulated the 
conference and also attacked UNA’s International Service Department (ISD). The ISD had 
evolved from a visit made in 1953 to the Netherlands by a team of UNA volunteers led by 
David Ennals, one of the principal movers behind UNA’s humanitarian campaigns, to assist 
restoration work after extensive flood damage. It was formally established in 1956 to assist 
Hungarian refugees in Austria. It was part of the strategy to attract members – especially the 
young through promise of foreign adventure and tangible contribution – who might otherwise 
be put off by the UN’s more divisive political and security issues.175 Courtney, however, 
doubted that this was the most effective method by which to attract young people. Instead she 
suggested that the ‘challenge to work at building the kind of world in which war and 
intolerance will cease to provide an endless succession of refugees and others who need to be 
succoured from generation to generation’ would have a much a stronger appeal among the 
young.176 It was the same fear that lurked behind the Citizen’s Enquiry; that enthusiasm for 
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humanitarian relief would distract UNA from its true purpose to promote international 
organisation and cooperation. Although the committee did not advise that UNA should pursue 
fewer objectives, significantly it did conclude that campaigns for the UN’s agencies ought to 
be reduced to one every three or four years. The government was also asked to press the UN 
to avoid placing upon NGOs the responsibilities for raising funds for work governments 
should themselves finance.177  
Courtney was correct. There was an appetite among young people for building a new 
world, rather than just providing temporary relief and the late 1950s and 1960s provided 
plenty of international political issues including the Suez Crisis, Apartheid, Vietnam, nuclear 
war scares and Rhodesia. Nonetheless, although such events helped attract many young 
people to the UNA, it was not at the same scale enjoyed by new social movements.178 Yet the 
need to attract young people to join UNA, to actively engage them in its activities and to get 
them to encourage other young people to do likewise was urgent. It was estimated in 1963 
that 80% of the membership was over 55, 10% were 25-55 and another 10% were under 25.179  
One of the most significant reasons for UNA’s membership decline was simply its 
failure to attract enough young members. Death even comes to die-hards eventually and 
through the 1960s to the 1980s UNA was gradually losing those members who had kept their 
subscriptions to LNU through the Second World War. In 1968, during another conference that 
discussed the future of UNA in Loughborough, UNSA argued that in order to attract younger 
members, UNA needed to make clear that it was ‘a radical organisation, in the sense we see 
what is going on in the world, don’t much like much of what we see, and are anxious for rapid 
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improvements’.180 UNSA recognised in UNA something unique. UNA was a multi-issue 
pressure group because the world's problems involved multiple issues. They thought that this 
should be a source of great strength for UNA, not a weakness.  
 
This gives us an opportunity – perhaps even an obligation – to put across our ideas as a total 
radical/internationalist philosophy. Our efforts should not simply be devoted to campaigning 
against Apartheid, Vietnam, Disarmament, Aid, etc., but to relating these issues to each other: 
super-power diplomacy affects disarmament, and also the nature of the relationship between 
rich and poor countries – which in turn involves a consideration of economic development, 
and national liberation movements. UNA is the only political organisation in this country 
which is in a position to relate all these issues together from a non-doctrinaire standpoint.181  
 
However, UNSA complained that UNA’s political work was ‘too fragmented’.182 
Fragmentation was particularly apparent among the youth sections of UNA of which, by the 
1960s, there were no fewer than four. In addition to UNSA, there were CEWC, ISD and a 
recently created body UNA Youth, which targeted young people outside universities and 
schools beyond the reach of UNSA and the CEWC.183 UNA Youth was inspired by the 
anxiety that the existing youth sections were failing to ensure that their members joined the 
parent body, UNA, when they left school or university.184 UNA Youth, however, discovered 
that the proposal that UNSA members should join UNA when they graduated was often met 
with derision. UNA was considered ‘old and decrepit’. Similarly to UNSA, UNA Youth 
worried of ‘compartmentalisation’ and warned against the implementation of a proposal for 
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yet another youth group framed along the lines of the Bow Group, to attract recent UNSA 
graduates.185  
However, the conference in Loughborough had been called to discuss how UNA 
might best direct an ambitious membership campaign that aimed to raise membership by 
50,000 within twelve months and sought to attract young people among others. In light of 
new publicity afforded to UNA in 1968 in connection with Human Rights Year and a well-
received defence of the United Nations from UNA Chairman Humphry Berkeley on the 
BBC’s Your Witness programme, UNA decided it an opportune time to launch a national 
membership campaign on UN Day. There were reasons for optimism. Firstly, prior to the 
campaign, the Opinion Research Centre had conducted a survey that indicated that 11% of the 
population was likely or very likely to join the Association if invited to do so. Secondly, the 
campaign had the support of the three party leaders. Thirdly, and most encouragingly, 
following their highly successful “For God’s Sake” Campaign for the Salvation Army, the 
KMP (Kingsley, Maston and Palmer) Partnership was enlisted.186 Once again it was the 
middle classes that were targeted and although young people were earmarked in the 
campaign, they were one of many target groups. On UNA advice the KMP Partnership also 
aimed to reach subscribers to similar organisations, those with humanitarian or liberal 
attitudes and community leaders, in addition to attempting to cajole lapsed members and 
ensure the loyalty of current members.187 
Furthermore, although its membership campaign was not without innovations – such 
as the uniform use of UN Blue for adverts, toys, ties and badges – it was hardly one focussed 
on attracting the young. It was mainly focused on attracting the attention of the quality press.   
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Illustration 2.1. UNA advertisement in the Guardian, part of the 1968/69 membership campaign. 





It secured favourable leaders in the Observer and The Sunday Times. A costly full-page colour 
advertisement was placed in The Times on UN Day. The advert read: ‘There wasn’t a world 
war again yesterday. Did you do anything to help avoid it?’ UNA received one thousand 
replies.188 The Guardian too carried a number of advertisements, including another that 
reinvented the popular First World War poster designed to invoke the (male) reader’s sense of 
duty (see illustration 2.1).189 However, the response was hardly electrifying; 133 subscriptions 
were received as a result of the advertisement.190  
The campaign fell far short of its ambitions. Within one year, membership had only 
increased by 6,000. Worse, the next year it nearly lost the same amount. Between 1970 and 
1976, another 19,000 members were lost. Amidst, falling membership figures, tensions and 
budgetary problems, those crucial sections of UNA targeting the young were forced to 
streamline. In 1971, UNSA and UNA Youth merged to become United Nations Youth and 
Student Association and CEWC became an independent body in 1977, as did the ISD in 
1998.191 UNA failed to don the radical image its younger members, who were so crucial to its 
future, desired of it. UNA was struggling in other areas too. In 1972, the print order of New 
World did not exceed 15,000; the bulk of UNA’s membership did not subscribe. It was 
claimed, however, that its readership was four times that figure.192 If it was, most of those 
who were reading were not joining UNA. Similarly, the 1976 annual report claimed that as a 
result of UNA and its agencies’ activities in the last year, ten million people had been 
informed of its existence, one million had been given some awareness of what it stood for, 
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250,000 had been significantly influenced and 30,000 had been ‘educated in some depth’.193 
Nonetheless, UNA was haemorrhaging members. In spite of some early success, it appeared 
that UNA had not quite understood the public understanding of international affairs. 
Unfortunately, while it struggled to attain support for the UN among the public directly, it 
also struggled to attain it indirectly.  
 
 
EDUCATING UNRELIABLE EDUCATORS 
When it came to the media, Chatham House was not alone in dabbling in the King-Hall 
model. Although UNA directly engaged with the public in order to coordinate it and give 
clout to their recommendations to the policy making elite, the media provided another route to 
reach public opinion beyond the reach of its activists and additionally bring further influence 
to bear on the government. Of course, UNA was not alone among NGOs in doing this. 
However, its media strategies were by no means as systematic and as effective as those of 
CND or the likes of Shelter or Oxfam.194 However, UNA and Chatham House’s cause of 
liberal internationalism was also hindered by media practices. If it was the role of Chatham 
House to ‘educate the educators’, the educators proved troublesome. The very nature of news 
selection and construction provided a set of structures that the causes of other NGOs could 
avoid or even manipulate. These structures proved especially unwieldy within the popular 
media. Nonetheless, the influence of Chatham House and UNA on setting the news agenda in 
the quality media – when international affairs were covered – should not be underestimated. 
However, the effectiveness of the King-Hall model must be brought into question, as it failed 
to reach out further to the consumers of the popular media.   
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Figure 2.7. Number of mentions of Chatham House in a selection of newspapers, 1945-1975. 
Source: Guardian, Observer, The Times, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Daily Mirror.  
 
Figure 2.8. Number of mentions of UNA in a selection of newspapers, 1945-1975. 




























































The assessment of the extent to which Chatham House influenced the international 
news agenda is inherently challenging. The Institute was not seeking the public profile of 
UNA. It sought to influence the media elite so that they in turn would influence public 
opinion. That influence was largely invisible. For example, figure 2.7, shows the number of 
mentions that the Institute received in a selection of newspapers, but it does not account for 
instances where the use of Chatham House’s research and facilities shaped journalists’ reports 
of international events, or how it affected their instincts for what constituted international 
news. In terms of both news construction and news selection there is qualitative evidence that 
suggests that Chatham House had a large impact, especially earlier in the period when there 
was greater concentration on international affairs and the Institute had fewer competitors in 
the field. When the Korean War began on 25 June 1950, the chief diplomatic correspondent of 
the Observer, William Clark, quickly convinced the editor, David Astor, that the paper’s 
principal response should be an article that filled the editorial page. 25 June was a Sunday, so 
Clark had a week to prepare. The next day at nine o’clock in the morning, his first port of call 
was Chatham House where Clark made good use of its ‘wonderful library service’.195 
Naturally, there was no mention of the Institute in the eventual article and so it does not 
feature within the results of figure 2.7.196  
 However, in order to maintain such relationships and form new ones, Chatham House 
needed to protect and nurture its intellectual legitimacy. A good profile within the media 
provided useful endorsements. It could also provide opportunities for staff members to talk to 
the public directly. This also suited those members who reasoned that if it was not the 
business of Chatham House to distribute their publications more widely, then it should liaise 
with those bodies whose business was dissemination to further the public understanding of 
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international affairs. In 1944, Henry Hodson, a member of the Chatham House Council and 
later Editor of The Sunday Times, was among them.  
 
[I]t is not only right but indeed necessary, if Chatham House is to fill its proper place in the 
life of the British Empire, that the fruits of its work should be more widely disseminated, since 
in a democratic country the public are in the end the masters of the experts.197 
 
There was demand within the media. During the Second World War, Chatham House 
staff had been in high demand at the BBC. Yet the secondment of Chatham House staff to the 
government during the war, in the form of FRPS, complicated the matter of their inclusion 
within BBC broadcasts. In light of an incident where a Chatham House researcher felt it 
necessary to consult the Foreign Office with his script before broadcast, Toynbee, the Director 
of FRPS, feared for the Institute’s prized reputation for objectivity and enacted an embargo. 
Once again the Institute was protecting its intellectual legitimacy.198  However, within the 
BBC the embargo was considered a ‘serious inconvenience’ that hindered its efforts ‘to give 
the public authoritative guidance...when we do need speakers from Chatham House, we need 
them badly, and their places are very difficult to fill’.199 Nevertheless, Chatham House’s 
relationship with the BBC did strengthen during the war. Soon after its outbreak, the need for 
more personal contacts between both organisations was recognised.200 The FRPS’s weekly 
review of foreign press was also placed at the disposal of the BBC. In return it provided FRPS 
with a twice-a-day digest of radio broadcasts by foreign radio stations monitored by the 
BBC’s Overseas Intelligence Department.201 The BBC also made extensive use of the 
Institute’s Information Department.202  
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After the war, Chatham House remained of value to the BBC. ‘The number of 
occasions’, observed the prolific educational broadcaster Jean Rowntree in 1953, ‘on which 
the BBC had been helped by Chatham House...were almost too many to be recorded’.203 No 
longer encumbered by an embargo, staff frequented a number of radio programmes including 
Facts First, a weekly series in which an expert examined a topical problem of domestic or 
foreign affairs.204 Toynbee was a staple fixture on the BBC’s programmes concerned with 
international affairs.205 Before the war, although, it was noted that was ‘apt to be fluffy and 
metaphorically prolonged’, he needed little rehearsal before recording. After the war, his 
contributions were sought with new vigour as he rose to fame after the abridgement of his 
Study of History began in 1946. The producer Anna Kallin was particularly persistent in 
attempting to enlist him for broadcasts on the BBC’s Third Programme, even after he had 
declined invitations.206 The Overseas Service was similarly keen to get Toynbee to feature on 
its programmes.207 In 1952, he delivered the Reith Lectures. His series, which was entitled 
‘The World and the West’, examined the impact that the West had on the rest of the world 
from the perspective of the latter.208 The BBC considered the lectures to be a good success. 
One report described it as representing ‘what we want in broadcasting – something personal 
and original... some of the grandeur of Spengler with a gloss of quiet liberalism’.209  
Toynbee’s successors also became old hands at the BBC. Notably Kenneth Younger 
frequented a variety of programmes, particularly for the Overseas Service, but also for the 
Home Service, including Woman’s Hour.210 His profile was elevated due to his former 
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position as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and he showed early promise. The first time 
he took part in a discussion programme, he was singled out in a BBC list of commentators as 
‘most impressive – clear fluent and very sound...Very strongly recommended’.211 Younger’s 
successor, Andrew Shonfield, became the second Reith Lecturer affiliated with Chatham 
House. In 1972 he delivered his timely lecture series, entitled ‘Europe: Journey to an 
Unknown Destination’, in which he debated (favourably) Britain’s entry into the EEC.212   
Chatham House also consolidated its relationship with the press during the Second 
World War. In 1942, concerned for its finances, the Institute decided to invite more bodies to 
become corporate subscribers, including newspapers.213 By 1945, 14 newspapers were 
corporate subscribers.214 All of the subscribers belonged to the quality press. As shown by 
figure 2.7, three of those subscribers – The Times, the Guardian and the Observer – made 
significantly more frequent mention of the Institute than the popular press – The Daily Mail, 
The Daily Express and The Daily Mirror – who were not corporate subscribers. The King-
Hall model had its limits. Even the references that were made to the Institute by the popular 
press were mostly in regards to the more controversial lecturers that visited St James’s Square 
rather than the opinions of its staff or publications.  
The Guardian, The Times and the Observer, however, all prided themselves on their 
international news coverage. As a weekly paper, the number of mentions made by the most 
cosmopolitan of the newspapers, the Observer, was especially high. During 1959, when the 
Observer mentioned the Institute the most, Chatham House was referred to once or more in 
21% of the paper’s issues over the year. This was natural in light of David Astor’s tenure as 
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editor between 1946 and 1975. Not only had his family played an important role in the 
development of Chatham House, he had a profound interest in international affairs which he 
shared with the columnists he enlisted. It was also the most liberal paper. Furthermore, the 
Observer prioritised ideas over news, which would have made it more likely to value the 
Institute’s research facilities and its utility as a forum.215 
In demonstration of the Institute’s connection with the establishment, significant 
reference was made to Chatham House by The Times, the ‘house journal of the British 
élite’.216 The large number of references made in The Times in the 1960s was in part 
attributable to advertising for the Institute’s publications and reflects Chatham House’s target 
audience. However, there were also a large number of references to the Institute in the 
obituary pages and in relation to economic and business matters. The latter may reflect the 
Institute’s desire for its research to be increasingly valuable to the large number of businesses 
who held corporate subscriptions. On a similar theme, a significant portion of the references 
were also made in relation to Chatham House research on the merits of Britain joining the 
EEC. The Guardian also made frequent mention of the Institute’s activities, research, and 
visiting lecturers (both controversial and not). It also took a strong interest in the purposes of 
the Institute itself and was not afraid to be critical.  
While some NGOs were unafraid of attracting criticism for publicity’s sake, Chatham 
House was particular sensitive in light of the need to maintain its intellectual legitimacy. 
Figure 2.7 shows a spike of mentions by the Guardian in 1954 when, as aforementioned, its 
letters pages played host to a very public airing of the grievances held by Chatham House’s 
membership. The Institute’s sensitivity was evident in the AGM that year when Younger, 
then Vice-Chairman of the Institute, made it known his irritation at those members for making 
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their criticisms so public.217 It was also particularly apparent in Macadam’s over-reaction to 
criticisms that surfaced in the periodical Truth. 
Truth had previously been a clandestine mouthpiece for Neville Chamberlain’s 
National Government controlled by the Conservative Research Department. However, during 
the Second World War controlling shares transferred to the libertarian Ernest Benn and Truth 
became a medium of propaganda for the Society of Individualists.218 Its Deputy Editor was 
Arthur K. Chesterton, the founder of the League of Empire Loyalists who later helped 
establish the National Front.219 Fearing the demise of the British Empire and suspicious of 
Chatham House’s Commonwealth Relations Conferences, between 1943 and 1952 Chesterton 
launched a litany of attacks on the Institute which amounted to conspiracy theory. ‘Ever since 
that notorious Chatham House “Empire Relations Conference”’, wrote Chesterton, ‘powerful 
interests have been working day and night to destroy the unique significance of the British 
Empire’.220 Chesterton vastly exaggerated the influence Chatham House had over British 
foreign policy.  
 
As the organisation known as P.E.P. [Political and Economic Planning] claims to have 
supplied the blueprints for much of the domestic “planning” by means of which the economic 
life of the nation is being “controlled”, so in the wider field of international relations Chatham 
House has sought to make itself the predominant influence...undeviating directed towards the 
disintegration of the British world.221 
 
After more such attacks in 1949, the Council nevertheless concluded that the influence 
of the magazine was too little to necessitate action. The Institute’s publications officer 
Edward Osborn was convinced that no one could alter Chesterton’s prejudice: ‘The real 
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answer seems to me to be a psychiatrist.’222 Even Chesterton’s editor Collin Brooks told 
Macadam that Chesterton was ‘as full of prejudices as a dog is fleas’.223 Yet Macadam still 
insisted on seeing Chesterton and stopping the attacks. It would not be until 1952 that 
Macadam would actually get to lunch with Chesterton and to Macadam’s credit the attacks 
did cease.224 Despite, having little interest in widely disseminating the Institute’s research 
directly among British citizens, Macadam proved eager to maintain the reputation of Chatham 
House among elite opinion informers.  
An important aspect of the Institute’s intellectual legitimacy was its collaboration and 
candid discussion with official experts. The Chatham House rule was instrumental here. 
Although it was designed to politically protect officials it was in order that information and 
ideas could be released. It was a democratising step in the politics of foreign policy. The 
media presented the greatest threat to it. At the sign of the rule being broken, the Institute had 
to take swift action, as it did with the Guardian. In November 1963, General Franco’s 
Minister of Information and Tourism, Manuel Fraga Iribane, came to speak at Chatham House 
where he was treated to a half hour interrogation concerning the detention and torture of 
Asturian miners in north-west Spain who had participated in a strike that summer. The 
Guardian detailed the meeting and Fraga Iribane’s responses.225 When Kenneth Younger 
protested, the Guardian’s editor Alistair Hetherington informed him that having failed to 
obtain an interview with Fraga Iribane, they felt it necessary to report what he said. 
Hetherington regretted the offence caused, but could not rule out the possibility of the 
Guardian reporting a future meeting of Chatham House. The Institute’s Council found this 
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unacceptable and the Guardian withdrew its membership of the Institute.226 It would not be 
resumed until 1986. 
The Guardian and Chatham House had contrasting views over what information 
should be kept away from public eyes. Hetherington explained to the soon-to-be Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, that ‘we must establish the principle that important public figures – 
especially those to whom we might in a sense, be hostile – ought to be accessible for on the 
record interviews’. Tellingly, the Labour Party leader gave a mixed and non-committal 
response. He could see some differences between dealings of non-attribution between British 
politicians and journalists on the one hand and such foreign visitors on the other, but 
nonetheless, ‘off the record briefings by these visitors could be valuable too’.227 Chatham 
House certainly thought so. As the political scientist David Vital put it, bodies like Chatham 
House believed that change of any real consequence could only be brought about  
 
Not by public demonstrations in Downing Street and Trafalgar Square, or by marches from 
and to Aldermaston, but over lunch at the Reform Club or the Travellers, by means of letters 
to the Times...and in the countless other miniature, latter-day agorae.228 
 
The Chatham House Rule was an intrinsic part of this method. It provided a secure 
space, one of those agorae, in which policy-makers could ‘talk and listen without commitment 
and without a record’.229 It was, of course, not alone in this practice. Wilson implicitly 
recognised it when Hetherington enquired into his views on Chatham House: the media lived 
and breathed on non-attribution.  
The uneasy relationship that followed between the Guardian and Chatham House 
revealed its public reputation. In 1974 Richard Gott, a journalist for the Guardian famously 
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later accused of being a Soviet informant, pilloried the Institute, ‘a corner of the 
establishment’, for first believing that if the public were better informed that world wars could 
be avoided and second, at any rate, never ‘seeking to educate beyond a restricted elite. It has 
never adjusted to the demands of a more populist age’. Gott complained that it ‘rarely hits the 
headlines, occasionally announcing with extreme discretion on the court page of the Times the 
holding of a dinner’.230 In 1977, a Guardian editorial hoped that the Institute would transform 
under the new Director David Watt towards ‘something less conformist and therefore more 
lively’.231  
 Gott’s critique of Chatham House of not adjusting to a more populist age could also 
have been applied to UNA. Both organisations could certainly have adopted more inventive 
media strategies. However, international affairs do not always lend themselves to being 
‘lively’. This is especially the case with those aspects that liberal internationalists desire to 
stress: multilateral, multifaceted solutions, cooperation and compromise make poor copy. It 
was especially apparent in UNA’s relations with the media.    
Even the BBC, with its Reithian pursuit to inform, educate and entertain, deemed the 
liberal internationalist cause to be so lacking in the last value as to negate its capability of 
providing in the first two. This was most evident in the BBC’s dwindling postwar 
commitment to the observance of UN Day. For the first UN Day in 1942, the BBC was 
enlisted to provide coverage on its Home, Forces and Empire Services. There was a message 
from the Prime Minister and a parade at Buckingham Palace. There was also commentary on 
celebrations in Aylesbury, the rural market town chosen to highlight the national commitment 
– outside of London – for the internationalist cause. A special service in St Martin in the 
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Fields was also broadcast.232 The following year, a special programme was written for the 
Empire Service which (rather painfully) enacted conversations between peoples of different 
nationalities recently acquainted, united together in London against the Axis Powers. They 
complained of too much singing of über alles and sentiments of my country right or wrong.233 
The BBC continued its all-day coverage throughout the 1940s, with some encouragement 
from the Foreign Office.234 It was well received within UNA. Activists reported that ‘public 
support for the United Nations Association is almost impossible to arrange without the regular 
reporting, of the kind undertaken by the B.B.C. News Division’.235 However, there was a 
growing disinclination to continue on the part of the BBC.   
 In 1949, the BBC hoped that the Prime Minster would not wish to broadcast a 
message on UN Day, as it would have to receive a prominent place within news bulletins.236 
UNA attempts to attach consistent significance to the observance of the anniversary within 
religious broadcasting department experienced difficulty. The head of religious broadcasting, 
fatigued by ‘an extremely long list of “special Sundays”’, was unconvinced that the special 
services advanced ‘the cause of Christian evangelism among the non-churchgoers who form 
the majority of the listeners’. It was further complicated by the anniversary’s proximity to 
Remembrance Sunday.237 The next year, soon after the Korean War had begun, it was argued 
that such occasions provided more effective, more topical, opportunities to propagate the 
merits of the UN ‘than anything purely formal and specially prepared for routine observance 
of an anniversary’.238  Topicality was the persistent problem. The work of the UN that did 
receive coverage was usually concerned with its role as mediator in Cold War international 
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politics, in which the UN often appeared to be a background actor. However, much of the 
UN’s energies were devoted to less glamorous economic and social concerns. The anniversary 
drew attention to such activities, but also sought to remind the public of the need to keep faith 
in an institution whose immediate rewards were not always obvious.  
The BBC’s research into its listenership found that the public were unimpressed. ‘It 
must be said’, wrote the BBC’s Assistant Director General Harman Grisewood, ‘these 
anniversaries do not represent natural or deepseated feelings among the people – as does for 
example, Armistice Day’.239 Furthermore, with little public sentiment attached to the day, 
there were fears that the BBC’s observation of it had the appearance of ‘semi-official 
propaganda’.240 In the 1950s and 1960s, the BBC’s coverage of the anniversary was 
significantly reduced. UNA attempts to encourage the BBC to do more, were met with the 
reply that the anniversary was simply not topical enough. The content of television magazine 
programmes that might be expected to cover such an anniversary such as Panorama or 
Tonight had to be ‘related to events and controversies of first significance to the public at the 
time’.241 By the 1950s, coverage of the anniversary was largely limited to a ministerial 
broadcast – now delivered by the Foreign Secretary, rather than the Prime Minister – and a 
radio broadcast of an internationally coordinated UN Day Concert.  
 The concert was a logistically ambitious event in which symphony orchestras from all 
over the world contributed to a live programme relayed by numerous broadcasters. It was 
somewhat like a UN version of the Proms. It had a mixed reception within the BBC. In 1958 
it was proclaimed an ‘undoubted success’, but by 1969 it was deemed ‘as usual well below 
normal broadcast standards of quality’.242 Awkwardly, the content fell somewhere between 
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the Home Service and the Light and Third Programmes. Indeed, over the years, it was played 
at least once on all three bandwidths. In order to reach the largest audience, it was preferable 
that it should be played on either the Home Service or Light Programme. But poor 
coordination by the concert organisers often meant that the BBC was given too little notice 
and in 1964 it was forced onto the Third Programme. Audience research that year found that 
only 0.2% of the population, or 1% of those listening to the radio, tuned into the concert. 
Although some listeners considered it to be ‘a rag-bag of miscellaneous pieces indifferently 
transmitted from all over’, more than half were ‘warmly appreciative’; some even received 
the intended message and pondered whether music was ‘the most effective language  for 
transcending national barriers’. 243 Yet it was hardly the mass audience UNA sought to 
captivate. In 1970, to add to the existing problems of poor audience uptake and insufficient 
organisation, there were technical problems and spiralling costs. The BBC, along with other 
world broadcasters, decided that it could no longer relay the concert. The decision was met 
with relief at Broadcasting House. ‘I know that many of us’ wrote the future Director-General 
Gerard Mansell, ‘have long felt that this concert had little musical interest, and we are now 
fortunately provided with a good reason for opting out of the whole exercise’.244 In the same 
year, the Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, was persuaded to move his UN Day 
message to the evening before, where it was attached to an episode of Radio 4’s Analysis 
concerned with the UN. It would be the last time a minister would deliver a message for UN 
Day.245 This was how the BBC marked the UN’s 25th Anniversary.  
Nonetheless, the public had hardly been biting at the bit in anticipation of the BBC’s 
UN coverage. The complaints that the BBC did receive were in the main from UNA, the 
United Nations Information Centre and the UN Department in the Foreign Office. In 1964, for 
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instance, the radio producer Patricia Brent was ‘somewhat embarrassed’ when she found 
herself being ‘shot at on all sides’ about the BBC’s lack of engagement with UN affairs at a 
meeting held in the Foreign Office to discuss plans for UN Day.246 However, the BBC and 
other media outlets pointed the finger of blame at the public’s lack of engagement with UN 
affairs.   
In the same year, the Observer journalist and television interviewer Kenneth Harris 
gave his thoughts as to why the UN failed to make good copy within the newspaper industry. 
He first made reference to newspaper policy. The Beaverbrook Press were opposed to the UN, 
while the Daily Telegraph, although supportive of its technical work, was frequently critical 
of the action it took during political crises. But the problems were more widespread than a 
group of papers with mixed feelings about the UN. Harris explained that the UN’s everyday 
successes, including its technical work, lacked excitement.  
 
[T]he continuing day-to-day constructive work of any permanent organisation is nothing like 
so interesting as a dramatic success or failure. The miracle by which dozens of aircraft cross 
the Atlantic every hour of the day intrigues nobody. When there is a crash it’s a different 
matter. The plain fact is that a great deal of the U.N.’s work is not dramatic enough to attract 
the newspaperman’s eye. 
 
Furthermore, the nature of the UN’s operation existed outside the traditional 
framework of a newspaper’s news story. Harris explained that diplomatic stories were usually 
presented in terms of personalities, sides and clashes in critical situations. British political 
coverage was ‘governed ultimately through the dialectic of the two opposing sides in the 
House of Commons, the continuing duel’. The UN’s purpose was to avoid polarisation and 
drama. British journalists were unfamiliar with the concept of framing news stories around 
multiple sides and personalities, including UN permanent officials who did not seek publicity 
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and instead pursued a ‘quiet diplomacy’. Moreover, this quiet diplomacy was nuanced and 
complex. The more people that a journalist wished to inform, the more the journalist needed 
to simplify and such simplification required more knowledge not less. Few correspondents 
were prepared to know all the ins and outs of the bewildering array of multiple and 
simultaneous UN activities. To cap it off, New York was an expensive location to maintain a 
permanent correspondent.247 This may help explain the sizeable coverage that the Observer 
provided to both Chatham House and UNA (see figures 2.7 and 2.8). The Observer’s 
aforementioned prioritisation of ideas rather than news perhaps provided a more favourable 
framework for reporting those aspects of international affairs that liberal internationalists 
wished to stress. David Astor’s indifference to his own wealth would have also helped 
provide more extensive international coverage.248 Nevertheless, Harris posited that the 
solution to the media’s aloofness towards the UN lay not within the media itself, but with 
bodies such as UNA. If they would encourage enough public interest, newspapers would be 
forced to alter their editorial content in order to maintain sales.249   
It was the chicken or the egg scenario: which came first, media coverage or public 
interest? The media blamed the public. UNA blamed the media. Harris’s explanation was 
published in United Nations News as a result of such criticisms. Furthermore, when there was 
UN coverage, UNA often criticised the media’s ignorance of international affairs. In 1961, 
UNA complained to the Daily Telegraph when its columnist Douglas Brown suggested that 
the UN should have left Belgium alone to deal with the Congo Crisis. Yet the crisis followed 
the withdrawal of Belgium from its former colony.250 Similarly, in 1973, New World 
complained of ‘abysmal ignorance’ on the part of the press generally, when the Guardian 
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‘“exposed”’ the system in which Africans were being employed by British companies in 
South Africa at starvation wages. New World noted how this had actually been exposed, 
‘more accurately’, thirty years before by the historian Keith Hancock stationed at Chatham 
House, ‘thought by some [including the Guardian] to be an excessively establishment 
body’.251  
Although the media had plenty of faults, UNA hardly proved media savvy. In 1961, 
the Press Association journalist Dennis Laxton, likened his experience of a meeting of UNA 
General Council to that of being introduced to a stereotypical ‘maiden aunt’.  
 
Aunty is prone to interfere in a good natured way. But no one dare openly criticise her 
because, occasionally in her old-fashioned way, she comes out with some sound advice. But it 
is felt that Aunty is rather out of her depth most of the time. Her high-pitched voice is 
tolerated but when boredom demands, she is persuaded it is time she went home – “and thanks 
for calling”. 
  
Laxton further complained that the meeting neglected the topical crisis in Berlin in 
favour of trivial internal administrative problems: ‘With it went a first class opportunity for 
publicity’. He was also concerned that UNA was too keen to revisit old arguments that had 
been played out in the press months before. If UNA was to influence the press and public, 
Laxton concluded, ‘it must be geared to throw in an opinion before the door is shut’.252 In the 
same year Hugh Walker, when looking covetously at CND’s publicity, complained of the 
same problem, that ‘UNA seems so often to comment after the event, and to take rather a long 
time to make up its mind and declare it’.253  
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Evidence of one of UNA’s favourite media strategies is apparent in figure 2.8. The 
number of mentions UNA received in The Times is indicative of the Association’s connection 
to the establishment and also of its faith in the value of a letter published in The Times for 
precipitating change. Nevertheless, UNA had a wider media presence at least in the quality 
press. There were many notifications for UNA events and advertisements for its campaigns. 
Promisingly, the majority of the mentions related to international news stories. Demonstrating 
the varying extents of coverage of the Suez Crisis in The Times, Manchester Guardian and 
Observer, most of the mentions of UNA in The Times in 1956 were related to its refugee 
campaign, rather than UNA’s opposition to the government. The opposite was the case for 
both the Observer and Manchester Guardian that shared UNA’s stance. The rise in mentions 
in the late 1960s relates to UNA’s membership campaign and the internal divisions between 
the chairman Humphry Berkeley and John Ennals, which are explored in the following 
chapters. However, by the 1970s, UNA was deemed less newsworthy; in 1973, it was only 
mentioned six times in the Guardian.  
Similarly to Chatham House, UNA received little coverage within the popular press. 
Mentions were in the main related to publicity for UNA’s campaigns. When the Association 
was mentioned in Beaverbrook’s Daily Express, it received no particular criticism. That was 
reserved for the UN. The importance of attracting well-known names in order that events 
received coverage was especially apparent within the popular press. A little drama had its uses 
too, such as when the League of Empire Loyalists protested at UNA meetings and heckled 
Harold Macmillan.254 Nevertheless, it was apparent that for most of the period UNA was 
deemed of little interest by the editors of popular newspapers. UNA wished to be a mass 
movement, but it was struggling to reach the vast majority of the public. So was it the chicken 
                                                             
254 ‘Man Stops Premier’s Toast’, Daily Express, 3 Apr 1958, 2; ‘Macmillan faces hecklers’, Daily Express, 6 Jul 





or the egg? Had UNA adopted better communication strategies, or perhaps had the media 
provided greater coverage to UNA activities, would there have been greater public enthusiasm 
for the internationalist cause? Could the same be said for Chatham House? Unsurprisingly, 
the answer is much more complicated.  
 
 
THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
In 1946, in common with UNA activists, Mass Observation encountered public scepticism in 
the capabilities of the new UN. Waldorf Astor’s high hopes that the experiences of the Second 
World War would make the public more internationalist, not less, were being dashed. 
Throughout the year, Mass Observation conducted a series of surveys in East Fulham 
concerned with public attitudes to world organisation. The ominous ‘they’ featured frequently 
in the answers of the interviewees. International affairs were considered the realm of the 
politician or – following the creation of the atomic bomb – the scientist. When asked whether 
the individual citizen could help to prevent war, 31% felt that they could, 61% thought not. 
Furthermore, Mass Observation identified a rapid public disengagement with international 
affairs after the war. It attributed this to pessimism over the chances of a lasting peace and a 
resultant fatalism. A survey in February found that 45% expected war within 25 years. By 
June – following Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech, Stalin’s reply and the Russian Foreign 
Minister’s decampment from a UN Security Council meeting deliberating on the Iran Crisis – 
it had risen to 70%.255 Opinion on the fledgling UN’s progress was mixed. In the same month, 
a Gallup Poll noted that 27% were satisfied with it, 39% dissatisfied and 34% did not 
know.256 In 1947 under the heading ‘Anxiety to Apathy’, Mass Observation’s director Tom 
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Harrisson noted a popular feeling that Britain was merely subject to the whims of the USA 
and the USSR, and that ‘[t]he continual news of ill-will and unrest in the world emphasises 
how little the individual can do and how pointless our individual efforts of 1940-47 seem now 
to be.’ Harrisson attributed an increased interest in astrology, greyhound racing and the 
football pools to an escapism derived from a fear of war. ‘A skilled listener-in’, he observed, 
‘might go for days through Britain without hearing a single mention of U.N., U.S.A., 
U.S.S.R., India, Atomic Bomb, or Science.’257  
Declining East-West relations also disheartened those internationalists who had hoped 
that stronger Anglo-Soviet relations – through such bodies as the UN – would lead to better 
conditions for the working class. There were self-proclaimed internationalists who were 
nonetheless prone to xenophobia such as that displayed to resettled members of the Polish 
armed forces.258 If internationalism was not perceived to be serving people’s interests, its 
popularity inevitably declined. As chapter three details, this held just as true among those 
supporters of political parties who limited their support to internationalism solely when it was 
believed to be serving national interests. People treated perceived national interests as 
increasingly precious as Britain’s global influence declined, while others wished to close their 
eyes to it.  
Apathy to international affairs was reflected among service personnel, those who had 
been affected by Chatham House’s collaboration with ABCA. Once demobilised, many 
would cease attending courses, which tended to be regarded as a mere extension of military 
training rather than a civic duty.259 ABCA’s successor organisation, BCA experienced 
difficulties in inspiring interest among those who remained in the armed forces and the new 
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recruits for national service. The loss of older personnel who tended to possess greater 
knowledge and interest in current affairs was lamented. ‘It is not easy’, wrote one course 
lecturer, ‘to talk of world affairs to youths who have little or no sense of responsibility and 
who have little interest in anything beyond their own personal welfare’. Another observer 
remarked that in the new national service era ‘reading meant comic papers like the Beano’.260 
Individualism and comic books: these were hardly the tenets of idealists’ conception of the 
altruistic, well-informed citizen. Following disputes with the BCA and its eventual demise in 
1951, the War Office produced its own discussion briefs. They were regimentally 
apolitical.261   
In 1955, Henry Durant, the Director of the British Institute of Public Opinion, noted 
that ‘the ignorance and lack of interest of the public in foreign affairs are proverbial’.262 In 
1963, psephologists asked 2000 respondents to list the most important problems to which the 
government should turn its attention to. Less than one in ten mentioned issues of foreign and 
defence policy.263 In 1976, William Wallace – then Research Fellow, later Director of 
Chatham House – noted that opinion polls over the last ten years consistently confirmed the 
low salience of international issues in comparison with the cost of living, taxation and the 
domestic economy. He concluded that the level of public interest in international affairs had 
declined since the Second World War.264 Ignorance naturally followed apathy. In 1963, a 
survey conducted shortly after de Gaulle’s famous veto found that several million respondents 
thought that Britain was already part of the EEC. Similarly, in 1977, the Schlackman Report, 
commissioned jointly between the Central Office of Information and the Ministry of Overseas 
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Development, revealed little popular understanding of problems in developing countries and 
complained of ‘national introversion’.265  
 It should not be assumed, however, that British people were innately unintelligent. 
Those activities Harrisson reported that many people were engaged in to the neglect of 
international political affairs, such as the football pools, required an intelligence that could 
easily have been applied to politics, international and domestic.266 People may be better 
understood as possessing selective expertise. Those who were politically disengaged were not 
provided with a motivation to be otherwise. For those who were politically engaged, there 
were plenty of other causes and methods beyond those on offer from UNA and Chatham 
House to which the public could direct their expertise. Jon Lawrence notes how many voters 
in the 1940s and early 1950s had ‘internalized the ideas that public politics should be about 
rational argument and instruction, rather than entertainment’.267 This was when the UNA was 
enjoying its peak. However, such public politics devoid of entertainment had a limited future; 
it did not suit everyone. Young people, in particular, the crucial demographic UNA was 
struggling to attract in sufficient number, were not impressed by colourless meetings in 
community halls.268 They would not need to wait long until a more glamorous public politics 
was on offer in such forms as new social movements. There were also plenty of political, 
social and economic causes closer to home that appeared divorced from international politics. 
The rediscovery of poverty in the 1960s provided many new projects to which young (and 
older) citizens could direct their expertise and resources. The rise and rise of single-issue 
NGOs constituted a congested market place, especially for the likes of multi-issue 
organisations such as UNA and Chatham House.  
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Nevertheless we must also be wary of a simple narrative of declining public 
engagement in international affairs, as held by Harrisson and a number within both Chatham 
House and UNA.  ‘There is apathy about’, Mass Observation reported shortly before the 
general election in 1945, ‘but it is not the apathy of non-interest. Predominantly it is the 
apathy of frustration.’269 Chatham House and UNA’s adherence to elite-centric models may 
have clouded their appreciation of a more complicated phenomenon of public frustration and 
disengagement with those elites. Interest in politics, international and domestic, was not 
necessarily in decline, but faith in and deference to both domestic and international political 
elites was.  
In 1956, Mass Observation conducted a similar survey to that which they had done in 
1946. It took place just after the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis. It noted support 
for organised internationalism, but also an increasing number of qualifications concerning its 
effectiveness. Respondents frequently commented on the UN’s inability to act in Hungary.270 
UNA’s membership may have been in decline and would never reach the peaks enjoyed by 
the LNU, but between 1949 and 1967, even though there was declining faith in the UN’s 
effectiveness, Gallup Polls consistently observed popular acceptance of the necessity of the 
UN’s existence and of ensuring its success.271 Crucially, Mass Observation’s 1956 report 
identified an increase since 1946 in the number who suggested that the best preventative of 
war lay with a better understanding between the ordinary peoples of the world: ‘between us as 
opposed to them’.272 This “them” and “us” axiom was a persistent theme of politics more 
generally. In his seminal 1957 work The Uses of Literacy, Richard Hoggart considered that 
this conflict occupied a significant position within working class attitudes that resulted in a 
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stoical, fatalistic acceptance of an inability to change the main elements of their situation.273 
The “them” and “us” axiom featured widely within cinematic representations of public 
officials and politicians throughout the 1940s to the 1960s.274 With regards to international 
affairs, people’s faith in their ability to actively engage with and influence international 
political elites, such as the UN and the EU – “them” – was low, even by means of influencing 
the other “them”, the British government. A Gallop Poll in 1955 revealed divided feelings 
over whether ordinary people could influence British government policy in the UN: 44% felt 
that it could be done, 32% felt that it could not be done while 26% did not know.275 This did 
not, however, automatically equate with a lack of interest in what was occurring outside 
Britain’s borders.  
Those who sought to improve the well-being of ordinary people around the globe and 
who could engage with the politics of “us” versus “them” effectively elicited interest. The 
New Left that owed much of its genesis to the events of 1956 had a profound impact on 
international thought. Its intellectuals were much less attached than their liberal 
internationalist counterparts to the idea of improving the world’s ills through international 
political bodies. At best, New Left intellectuals deemed them ineffective; at worst, they 
considered that such bodies only served to maintain inequalities and subsequently sought to 
take power away from them. The New Left's recognition and condemnation of neo-
colonialism influenced protests against the Vietnam War, humanitarian concerns and the call 
for unilateral nuclear disarmament, embodied in CND.276 Such NGOs that could be seen to be 
employing the “us” versus “them” axiom, or be perceived to operate outside it – for example 
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Oxfam or Save the Children – managed to inspire public interest in causes overseas.277 The 
Slater Report, produced in 1973 by the Foreign Office to examine its relations with NGOs, 
observed that there was ‘impressive evidence...among the British people at many levels and in 
many walks of life to devote time, talent and money to international affairs without thought of 
personal profit’.278 Proposals within UNA to adopt alternative strategies for engaging the 
public in the work of the UN, especially by following ‘the line of least resistance’ and 
focussing its efforts away from international politics and on to humanitarianism, could 
possibly have been successful if they had managed to compete with similarly orientated, but 
much more media savvy NGOs.279 However, UNA, along with Chatham House, was not only 
a fundamentally liberal internationalist body that celebrated international political structures; 
it was also part of Marwick’s ‘middle opinion’. Both bodies sought consensus between the 
public and the elite and both ‘believed in the essential soundness of established society’.280 
Both bodies were founded upon liberal tenets of social harmony in contrast to social conflict 
that became out of step with the politics of “them” and “us”.281 
Another axiom of significance was the differing level of public attention applied to 
crises and noncrises. Notwithstanding the success made by NGOs in inspiring interest in 
world affairs, it would be inaccurate, to suggest that the British public were necessarily 
consistently engaged. Both Younger and Durant noted how public interest in international 
affairs was at its lowest in the intervals between crises, but appear not to have understood the 
full implications.282 Political scientists Thomas Knecht and M. Stephen Weatherford, in their 
examination of American public attitudes to foreign policy through media visibility, argue 
                                                             
277 See Hilton et al, The Politics of Expertise, 28-53. 
278 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 13/640: R.M.K. Slater, ‘FCO’s Relations with Non-Governmental 
Organisations in the Field of International Social and Cultural Cooperation’, 25 Jul 1973. 
279 UNA Mss: UNA/6/2/1: ‘Priorities for UNA’ by J. Hodgess-Roper, undated.  
280 A. Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, progress and political “agreement”’, English 
Historical Review, lxxix (1964), 297.  
281 See, G. Duncan, Marx and Mill: Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony (London, 1973). 






that a comprehensive understanding of the character of public interest in international affairs 
requires a distinction between crises and noncrises. They defined crises as entailing one or 
more of the following factors: a threat to basic values, a finite time for response, and a 
probability of military involvement; for example the Cuban Missile Crisis. Conversely, 
noncrises were defined as situations whereby military force is highly unlikely and there is 
much more time for policy decisions and their implementation. Examples included 
international economic agreements, environmental issues and foreign aid.283  
CND’s two waves of popularity provide evidence of this. During detente it received 
considerably less attention than it had in its early days. In 1964, Christopher Driver wrote a 
series of articles in the Observer entitled ‘The Rise and Fall of CND’, in tandem with a book 
he published the same year. It amounted to an obituary.284 During CND’s second wave, as the 
Cold War thawed, CND’s membership rose from 4,000 in 1979 to its peak of 100,000 in 
1984. When the Cold War cooled again and eventually ended, membership rapidly declined. 
By 1991 it stood at 60,000 and continued to decrease thereafter.285 Nevertheless, Knecht and 
Weatherford noted that although the crisis/noncrisis axiom was frequently correct, it was not 
universally so. Some issues they defined as noncrises such as apartheid in South Africa, the 
Ethiopian famine in the mid-1980s and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol received much public 
attention.286 Arguably, however, this could be attributed to the work of media savvy NGOs, 
distanced from political elites, who successfully presented such events as crises. Even with 
their sophisticated media strategies, Oxfam struggled to draw attention to noncrises. Their 
survival rested upon campaigns for crisis relief, rather than long-term projects for correcting 
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the deep-rooted international political and economic structural inequalities that only 
international bodies could feasibly coordinate.287 The frustration behind the apparent public 
apathy over international affairs held by luminaries of Chatham House and UNA was often 
due to the impact world events had on the everyday lives of ordinary people. Public attention 
was drawn to crises that exposed global divisions to the neglect of noncrises, such as trade 
agreements, that best demonstrated global interdependence. Arguably, the public 
understanding of the scope of globalisation and thus the significance of international affairs 
was subsequently warped.  
Knecht and Weatherford’s study was based upon media visibility. The limited extent 
of alternative sources of accessible information on international affairs made the media’s 
selection of international news stories especially significant. A Mass Observation study in 
1949 indicated that newspaper influence in international affairs was ‘considerably stronger’ 
than in domestic affairs.288 Yet, the former editor of the Survey of International Affairs, Peter 
Calvocoressi remarked in 1970 that British press coverage of world affairs was 
‘deplorable’.289 A study conducted the next year of news-space devoted to international affairs 
over a week found that the quality press dedicated 22% and the popular press 10%. The 
coverage in the latter was typically limited to disaster stories and sensationalism, but 
ethnocentrism pervaded both.290 Another study conducted ten years later found that The Times 
had a strong tendency to select international news stories involving Britain and countries they 
assumed carried the most meaning for their readership, namely the USA, Western Europe and 
former or current members of the British Empire or Commonwealth. This had ugly 
consequences. Disregard to countries that did not fit such criteria contributed to the media’s 
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neglect of the Cambodian genocide (1975-1979). International news in The Times was also 
found to be often negative in content; the paper was particularly guilty of focusing on 
conflict.291  
Television provided greater international coverage than the newspapers. In 1973, both 
the BBC and ITV devoted 37% of news-space to international affairs. 292 However, they also 
found that the television broadcasters were guilty of the same ethnocentrism and prioritisation 
of countries thought to hold meaning with the British public as the press were.293 Studies of 
international news coverage by American networks have revealed television necessarily 
oversimplifies highly complex issues as a result of the limited time devoted to the news in 
general on a medium that primarily values entertainment.294 Terence Lawson, the Secretary of 
the CEWC concurred. He worried that a significant section of the television audience were 
more interested in the ‘flow of adrenaline than the process of reasoned argument’.295 
Those media outlets that prided themselves on serious international coverage also 
experienced problems. David Astor described himself and his staff at the Observer as ‘liberals 
and internationalists’.296 Astor believed that his predecessor J.L. Garvin had made the grave 
error of prioritising coverage of the domestic scene to the neglect of the deteriorating 
international situation of the 1930s.297 Astor’s editorial staff in the 1940s and 1950s reflected 
his internationalist vision, more than half of whom were German or central European.298 
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Astor, however, was unusual. His wealth and the premium the newspaper could charge on 
advertising during paper rationing enabled him to enact his strong editorial line with few 
financial considerations. However, by 1975 Astor was forced to sell the nearly bankrupt 
newspaper. Market conditions and the priority attributed to them limited international 
coverage. The Observer’s rival The Sunday Times experienced similar problems. In 1945, the 
soon-to-be famous novelist, Ian Fleming became foreign manager of The Sunday Times and 
undertook an ambitious project to provide the best foreign news service in the country, if not 
the world.  Within three years, the number of foreign correspondents serving the project 
totalled 88. However, demand for foreign news stories was low and the model proved 
financially unsound. When Fleming resigned in 1959, he left behind a tiny team.299 In 1983, 
the limited value attributed to international coverage led to the removal of war photographer 
Don McCullin from the newspaper’s magazine. The new editor, Andrew Neil, had a 
conflicting vision for the magazine summarised by a friend of McCullin as ‘no more starving 
Third World babies; more successful businessmen around their weekend barbecues’.300 Those 
who relied upon the media to improve the public understanding of international affairs, let 





In one of the memoranda submitted to the committee that met to discuss UNA’s future in 
1963, Jessie Stephens, a regional officer, observed:  
 
In spite of increased foreign travel, an increase in international exchange of all kinds and a 
considerable desire to help people in countries less well off than our own, there is present in a 
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large section of the adult British public a reluctance to become involved in the International 
Political scene except when our own country is immediately affected.301  
 
Chatham House and UNA faced an uphill struggle in their attempts to cultivate public 
support for liberal internationalism. Their elite-centric models were too tied to the traditional 
political institutions that other NGOs were moving away from. This did not appeal to younger 
constituencies. Chatham House and UNA preached the need to align public and elite opinion, 
to reach consensus not conflict. Their politics clashed with the politics of “them” and “us”. It 
is impossible to know whether Waldorf Astor’s postwar plan for Chatham House and his 
alternative to the King-Hall model would have been more successful. However, the King-Hall 
model relied too heavily on the media’s ability to improve the public’s understanding of 
international affairs and to stress those aspects of international affairs that were so crucial in 
demonstrating the need for international integration, namely growing global interdependence. 
Astor’s plans to reach out to other educators beyond Westminster and beyond the media may 
thus have been more fruitful. Similarly, had the UNA paid greater attention to its youth 
section, which appreciated the need to engage with the international politics and diplomacy 
that other NGOs attracting their peers avoided, perhaps it could have stemmed the loss of its 
members.  
Again, of course, it is impossible to know. Not only did the media, despite its highly 
significant role in shaping the public understanding of international affairs, prove reluctant to 
inform it, but also external events bred fatalism and apathy that undermined the 
democratisation of foreign policy and limited the attention paid to international affairs by the 
media. Among those engaged with international affairs, there was certainly life left in liberal 
internationalism after the Second World War, but it was fragile. Faith in political elites at 
home and abroad was low. A more broadly defined internationalism without the stress on 
                                                             





international organisation and diplomacy and with a greater emphasis on the cooperation of 
peoples rather than governments was very much alive and well. Nevertheless, Chatham House 
and the UNA were right. International problems required international solutions and they 
necessitated the cooperation of governments. Both CND and Oxfam found that selling 
singular issues was one thing, but selling all-encompassing internationalist philosophies that 
involved changing foreign policy was much more difficult.302 Yet if internationalist, be they 
liberal or otherwise, achievements were to be made sustainable, they required favourable and 
active public opinion. The founders of LNU and Chatham House were right to be impressed 
by the power of public opinion, but it was extremely difficult to coordinate, especially when 
the media practices unyieldingly failed to accurately present the extent of global 
interdependence to the public and why global problems could not be solved by targeting 
singular issues. The politics of British foreign policy proved only more difficult to navigate 
for those who wished to bring about meaningful change when Whitehall was brought into the 
equation, even for insiders.  
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The Same Old Diplomacy? 
Whitehall and Being an Insider 
 
The [Foreign Office’s UN] Department has always held the view that the United Nations 
Association is, all things being considered, a reasonable and moderate body which does much 
to canalise woolly idealism which might otherwise prove tiresome and embarrassing. It has 
therefore been felt that it is desirable to preserve good relations with the Association and be as 
helpful to them as possible. 
Minute by David Hildyard, 1 Apr 19501 
 
the continued existence of Chatham House at or near its present level of activity is not 
essential to the FCO...We value highly the extensive meeting programme and the extent to 
which Chatham House provides a forum for the informed discussion of foreign affairs. But the 
library facilities (except for the Press Cutting Library) and research programmes, useful and 
interesting though they may be, duplicate the larger and better organised facilities of the FCO 
itself. 
James Cable to Thomas Brimelow, 12 May 19722 
 
Insiders groups such as Chatham House and UNA played a dangerous game. Just as they tried 
to influence the state, the state tried to influence them. David Hildyard, a member of the 
Foreign Office’s UN Department encouraged ministers to accede to the requests made by 
UNA to continue to receive deputations from them. Their prestigious patronage, that included 
the leaders of all three main political parties, also endowed UNA with an insider status that 
many politicised NGOs would have been envious of. As Hildyard outlined, Whitehall valued 
and respected insider groups like UNA and Chatham House. In terms of foreign policy, both 
organisations occupied a position in D.C. Watt’s unofficial elite.3 Chatham House staff 
advised on policy papers from the Foreign Office and during the Second World War many 
even became temporary civil servants. Similarly, retired diplomats and ministers became staff 
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at Chatham House while Foreign Office officials sat in Chatham House study groups. MPs 
would become UNA Chairmen and UNA Secretaries would become Ministers. Prime 
Ministers and leaders of political parties addressed meetings of the UNA General Council and 
spoke at UNA branches all over the UK. The staff of both organisations often operated within 
the same social milieu of their Whitehall counterparts. They tended to be from wealthy 
families, privately educated, had attended Oxbridge and were, with some exceptions, male. 
They attended the same parties as government officials and – Chatham House staff at least – 
took lunch at the same clubs in Pall Mall, just a few minutes’ walk from Chatham House in St 
James’s Square.  
However, the privileges afforded to insider groups like UNA and Chatham House 
should not be exaggerated. In 1970, Elie Kedourie’s famous essay ‘The Chatham House 
Version’ argued that between 1918 and 1945 – and even since then – Chatham House was so 
influential within the corridors of power that he laid perceived failures in British Middle 
Eastern policy at the Institute’s door.4 Such anxieties over Chatham House’s potential malign 
influence over foreign policy were not new. In the Institute’s early days, there were officials 
within the Foreign Office who were concerned that it might become ‘a sort of rival civil 
service’5. Similarly during the Second World War, there was apprehension in the House of 
Commons that Chatham House and Whitehall had grown too close.6 On occasion, these fears 
amounted to conspiracy theory. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Arthur K. Chesterton – the 
future co-founder of the National Front – routinely attacked the Institute within the periodical 
Truth: Chatham House had seduced the government, and was hell-bent on the disintegration 
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of British power.7 Professor Carroll Quigley’s musings on the Institute as one of the 
numerous instruments of Milner’s Kindergarten, which had ensnared the British and 
American establishments, was posthumously published in 1981. Today Chatham House 
features on a number of conspiracy theory websites largely inspired by Quigley’s work. One 
provides a diagram, tellingly shaped as the Star of David, detailing the Institute’s supposedly 
perfidious connections with the CFR, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Group and 
the United Nations.8  
 These anxieties – be they borne from respectable or questionable sources – were 
largely unfounded.  Zara Steiner proved the importance of taking into account the diversity of 
opinion within the Foreign Office.9 Officials would ignore the advice of ambassadors let 
alone non-state actors who were, of course, not privy to the same classified information. 
Chatham House appears to have perhaps been the most influential NGO on Foreign Office 
opinion. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office proved wary of external opinion and, at least in this 
manner, aspects of the old diplomacy lived on. Even James Cable, the head of the Foreign 
Office department perhaps most favourable to Chatham House, the Planning Staff, understood 
the Institute’s research as a mere duplication of their own. Members of the Foreign Office 
often perceived themselves as the ultimate experts who needed little tutelage from external 
sources; quite the reverse.  
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UNA’s policies were considered, but more often as a result of their representing an 
important body of opinion than any faith in their expertise. Moreover, the deputations 
afforded the opportunity to put the government’s point of view across to UNA. Government 
support for the Association was often intended to encourage the moderates and, in Hildyard’s 
words, ‘canalise’ opinion away from radical views and deter such views from entering UNA 
and the organisations it was associated with. All the while Whitehall jealously guarded the 
line between state and non-state and significantly so too did Chatham House and UNA in 
their eagerness to appear impartial. Neither body was subservient to Whitehall, Chatham 
House refused a number of opportunities for government funding while UNA, often to the 
surprise and disgust of ministers, mobilised opinion against them. However, as Matthew 
Hilton et al demonstrate, the shared frontier between official and unofficial sectors has been 
constantly redrawn and thus there can be no notion of a tidy separation.10 Instead, we should 
understand Chatham House, UNA and Whitehall as occupying shared space, most clearly 
demonstrated by the aforementioned sharing of personnel.   
This chapter will explore the dangers for both parties inherent in this shared space. It 
will, in a broadly chronological fashion, plot the changing stakes that Whitehall held in both 
organisations. Shortly after the Second World War, Whitehall appears to have been mostly 
interested in the Institute’s research. However, it grew increasingly interested in Chatham 
House’s role as an unofficial diplomat at international conferences along with its study groups 
and meetings through which it could gauge domestic public opinion, or at least informed 
public opinion that was perceived to go on to shape more popular opinion. Whitehall’s stakes 
in UNA also changed, but much more erratically. Often, governments would support UNA in 
an endeavour to prove their internationalist credentials; often, governments would find 
themselves defending themselves from UNA protests. Furthermore, while the Association 
                                                             





was struggling to stem the loss of its members and experienced extensive financial problems 
in the 1970s, governments vacillated on the scale of support they should offer. However, in 
and around times of crises, insiders were held within Whitehall in greater esteem.  
 
DIVIDING THE CHINA 
Chatham House was at its most influential during the Second World War; or at least a part of 
it was. At the outbreak of war, the Institute created the FRPS for government use. It was 
housed in Balliol College, Oxford and 80% of its expenses were paid by the Foreign Office, 
the rest by Chatham House and the University of Oxford. Chatham House lent for FRPS 
work, portions of its library, the whole of its unique collection of press cuttings and crucially, 
of course, staff.  The FRPS was headed by the Institute’s Director of Studies, Arnold J. 
Toynbee. Other members of staff included historians Alfred Zimmern and Charles Kingsley 
Webster. The FRPS produced a weekly document, the ‘Review of the Foreign Press’, which 
was circulated among government departments and the BBC. It also answered enquiries from 
over twenty government departments or bodies working for the government. Furthermore, it 
undertook continuous research on the principal topics of international affairs and a research 
committee with sub-committees was constituted to study materials, particularly in connection 
with war aims and reconstruction.11  By 1942, the FRPS was being used to such an extent that 
the government decided that it should convert the body into a Foreign Office department and 
turn its members into temporary civil servants; and so the Foreign Office Research 
Department (FORD) was born.  
 We should be cautious, however, not to exaggerate Chatham House’s capabilities to 
influence policy during the war. Some works have demonstrated that the FRPS and FORD 
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played a significant role in moulding policy, specifically with regard to South East Asia, 
South East Europe and the Baltic States.12 Nevertheless, as Inderjeet Parmar has observed, 
Chatham House did not in any sense control the Foreign Office. Foreign Office officials 
shared fundamentally similar outlooks with those of Chatham House. The Foreign Office was 
involved with the creation of the FRPS planning machinery; it decided the majority of its 
tasks. Moreover, the FRPS was ‘nationalised’ to become FORD and absorbed into 
Whitehall.13  
 Here the line between state and non-state were being redrawn. The Foreign Office, 
understood the FRPS and Chatham House as two separate bodies.14 The decision to convert 
the FRPS into a Foreign Office department arose in large part out of the frustration over the 
false perception held by other Whitehall departments, MPs and foreign governments that the 
FRPS was just ‘Chatham House at Balliol’. Eden wished to be in the position to be able to 
explain that he was firmly in control of the FRPS and that it was on the same footing as any 
other department within the Foreign Office.15 Eden’s ministerial colleague Richard Law 
feared that if left unchanged, parliamentary critics would proclaim that policy was dictated by 
the whims of Chatham House’s ‘long-haired people’.16 Chatham House also had reservations. 
They were unconvinced ‘that an organisation which owes its acknowledged success to the fact 
that its members were recruited from outside the Civil Service’ was better managed by 
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Whitehall than the Institute’s Council.17 Nevertheless, noting a position of force majeure 
existed and that it would be unfitting to create controversy during war, Chatham House 
reluctantly agreed.18 Furthermore, lest Chatham House Council refuse, Toynbee, who 
thoroughly approved of the scheme, threatened to discontinue his work on the Survey of 
International Affairs. Although, within months of the establishment of the FRPS, Toynbee 
complained of bureaucratic infighting and departmental hatred, Toynbee had grown rather 
fond of his position.19  
Between 1944 and 1946, eager to retain the certain privileges that he experienced as a 
temporary civil servant, Toynbee requested that he and senior Chatham House colleagues be 
allowed to consult with officials before embarking on their studies and access official 
documents to aid them in their history of the Second World War for the Survey of 
International Affairs. Toynbee further argued that after the war, the Foreign Office ought to 
organise its relations with unofficial bodies devoted to the scientific study of international 
affairs (read Chatham House) in the same manner that after the First World War, the Foreign 
Office organised relations with the press by establishing the News Department. He argued 
that world opinion of Britain was now more important than ever before. In order that the 
Institute might write an ‘accurate and authoritative’ history that gave a fair account of British 
policy-making, he recommended that Chatham House be given access to certain categories of 
unofficial papers.20  
The Foreign Office did not look too fondly on the request. The documents Toynbee 
requested were deemed to amount to ‘almost unlimited’ access. Officials feared that as soon 
as the facility was in place, requests for information would only grow, ultimately leading to 
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embarrassment. Worse, if Chatham House were privy to such information, soon all historians 
would want their share too.21 There was one historian, however, who was not impressed by 
the prospect of such privileges being afforded to Chatham House: Ernest Llewellyn 
Woodward, the Foreign Office’s official historian who was anxious that Chatham House was 
attempting to grow and grow until it became ‘a kind of shadow Foreign Office’.22 
Nonetheless, two concessions were made for Toynbee. He was to be supplied with the weekly 
intelligence summary to the end of the war (which Toynbee had already helped to produce 
while at FORD) and copies of the documents used at the Nuremburg Trials that were already 
published, but not widely available.23 It was not the new relationship that Toynbee had 
envisioned for the Foreign Office and Chatham House.  
 But it was not only Whitehall officials who stood in his way. There was also the 
House of Commons. At about the same time, Waldorf Astor proposed that when Foreign 
Office officials lectured at Chatham House, they be authorised to follow up with confidential 
talks off the record with the Institute’s staff. Astor felt that it would ultimately be helpful to 
the Foreign Office since Chatham House were able to publish matter which was ‘free from the 
flavour of official propaganda’.24  At first, there was little objection; no extra work would be 
required and the lecturer would know their subject along with the pitfalls to be avoided. The 
decision even got the approval of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State (PUS) for Foreign 
Affairs, Alexander Cadogan. This preceded, however, reports that Gladwyn Jebb, then head 
of the Foreign Office’s Reconstruction Department, had provided information that was not 
made available to MPs. Cadogan reversed his decision.25   
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So what exactly was the postwar relationship between Chatham House and Whitehall? 
In a sign of things to come, Whitehall welcomed attempts made by the Institute during the 
Second World War to inform public opinion. As the war came to a close, Chatham House 
commissioned a series of Looking Forward pamphlets on reconstruction, including Britain 
and the World by HA Wyndham, Foreign Affairs and the Public by John Price and the most 
famous – if only among International Relations scholars – Martin Wight’s Power Politics. 
Eden – of the opinion that Chatham House publications had an important part to play in 
informing public opinion – wished to see that the pamphlets were given the widest possible 
circulation and thus requested that the Paper Controller increase the Institute’s ration.26 
Eden’s successor, Ernest Bevin, an old hand at Chatham House also thought highly – or at 
least spoke highly – of Chatham House’s sway over public opinion. In a speech at Chatham 
House, he celebrated it as one of the most important elements in the country for such 
education.27 Nevertheless, doubts were expressed as to the Institute’s effectiveness at 
informing opinion, particularly with regard to reaching popular opinion. One official was 
unimpressed by the names of the pamphleteers; another doubted the effectiveness of 
pamphlets as a popular medium. The future PUS, Ivone Kirkpatrick, then an under-secretary 
responsible for information work, remarked more generally with regards to the distribution of 
Chatham House’s research: ‘The point is we can reach millions & Chatham House 
thousands’.28 
Other Chatham House activities received more consistent praise within Whitehall, 
especially its lectures, specialist library, Information Department and its unique press library. 
Ernest Passant, the Foreign Office librarian, considered the Press Library the most important 
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service that Chatham House provided. The Foreign Office’s Research Department relied upon 
the Institute for a number of important press reports, particularly from South East Asia and on 
international communism. Between 80 and 90% of Whitehall enquiries addressed to the press 
library originated from the Foreign Office. Yet the Foreign Office had ceased paying any 
money to Chatham House once their staff had returned from FORD. The Institute’s 
subsequent request for compensation precipitated a Treasury-led enquiry as to how valued the 
Institute was across Whitehall.  The feedback was very positive. The Ministry of Defence 
reported that much use was made of the Institute’s lectures, its 80,000 books, 600 British and 
foreign periodicals and 50 continental daily papers, and the bibliographies it compiled on 
request. An official considered the services offered by Chatham House, one of the main 
sources of international information and ‘extremely valuable’. The Home Office also made 
‘considerable’ use of Chatham House. They noted their use of the main library and press 
library and reported how members of the Home Office Intelligence Section had recently 
attended a meeting related to the Tito-Stalin split and learned much that helped them with 
their planning. The Treasury was thus satisfied that the Foreign Office should become a 
corporate subscriber at the rate of £200 per annum. Yet, despite their initial request, the 
Chatham House Council grew uneasy and turned down the offer having felt that it was not in 
their best interests to accept. They, nevertheless, wished to keep the avenue open.29 It was 
another case of attempting to police the line between the state and the non-state.  
It was to happen again soon after. In 1950, it was feared that the Rockefeller 
Foundation, one of Chatham House’s principal benefactors, was to withdraw its funding from 
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the Institute’s Soviet Studies Programme.30 This prompted Denis Healey, who was then 
heading the Labour Party’s International Department, but also had a seat on the Chatham 
House Council, to raise the concern with his party colleague in the Treasury.31 Ernest Davies, 
the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, simultaneously explained the 
problem to the Treasury. He noted that the Programme worked in the closest cooperation with 
the relevant Foreign Office departments and that if its work should be discontinued it would 
leave ‘a most serious gap’ in their studies of the Soviet Union.32 The Foreign Office received 
constant and valuable assistance from the programme and its resultant publications were 
deemed ‘invaluable’. Concerns were also raised that with the demise of the Soviet Studies 
Programme that the Foreign Office would have to hire more research staff to compensate for 
its loss.33 Subsequently, it endorsed a proposal whereby the government would fill the 
funding gap. However, following the aforementioned ordeal over the proposed annual sum 
from the Foreign Office, they had become only too aware of the Institute’s reluctance to 
receive money directly from government sources. The point had not been lost on the Foreign 
Office that the approach had been made by Denis Healey, not Macadam.34 So in order to get 
the Institute to, as one official put it, ‘swallow its pride’, various elaborate schemes were 
concocted whereby Chatham House would receive the money indirectly through the 
University Grants Committee or the Royal Academy. Concerns were raised, however, that 
such a subvention through a third body deceived no one and the Treasury told the Foreign 
Office that the money should come from the Foreign Office budget or not at all.35 In the end – 
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and again – it all amounted to nothing. The Rockefeller Foundation decided to continue its 
funding.36  
Chatham House’s expertise was also sought soon after the formal establishment of a 
Planning Section within the Foreign Office in 1957 consisting of just one official, Cecil 
Parrott.37 Parrott, no doubt only too appreciative for help, requested that there be closer 
contact between his department and the Institute’s research committee and a number of papers 
were subsequently exchanged. In 1959, this was set to increase when Parrott told Chatham 
House’s Chairman, ex-PUS, William Strang that the Foreign Office was going to depend 
more on Chatham House and universities now that there was a greater demand for ‘looking 
forward’ studies. Parrott also enquired as to whether Chatham House would undertake joint 
research into editing the German Documents with official historians in the Foreign Office 
together with French, German and American counterparts. The request was turned down for 
fear that people would deduce that Chatham House was part of the official machine. The line 
between state and non-state was once again policed. Nonetheless, it appears that contact was 
reduced after 1961, the same year the Foreign Office Planning Committee grew to two 
members of staff. A separate, larger, Planning Staff department was created in 1964 once the 
proofs of the Plowden Report were seen. The Plowden Committee had been highly critical of 
Foreign Office planning and advocated greater engagement with external bodies.38 The 
Foreign Office did something toward the former, but did little toward the latter. It would 
appear that once the Foreign Office was in possession of its own facilities it saw less of a need 
to look to Chatham House. If the value of Chatham House’s external expertise was treated 
with some suspicion, it would be more so for UNA. 
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Nevertheless, in 1945, although UNA was not the LNU, the new organisation had reasons to 
be optimistic over its future relations with Whitehall. One was the new Prime Minister. 
Attlee’s new government took a ‘very sympathetic interest’ in UNA’s work and aims.39 Attlee 
issued a circular around Whitehall asking his colleagues to do all they could to accept 
invitations from UNA to speak at their meetings.40 In a speech at Mansion House in April 
1946, drafted by Charles Webster, the then Lord President of Council Herbert Morrison 
assured UNA members assembled that the government was ‘pledged to the hilt to give their 
full support to the United Nations’. ‘But our people’, Morrison noted, ‘have still a great deal 
to learn about the new machinery of peace...no Government in this country can do much 
unless there is an instructed public opinion behind it.’ Subsequently, he encouraged those in 
attendance to donate to UNA even in hard times.41 Other ministers were not so forthcoming.  
In May, Cecil hoped that the Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin might make a public 
pronouncement on the necessity of public support for international peace and advertise the 
aims and activities of UNA. Bevin, however, feared that such a speech risked both falling flat 
and doing more harm than good at the present time. John Ward, the Head of the Foreign 
Office’s UN Department sympathised. Ward acknowledged the difficulty reconciling a refusal 
to use an opportunity to enlist support for the UN with previous statements made by both the 
Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary that went so far to declare the UN the ‘overriding 
factor in British foreign policy’. However, Ward also acknowledged the current public 
disappointment with the effectiveness of the UN in the wake of the discussions concerning the 
Iran Crisis in the meeting of the Security Council referred to in chapter two. Ward felt that it 
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would be ‘dangerously misleading’ to give the impression to the public that if only they could 
muster enough faith in the UN it would ensure peace. Tellingly, Ward believed public opinion 
understood that such an appeal was needed to be made to the Russian government, not the 
British public. Gladwyn Jebb – then Assistant Under-Secretary for UN affairs, later the UK’s 
representative at the UN – reluctantly concurred. Emotional appeals concerning the UN’s 
ability to secure peace while the Security Council could not reach a consensus would only 
arouse cynicism. Nevertheless, Ward thought it possible for Bevin to make a future appeal for 
greater interest in UNA to ensure healthy support for the UN so that Britain might set the 
right example and mould developments in order to utilise the UN as an instrument for peace 
where possible. Jebb felt that useful work could be done in explaining the workings of the 
UN.42   
Bevin, despite informing the House of Commons in November 1945 that he 
remembered Britain’s obligations to the UN with an ‘almost religious conviction’, was 
sceptical of those who believed that campaigning for the UN would make its authority more 
effective. Nor did he feel that the establishment of the UN negated the need for Britain to 
develop its own foreign policy.43 Bevin certainly appears to have not conferred high priority 
to assisting UNA. He did not publicly address UNA or receive a UNA deputation throughout 
his tenure in spite of a number of requests. In 1947, he was invited to speak at two UNA 
rallies; its inaugural meeting at Albert Hall in March and Chilham Castle in Kent in June. On 
both occasions, due to pressure of work, Bevin declined and Attlee took his place. When in 
1948 Bevin was again invited to a summer rally at Welbeck Abbey in Nottinghamshire that 
expected 30,000, the UN Department was keen for him to accept. Paul Mason, Ward’s 
successor, deemed UNA ‘as the proper medium for supporting the U.N. with British public 
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opinion’ and felt that it would be disheartening for UNA to fail to obtain the Foreign 
Secretary once again. As the Cold War begun in earnest, civil servants appreciated that Bevin 
could not give a firm commitment five months ahead, but pressed that he accept in principal 
on the condition that he might have to change his plans nearer the time.44 Bevin, however, felt 
unable to make any commitment and Hector McNeil, the Minister of State, an old hand in UN 
affairs, was sent in his stead.45 It had also mostly been the Ministers of State, rather than the 
Foreign Secretary, who received UNA deputations that by 1950 were normally met twice a 
year.46 In March 1950, Herbert Bullock, the President of the Trades Union Congress and 
UNA Executive Council member, confided in Bevin that UNA was ‘somewhat aggrieved’ 
that he had not received them in the previous administration. They were subsequently anxious 
that Bevin personally receive a deputation concerning proposals for international controls of 
atomic technology.47 On this occasion, however, the UN Department realised that Bevin was 
too busy. Not only was he occupied by internal divisions within the newborn NATO – in 
large part due to the USSR having successfully detonated its first atomic bomb some months 
before – Bevin was also growing increasingly ill.48 The UN Department was eager, however, 
that a Minister of State should receive UNA deputation. In the event, it was Kenneth 
Younger, McNeil’s successor.  
Nonetheless, the UN Department’s enthusiasm for UNA was preoccupied with its 
influence over public opinion rather than their expertise. When UNA requested that they be 
consulted on ‘appropriate occasions’ the aforementioned David Hildyard briefed Younger that 
the government could not consult UNA – or any other body – before making decisions on 
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foreign policy. The deputations and the detailed answers that UNA would receive from 
written questions to ministers were deemed as sufficient contact. Furthermore, government 
support of UNA by way of assisting it in its attempts to propagate information regarding the 
UN to the general public was hardly spectacular. Subsequently, Hildyard predicted that UNA 
would attempt to gain assurance of greater financial assistance for the observance of UN Day, 
especially in the wake of declining government support. Hildyard noted that the government 
made a substantial contribution in the form of a booklet entitled Britain and the United 
Nations published in 1948. However, in the following year the government contribution was 
limited to raising the UN flag over London County Hall. It was primarily due to economies. 
For this reason too, Hildyard warned Younger that he should refrain from any commitments 
to the celebrations in that year and instead console them that the government was considering 
including a section on the work of International Organisations and their relation to the UK for 
the 1951 Festival of Britain.49  
The search for economies by other government bodies had also taken its toll on the 
promotion of UN work. In 1946 the leading UNA member Philip Noel-Baker, tried to help 
the Association in his position as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, by requesting that the 
UN feature as a topic for a lecture service provided by the Central Office of Information. 
Between September 1946 and March 1948, the Central Office of Information arranged 1,445 
lectures on the UN. In 1948, a ministerial committee was tasked with reviewing the range of 
subjects the lecture service covered, in an attempt to make savings. It decided to discontinue 
the lectures on the UN. The decision was taken on the basis that information on the 
government’s production drive took priority. Whereas the government was peculiarly 
qualified to explain the production drive, UNA was considered to be a better substitute to 
                                                             





detail the UN’s activities.50 A committee of ministers from the same government that was two 
years before, in Morrison’s aforementioned words, pledged ‘to the hilt to give their full 
support to the United Nations’ was already pushing British support for the UN down its list of 
priorities. Nevertheless, Whitehall remained sensitive to public opinion on international 
affairs in Britain and elsewhere.  
 
 
UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY AT HOME AND ABROAD 
If the championing of the UN was being pushed down the government’s agenda, the Cold 
War was not. Chatham House’s ability to attract foreign dignitaries, its transnational contacts 
and its unofficial status ensured a place for the Institute in the Foreign Office’s Cold War 
arsenal. In 1956, Christopher Montague Woodhouse attempted to open up contacts with 
Russian academics in light of Khrushchev’s secret speech and his visit to the UK. The 
Foreign Office approved of Woodhouse’s abortive attempt to get the Russian Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Gromyko to speak at Chatham House. However, the Foreign Office refused 
to provide in his stead one of their Soviet experts currently engaged in the secret Anglo-Soviet 
talks to answer questions from the Institute’s East European study group. Foreign Office 
officials acknowledged that it was policy to help the Institute in their confidential discussions, 
but refused for fear that the members of the study group might, through interrogation, succeed 
in revealing the contents of the talks.51  
In the same year, Henry Kissinger and Anthony Buzzard were publicising their idea of 
limited atomic warfare. A private study group at Chatham House looked favourably upon the 
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theory, causing concern within the Foreign Office. An official reading the document produced 
by the study group annotated a section explaining the need for both sides to agree to 
distinguish between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons: ‘You cannot play this like a 
cricket match!’52 Officials were thus keen to attend a conference chaired by Buzzard the 
following year. This time, however, they were relieved to note that Kissinger’s theories did 
not find favour with an audience deemed representative of informed opinion. The Foreign 
Office attendee concluded that any attempt to come to a solution for the nuclear stalemate 
must be to some extent conditioned by public opinion and that the discussion under Chatham 
House auspices helped to enlighten public opinion, and he recommended that the Foreign 
Office ought to continue to encourage them and attend where possible.53  
Chatham House also acted as a valuable asset in regard to Britain’s relations in the 
Pacific. Since the second meeting of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1928, Chatham 
House formed the British delegation. The IPR was a confederation of national councils made 
up of delegates from countries with interests in the Pacific. During the Second World War, 
fearing anti-colonialism, the Foreign Office became considerably interested in the IPR 
Conferences. When Chatham House informed the Foreign Office that it could not afford to 
attend the 1942 Conference in Canada, the Foreign Office covered the cost. It came at the 
price that the Foreign Office could choose members for the delegation and did so again for the 
1945 Conference in the USA. Chatham House thus established relevant study groups in 
parallel with the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and papers were exchanged.54  
During the Conferences, Chatham House was often placed in a difficult scenario of 
defending British colonial interests amid a barrage of criticism, particularly from the 
American representatives. The delegation’s position was further complicated by the lack of 
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direction in government policy; both Chatham House and the Foreign Office were burdened 
by having to explain away Churchill’s public announcements about the restoration of empire. 
Contrary to the Churchillian rhetoric, both Chatham House and the Far Eastern Department 
understood the regaining of colonies from the Japanese would amount to a resumption of 
responsibilities towards self-government. The problem was exacerbated by the level of 
government involvement that helped reinforce the perception of foreign observers that 
Chatham House was in fact a quasi-official body. The reality was that due to the high level of 
government involvement, the Institute’s independence was much diminished. Both Chatham 
House’s and Whitehall’s interests in the IPR appears to have dwindled after the Second World 
War. By 1945 British officials doubted the IPR’s utility and since 1942 Chatham House had 
already been debating whether it was worth going. Nevertheless, the Institute remained 
involved with the IPR until its end in 1961; an end that was the result of legal costs 
successfully battling fierce accusations during the McCarthy years that the organisation was a 
centre of communist conspiracy.55 
Perhaps the most well-known example of Chatham House diplomacy is its 
organisation with its sister institutes of the Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences. 
These were held at roughly five year intervals between 1933 and 1959 and provided a forum 
for politicians, civil servants, academics, businessmen, lawyers and trade unionists. Those 
affiliated with the Chatham House delegations throughout the lifetime of the conferences 
included Ernest Bevin, Patrick Gordon Walker, James Callaghan, R.A. Butler, Denis Healey, 
Hugh Gaitskell and Peter Thorneycroft. They were designed to promote understanding 
between Commonwealth countries and preserve Commonwealth relations. However, 
Chatham House could be a source of concern for government departments, most of all the 
Dominions Office, later the Commonwealth Relations Office. Astor opened the 1945 
                                                             





conference at Chatham House by suggesting that foreign observers viewed the 
Commonwealth with ‘bewildered incredulity’. While Curtis, who before the war had preached 
that the Commonwealth was the nucleus of world government, now – brandishing copies of 
his new book World War: Its Cause and Cure – played down Commonwealth cooperation. 
For Curtis, hope for world government now resided with a union of European democracies.56 
This was not appreciated by Malcolm MacDonald who, soon to leave his post as High 
Commissioner to Canada, complained that the views of the UK delegates were obsolete and 
recommended that the Dominions Office should exercise closer supervision over the 
delegates. A predecessor of Macdonald’s, suggested that the responsibility for organising the 
Conferences should be transferred from Chatham House to the Royal Empire Society. The 
Dominions Office sympathised. Curtis was singled out as the chief difficulty, but the 
department felt it essential that the conferences remained unofficial and free from government 
interference.57 Curtis continued to deliver his sermons at the next conference held in Canada 
in 1949 and met some lively questioning.58  
Chatham House’s position on Europe in relation to the Commonwealth continued to 
cause concern in Whitehall. In 1959, on the occasion of the last Conference, officials within 
the Commonwealth Relations Office were concerned when the Conference concluded that the 
UK and other Commonwealth countries should negotiate jointly for free trade in Europe – 
seeking access to Europe for Commonwealth products. The French would never concede.59 
Yet by 1962 at an unofficial study conference in Nigeria, the delegates were far more 
sceptical that this could be done, and although accepting that the UK must come to terms with 
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the EEC, other Commonwealth countries realised that they must negotiate their own terms 
with it, one by one.60 For the staff at the Commonwealth Relations Office, this was more 
disturbing than the display of Commonwealth unity in 1959. At a post-conference discussion 
at Chatham House, the Director Kenneth Younger appeared to have written off the 
Commonwealth altogether. Younger argued that by contemplating entry into the EEC, the UK 
government had already indicated that it regarded the Commonwealth a secondary 
connection. To the irritation of officials, he repeated that Britain had to choose between 
Europe and the Commonwealth. The Deputy Under-Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 
Arthur Snelling, argued that the government wanted something of both. Younger retorted that 
he was ‘nursing a fond illusion’. Subsequently, Snelling advised that officials ought to go to 
such meetings more often. Indeed, later that year a member of the Commonwealth Relations 
Office was injected into a meeting on Commonwealth Studies at the last minute owing to the 
failure of Chatham House to remember to send an invite. Once again, great cynicism on the 
Institute’s behalf was noted.61 
However, as one official in the Commonwealth Relations Office noted, there was a lot 
in Younger’s view in the long term.62 Younger set out his views in an essay published in 1964 
entitled Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy, in which he stated the need for 
British attitudes to change; to recognise the end of empire and to see their future in Europe.63 
In the same year, Younger, in collaboration with the Franco-British Society, decided to call 
together a small private conference in order to encourage a better mutual understanding of 
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current policies amid Anglo-French tensions over EEC negotiations.64 Pierson Dixon, 
Ambassador to France, welcomed it, believing that if Chatham House remained in control of 
affairs, the risk of Gaullist infiltration would be constrained. The risk of Gaullists taking 
charge of a French-sponsored programme was deemed much greater.65  
A number of historians have detailed how Chatham House acted as an unofficial 
diplomat elsewhere. Inderjeet Parmar demonstrates the significance of the role played by 
Chatham House in Anglo-American relations through its staff during the Second World War. 
Particularly, through Lord Lothian as the US ambassador and Toynbee, Webster and 
Macadam as semi-official emissaries to the USA; all aided by the work of the FRPS and 
IPR.66 Christian Haase has also demonstrated the significant role played by the Institute on 
British-German relations. He shows that the Institute’s reputation as a major authority on the 
Soviet Union in the immediate post-war years, as demonstrated earlier, enabled it to 
contribute to the Anglo-American consensus that West Germany need to be brought into 
Western political, economic and security structures. Furthermore, Haase details how Chatham 
House impacted upon West German politics – both foreign and domestic – via the platform of 
the Königswinter and Weinheim Conferences.67 Finally, Priscilla Roberts has outlined how 
Chatham House aided the Foreign Office’s efforts to improve Anglo-Chinese relations in the 
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THE WORLD FEDERATION OF UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATIONS 
Cold War politics also influenced the Foreign Office’s interest in UNA and its relationship 
with World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA). The UK’s UNA played a 
significant role in the establishment of WFUNA in 1946 – the global network of United 
Nations Associations. In February 1946 a meeting was held in London chaired by the first 
President of the UN General Assembly Paul-Henri Spaak and attended by 21 representatives 
from United Nations Associations around the world to plan an inaugural congress for the 
WFUNA in Luxembourg for July and August.69 The establishment of the WFUNA had the 
government’s seal of approval. The then Minister of State, Philip Noel-Baker when meeting 
the first UNA deputation to the Foreign Office agreed to approach the Rockefeller Foundation 
for funding the WFUNA.70 Furthermore, the Foreign Office aided John Ennals, former 
President of the British Universities League of Nations Society, on an Eastern European tour 
arranged and funded by the UK’s UNA, the aim of which was to encourage the foundation of 
United Nations Associations and their joining of the future WFUNA. The Foreign Office 
ensured that British embassies would help them in any way they could.71 John Ennals, the 
eldest of the Ennals brothers, utilised numerous contacts across Europe as a result of his time 
during the war as a lecturer for the British Council in Romania and Yugoslavia and then a war 
correspondent before joining the Foreign Office in 1941, for which he was posted in Madrid 
and London before joining the armed forces in 1943.72 In his Eastern European tour in 1946, 
Ennals was able to visit Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Austria and France 
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where United Nations Associations and preparatory committees were already functioning. A 
sojourn to the USSR was not possible; requests for a visa were not met with a reply.73 The 
USSR did not establish a United Nations Association until 1956. It joined the WFUNA in the 
same year.74  
Nevertheless, the WFUNA’s Eastern European members caused consternation within 
Whitehall. Officials grew anxious that the WFUNA ‘should tread the path of true democracy 
and not fall under the influence of the political notions of Eastern Europe, like certain other 
Federations of recent foundation’.75 The Foreign Office took great interest in the inaugural 
congress and attempted to get information from the British Embassy in Paris where 
preparations took place.76 The East-West divide lent some drama to the congress when the 
Hungarian delegation abruptly left shortly before the end and the Foreign Office intrigued 
whether the USSR had – albeit lately – intervened.77 The greatest attention, however, appears 
to have been dedicated to the proposed first Secretary General of the WFUNA, John Ennals. 
Ennals’s trip around Eastern Europe had become somewhat notorious, in part because he had 
not revealed that he was also acting as a correspondent for Reynolds News.78 Moreover, it was 
understood that Ennals held communist sympathies. The Labour MP Ernest Millington 
warned that Ennals ‘was the kind of person one met in “doubtful” places in London such as 
the Polish Embassy’. It was also alleged that Ennals was formerly attached to a Women’s 
Auxiliary Air Force officer, Sybil Sturrock, who was now understood to be a press attaché in 
Yugoslavia.79 To stoke concerns still further, Ennals had recently written a piece for the New 
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Statesman following his tour of Eastern Europe, praising governments for working with 
‘considerable success’ to improve the well-being of their peoples.80 The Foreign Office 
informed UNA’s delegation just before its departure from Luxembourg of their concerns over 
Ennals’s suitability as WFUNA secretary-general. In view of this, UNA Secretary Charles 
Judd, proposed that Ennals only be elected for six months (instead of two years). However, 
the majority of the delegation were not too pleased at the suggestion that UNA (or the 
WFUNA) should take direction from the UK government. After a discussion between the 
head of the delegation, Leonard Behrens, and Ennals himself, the delegation was satisfied that 
Ennals realised that he was not to express or promote his own political views. WFUNA 
unanimously elected Ennals as its first secretary-general, no other candidate being put 
forward.81 Ennals would remain secretary-general until 1956.  
Government interest in WFUNA continued past 1946, not only due to the fear of 
communism, but also anti-colonialism. A few months later the Foreign Office was able to 
assure the Lebanese Government that UNA was fully alive to the danger of the WFUNA 
falling under communist influence and that there was no sign of it occurring to date.82 
However, in 1955, the Colonial Office alerted the Foreign Office to fears that the WFUNA 
and United Nations Associations in the colonies were being exploited for anti-colonial 
purposes. It followed a circular sent to Governors by the Secretary of State for Colonies 
Oliver Lyttelton requesting an assessment of the activities of United Nations Associations. It 
was revealed that in the majority of colonies there was no United Nations Associations, with 
the exception of Singapore, Malaya, Sierra Leone, Malta, Hong Kong, Jamaica, British 
Guiana and Kenya. The Hong Kong Government was particularly concerned once it found 
that local politicians were attempting to use the United Nations Association as a vehicle to 
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lobby on issues such as labour relations that they deemed outside the ‘proper scope’ of United 
Nations Associations. There were also stirrings of communist influence within the United 
Nations Associations in Jamaica, British Guiana and Kenya. The report did not recommend 
that any particular action be taken, but suggested that ‘respectable patronage’ could prevent 
the organisations from being used for ‘irrelevant political ends’.83 Canalisation was being 
attempted abroad as well as at home.  
There was more wariness to come when in the same year the WFUNA was organising 
a summer school and requesting a British official representative on a panel entitled ‘The 
United Nations and Africa’. The new head of the UN Department, Edward Warner’s first 
reaction was to have nothing to do with WFUNA activities: ‘WFUNA is disreputable, and the 
Africa theme probably has anti-colonial intentions’. However, Warner warmed to the idea 
when he discovered that Judd would be the chair and that Judd had assured the similarly 
unfavourable reactions of the French and Belgian representatives that the meeting would not 
become an anti-colonial demonstration.84 Another official welcomed the opportunity to put 
the UK point of view across to a ‘strong pressure group’, without the risk of being exposed to 
embarrassing discussions.85 In the end, a British representative was put forward, but due to 
last minute rearrangements of the schedule at the conference they did not get an opportunity 
to speak. Judd, nevertheless, considered it to be a great success. Demonstrating that the 
Anglo-French rivalry was alive and well, British representatives appeared to have taken 
particular delight when people from British colonies criticised French colonial policies.86 
Whitehall appears to have been less interested in WFUNA in the 1960s and 1970s. WFUNA’s 
attitudes on disarmament and Vietnam War were noted in 1966 and 1967 respectively, but by 
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the 1970s there appears to be little reference to the organisation.87 It is probable that after 
decolonisation, there were fewer obvious divisions of opinion and perhaps the organisation 
was generally deemed ‘innocuous’, as one official noted on WFUNA resolutions on 
disarmament in 1966.88 There was much more consistent interest in Whitehall circles 




UNA, like the UN, possessed the ability to irritate Whitehall ministers and officials. However 
much praise was lauded over UNA and the UN, there were many within government who felt 
that it too often interfered in matters that were not their concern. In July 1950, one official in 
the UN Department, Peter Hope, found that many of the resolutions adopted by UNA at its 
AGM were ‘highly provocative, not to say undesirable’. One such resolution was that the 
British government should adopt the UN general-secretary Trygve Lee’s ‘Twenty Year 
Programme for Achieving Peace through the United Nations’ as a primary factor in British 
foreign policy. Lie’s ten-point programme included the control of atomic energy, universality 
of UN membership and the advancement of dependent colonial and semi-colonial peoples, the 
details of which the government felt unable to agree with. Hope urged that another UNA 
deputation should be received by the Foreign Office, despite having only received one two 
months beforehand, to put UNA’s ‘thinking on the right line’.89 Ultimately, when the 
deputation was received in September, it was reported that the Korean War and the resultant 
deterioration of East-West relations had made UNA realise that nothing could be done to 
improve relations until the situation was cleared up and did not attempt to press their 
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resolutions.90 Nonetheless, UNA would continue to provide Whitehall with headaches, 
particularly over the issues that surrounded the end of empire. Enter Seretse Khama, the 
future Prime Minister of Botswana.  
Khama was the Chief-Designate of the Bamangwato people in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate (modern-day Botswana), who trained to become a barrister at Oxford University. 
In 1948, he married Ruth Williams a clerk at Lloyd’s of London. The interracial marriage 
sparked some initial controversy among Khama’s family, but earned much more persistent 
disdain from the apartheid government of South Africa. The South African government 
pressed Britain to disinherit Khama of his chieftainship and eventually the British government 
exiled both Seretse and Ruth Khama from Bechuanaland in 1951. Lord Salisbury, the Lord 
Privy Seal, was the minister ultimately responsible and his decision was met with significant 
protest in Britain.91 One of the principal bodies organising such protest was UNA. In 1952, 
UNA passed a resolution deploring the actions of the government for exiling Khama. The 
Birmingham branch of UNA arranged three public meetings held at Birmingham Town Hall 
on the topic of British policy in Africa. The first meeting was addressed by Khama and a 
petition was circulated condemning the government’s actions. Moreover, the next two 
meetings were concerned with the British relationship with the South African apartheid 
government and British plans to establish the Central African Federation.92 Salisbury, now 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, was furious. Salisbury, like many politicians 
was a patron of UNA; he held a Vice-Presidency. He informed Cabinet that he wished to 
resign his patronage. Eden, then Foreign Secretary, reminded Salisbury that there would be 
political consequences from disassociation from UNA given that there was much ‘Liberal’ 
opinion within it. In the 1950s, the Conservatives were especially keen to be seen as the 
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inheritors of the liberal tradition while the Liberal Party hits its nadir. Churchill’s government 
also owed its parliamentary majority to the National Liberal Party. Here was an example of 
where the UNA’s ability to be seen as representing the centre ground proved valuable. Eden 
felt that it was a better course of action to attempt to persuade the Association to discontinue 
its activities.93  
Salisbury did not resign his patronage, but he considered Khama’s case to be ‘outside 
the competence’ of UNA. The UN Department was ‘not too happy’ with this reasoning. It 
judged that as a private body, UNA could presumably discuss what it liked and that Khama’s 
case might be held to be within the Association’s aims, namely 4(c) which advocated ‘the 
building up of an agreed code of international law applicable to all nations great and small’.94 
Nonetheless, it was believed within the Foreign Office that General Lyne, the UNA 
Chairman, should be given ‘a good talking to on the subject’, explaining the embarrassing 
effect that UNA’s action had for members of the government who patronised the UNA and 
the reluctance they would feel in accepting future invitations to speak at UNA rallies. Cecil 
Parrott, then head of the United Nations Department, nevertheless defended UNA, noting that 
it had played a significant role in keeping the ‘much more dangerous’ WFUNA ‘out of 
communist hands’ and it should therefore be given a ‘fairly easy rein’. The PUS William 
Strang recorded his belief that there was little that could be done to prevent UNA – any more 
than the LNU – from taking the opposition line when the Conservatives were in power.95 The 
Minister of State, the future Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd spoke firmly to Lyne, 
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explaining the embarrassment it had caused and Lyne asked that prominent Conservatives 
serve on UNA Executive Committee in future to assuage doubts over its impartiality.96  
The Commonwealth Relations Office remained sceptical especially amid UNA protest 
over their planned creation of the Central African Federation. UNA was anxious that the 
Federation combining Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was yet another 
example of a white minority riding roughshod over the wishes of the black majority in 
contravention to the spirit and word of the UN Charter. Freda White wrote an article to this 
effect in United Nations News and it was criticised severely within the Commonwealth 
Relations Office for being ‘scandalously biased’.97 The article was decried by one official as 
another example of ‘irresponsible malcontents’ from UNA dabbling in controversies outside 
its ‘proper purview’ armed with ‘rabble-charming’ slogans and feared for the ‘deplorable 
effect’ that the article would have through its dissemination among UNA branches.98 The 
department’s inexperience in dealing with criticism from NGOs and a distinct lack of 
appreciation of the scope of the UN charter was revealed in the audacity of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office to state the business of UNA to its own leaders. ‘I feel 
bound to say’, Salisbury’s successor Lord Swinton wrote to Lyne, ‘it has been generally 
accepted that the object of the Association is to deal with matters falling within the scope of 
the United Nations Organisation: hence its name. Central African Federation would clearly be 
outside the jurisdiction of U.N.O.’. Lyne replied to correct Swinton’s crude formula, noting 
that the UN Charter promoted the political (in addition to the socio-economic) advancement 
of peoples in dependent territories.99 Unfortunately, as will be shown later, government would 
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continue to be bemused by the prerogative of both the UN and UNA to protest against British 
colonial policy. 
Both episodes concerning Khama and the Central African Federation demonstrated a 
genuine concern within Whitehall over UNA’s impact on public opinion and a subsequent 
desire to intervene and condition UNA’s output.  When Selwyn Lloyd first became Minister 
of State in 1952, he asked his officials whether he should accept a request to receive a UNA 
deputation to discuss Korea, he was informed that it had become traditional for ministers to 
receive UNA deputations and that he should welcome the opportunity to keep UNA ‘on the 
lines’.100 In 1955, the new Minister of State Anthony Nutting was worried to hear that Lyne 
was considering leaving his post, noting that he would like to have ‘an experienced hand to 
guide’ the UNA’s Executive Council. ‘It is important’, wrote Warner, ‘to have a sound man in 
the position’. Warner noted an ‘idealistic element’ within UNA that was prone to 
‘irresponsible criticism’ of the government. Furthermore, the concern over communist 
infiltration remained from the days of the LNU and Warner pressed that all should be done to 
obtain a ‘sensible man’ with whom ministers could discuss confidential matters.101 In the end, 
Lyne would remain until 1957, when replaced by ex-Director-General of the British Council, 
Ronald Adam. Officials within the UN Department were, nevertheless, optimistic about the 
future of UNA and felt, in a sign of things to come, that the organisation contrasted well with 
the anti-nuclear sermons of the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell. The Department was thus 
anxious that the membership be broadened and its standing enhanced.102  
Even as the Suez Crisis developed alongside UNA’s criticism of the government’s 
role, the Foreign Office was keen not to offend the organisation unduly. When a Conservative 
MP, certain that his colleague the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs John 
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Hope, ‘shared his disgust’ at UNA denunciations and conviction that Conservatives should 
withdraw their membership, Hope’s reply, drafted by Foreign Office officials, advised 
caution. Despite UNA publicising that it ‘deplore[d]’ the government’s military intervention 
and the undermining of UN authority, Hope argued that it was better to retain membership 
and ‘try to influence it’.103 The Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd also sought to assure his 
UNA ‘friends’ that he was ‘convinced with the knowledge at my disposal that our action was 
right. We may have stopped the Third World War. Unfortunately one cannot unfold the full 
story in public’.104 Nevertheless, as in the past, offence was taken at UNA’s perceived lack of 
sufficient deference. One senior official in the Foreign Office complained ‘it is tiresome of the 
UN Association to try to operate as a pressure group’ and noted that parts of its resolutions 
were ‘pretty heretical’.105  
However, of course, in order to maintain its insider privileges, UNA was conscious 
not to appear too heretical, especially when other anti-nuclear bodies appeared on the scene. 
In June 1957, UNA’s secretary David Ennals joined the committee of the National Council 
for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), the CND in embryo. In the view of 
one member of NCANWT, this was ‘a far bigger catch than either the Labour or Liberal 
parties’ due to UNA’s prestigious patronage. However, in 1958 UNA severed its connections 
with the fledgling CND when its initial policy statement was revised to be made 
unambiguously unilateralist in order that the organisation could become a mass movement, 
rather than an elite pressure group. The statement was followed by a sit-down demonstration 
outside Downing Street, which only further deterred UNA.106 Nevertheless, UNA would 
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continue to be a potential thorn in the side of government. One such occasion related to the 
abortive attempts at multilateral disarmament at the Ten Nation Committee on Disarmament 
in 1960, where UNA criticised the British government and the Western powers for failing to 
seize upon Soviet proposals, which UNA considered as potentially fruitful. UNA also pressed 
the Foreign Office for prompt publication of the Committee’s negotiations in order to 
encourage public interest and rebuff cynicism that UNA argued only encouraged support for 
unilateralism.107  
UNA’s insider position also ensured that it played a significant role in the 
coordination of British responses to UN campaigns. In 1959, UNA coordinated British non-
governmental activities for the UN’s World Refugee Year and would play an important role 
in the UN’s five year programme, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign that opened the first 
UN Development Decade in 1960. In the early stages of the latter – before a national 
committee was formed – UNA acted as a go-between, between government and other NGOs. 
When NGOs were keen to learn of government plans for Britain’s contribution to the 
campaign, it was UNA that was sent to speak with the responsible department, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. Indeed, in these early stages, officials were keen to speak to 
UNA alone. UNA also offered advice on the choice of organisations to serve on the National 
Committee.108 The arrangement was mutually beneficial. The Ministry used UNA as an 
informal line of communication to the other NGOs through which it could explain problems 
with the campaign that it did not wish to be made public.109  
 
 
                                                             
107 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FO 371/149397: R. Adam to S. Lloyd, 11 Jun 1960.  
108 TNA: Ministry of Agriculture Archives: MAF 252/215: Minute by S. Campbell, 23 Nov 1960; Minute by 
D.H. McPhail, 24 Nov 1960; Minute by RGR Wall, 25 Nov 1960; Minute by G. Gunner, 25 Nov 1960; Minute 
by RGR Wall, 15 Dec 1960; Minute by S. Campbell, 22 Dec 1960. 
109 TNA: Ministry of Agriculture Archives: MAF 252/215: ‘Freedom from Hunger Campaign Delegation from 
UNA’, undated; ‘Note for the Parliamentary Secretary (Lords) for Meeting with Sir Ronald Adam, 8 December 





HIGHS AND LOWS 
Greater cooperation with the government appeared to be on the horizon when Harold Wilson 
won the general election in 1964. UNA had reasons to be cheerful. The Labour manifesto 
declared that the most important factor in securing international peace was ‘to revive the 
morale and increase the powers of the United Nations’.110 Transport House promised change, 
having described the Conservatives as ‘fair weather friends of the UN’ who only supported it 
when it was considered to be in British interests.111 Furthermore, these words belonged to 
David Ennals who had joined the Labour Party Research Department after leaving his post as 
UNA secretary in 1957.112 In 1967, UNA’s new Chairman of the Executive Council the ex-
Conservative MP Humphrey Berkeley, informed Wilson that  
 
my entire Executive feel that for the first time the Government takes the UN very seriously, 
and also appreciate the work which we, as an Association, are trying to do...As a former 
Conservative Member of Parliament, I find it slightly mortifying to have to tell the members 
of my organisation that we get more whole-hearted support from the present Government than 
we have ever got before, or are likely to in the future.113  
 
Wilson himself addressed UNA’s General Council just a few months before. UNA 
published the speech, heralding the occasion – the first time a Prime Minster in office had 
addressed the council delegates – as ‘an important event in our history’.114 Lord Caradon, the 
Minister of State and Permanent Representative to the UN, was also very keen to support the 
UN cause in Britain. During his tenure, Caradon devoted one or two weeks a year to speaking 
engagements in the UK on UN affairs. In 1966, he requested that UNA organise an itinerary 
for him. UNA happily accepted and in the following year, Caradon spoke at 16 events in 
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Wales, Scotland and England over 21 days.115 Caradon, however, was eager that he would not 
simply be preaching to the converted and worked on the assumption that it was ‘no use 
talking about international affairs to anyone over thirty’. Subsequently, he specified that he 
wished to speak mostly at universities and schools rather than solely UNA branches.116 
Foreign Office mandarins agreed. In 1968, an assistant under-secretary, Peter Hayman, felt 
that UNA should avoid attempting to enlist the ‘elderly “do-gooders” which made up the 
majority of its membership’.117   
The Foreign Office grew interested in the perceptions of the UN among young people 
and thus the CEWC and UNSA. The CEWC was perceived as ‘a reputable off-shoot’ of UNA 
and was praised for its works in publicising the UN among young people. During Caradon’s 
speaking tour in January 1967 he, along with fellow Minister of State Lord Chalfont, attended 
a UNA-CEWC conference aimed at young people.118 Caradon was made UNSA’s Honorary 
President and both he and Chalfont held briefing sessions with the organisation in the late 
sixties. In 1970, under the new Conservative government, the new Minister of State Joseph 
Godber received for the first time in UNSA’s history a deputation at the Foreign Office.119 
Godber’s officials recommended the meeting on the basis that UNSA was ‘virtually the only 
body in this country representing the interests of youth in international affairs’ and to 
encourage its current moderates so as to prevent the organisation from becoming 
radicalised.120 
Berkeley also impressed the Foreign Office. When Berkeley became Chairman in 
1966, he told Wilson that he was ‘determined to make UNA into a great national 
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movement’.121 He aimed to double the existing UNA membership in order that UNA would 
be comparable in size to the LNU.122 For this he needed money. Berkeley, citing a diner 
hosted at 10 Downing Street by Harold Macmillan to raise money for the British Council of 
the European Movement from wealthy businessmen, suggested that Wilson might host a 
similar dinner for UNA.123 Wilson agreed and Berkeley enlisted Jeffrey Archer, who had 
previous fundraising experience with Oxfam. Archer targeted businessmen who were on the 
way up and were flattered to receive an invitation to dine in Downing Street. The event held 
in 1968 was an apparent huge success, raising £208,000; 83% of the £250,000 that Berkeley’s 
campaign had raised in total.124 
 But not all was sweetness and light between the government and UNA in the sixties. 
In November 1966, Berkeley wrote to the new Foreign Secretary George Brown enclosing a 
resolution adopted by the Executive Committee which was highly critical of a number of 
aspects of government policy in the UN. Although complimentary of the work done by 
Chalfont and Caradon, UNA was ‘greatly disturbed by the declining influence’ of Britain in 
the UN and ‘the contrast between the Government’s repeated declarations that the UN is a 
corner-stone of our foreign policy and their reluctance to use the Organisation to its fullest 
extent’. UNA’s protestations were concerned with Britain’s failure to end Ian Smith’s regime 
in Rhodesia and to secure UN participation in Britain’s subsequent sanctions; Britain’s 
abstention on the UN resolution to end South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa; 
Britain’s half-hearted advocacy for the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
Security Council; and that Britain was not fulfilling its financial obligation to the purposes of 
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the Development Decade.125 Nor was UNA quiet on the Britain’s reluctance to criticise 
America’s actions in Vietnam War. In the same year it produced a publication promoting self-
determination in Vietnam.126 Donald Murray, the Head of the East Asia Department 
complained that UNA had ‘fairly consistently offered gratuitous advice to H.M.G. on their 
Viet-Nam policy’.127 As within the Conservative administration, a minister protested that 
certain issues were beyond UNA’s proper purview. The Minister of State Goronwy Roberts 
felt that UNA’s purpose was merely to educate people about the UN and promote the support 
of its Charter. He believed that it ought to only be partisan when the Charter was infringed or 
insufficiently supported: ‘Suez came into this category. Viet Nam does not’.128  
However, it was over the issue of Rhodesia that UNA would cause the most anxiety in 
Whitehall. In October 1967, a UN Department official, John Sanders, met a group of UNSA 
representatives explaining their intentions to organise a simulated sitting of the International 
Court of Justice in March, which would give an advisory opinion on whether any UN member 
would be acting unlawfully if it were to recognise Smith’s Administration. Sanders informed 
the UNSA members that the Foreign Office would welcome such an exercise and would assist 
where they could and advised his colleagues that UNSA should be encouraged.129 However, a 
mistake was made and Sanders’s minute was lost in the system and not picked up until 
January.130 When the head of the Commonwealth Office’s Rhodesia Department, Richard 
Faber, received the news in February, he pressed officials to persuade UNSA to change the 
topic to one less potentially embarrassing. Faber felt that either verdict reached by the “Court” 
would not be helpful, but obviously was particularly concerned if it found in favour of 
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recognition. He wished to keep the government’s options open and felt that if a policy of 
‘quietism’ was pursued, ‘[w]e may not be too concerned to prevent “creeping”, but we will 
not want to be faced with “galloping” recognition’. Faber thus felt that the attendant publicity 
could be ‘inconvenient, if not disastrous’.131 It was, of course, too late. UNSA had done well: 
the “Court” would sit in Chatham House and its proceedings would be covered by the BBC 
and ITV.132 Subsequently, although the government had to avoid open sponsorship, the “UK 
representatives” were briefed by the Foreign Office on the proviso that it was understood that 
the government could no more than suggest possible lines of legal argument and that such 
assistance was ‘wholly informal and unofficial’.133 Ultimately, it was a storm in a tea cup. The 
judges unanimously found against recognition and an official even wondered whether it might 
be worth giving the event wider publicity.134  
The government certainly did not want to attract further attention, however, to the 
protests made by UNA later that year concerning Wilson’s talks with Smith on HMS Fearless. 
UNA felt that no honourable deal could be made with Smith.135 Wilson was particularly 
sensitive in regard to a reference to Munich, reported to have been made by Berkeley; for this 
and the other public comments made by UNA, Wilson privately took Berkeley ‘politely but 
firmly to task’.136 Further embarrassment was caused in 1969 by the widely publicised 
“Berkeley Plan” that proposed a British caretaker administration in Rhodesia of up to ten 
years directing the country to independence and majority rule.137 Barbara Castle, the Secretary 
of State for Employment and UNA supporter, even enquired with the Foreign Secretary 
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Michael Stewart over the validity of the idea.138 Furthermore, an official within the Foreign 
Office South African Department thought the plan sufficiently interesting to submit to the 
British Embassy in South Africa for comment and pondered whether it might make a good 
topic for a potentially new Chatham House study group on Southern Africa.139   
Whitehall’s sensitivity to UNA activity was once again demonstrated when it 
attempted to police the line between state and non-state in an endeavour to avoid becoming 
embroiled in the internal battle within UNA in the late 1960s. The other new member of UNA 
staff that sparked intrigue at Whitehall was the new Director in 1966, the ex-Secretary-
General of WFUNA, John Ennals. In 1967, further fuelling his notorious reputation within the 
Foreign Office, Ennals, without reference to Berkeley, authorised that an office be provided 
within UNA headquarters for use by the Council for Advancement of Arab-British 
Understanding. Inevitably, a complaint was lodged by the Israeli Embassy. This prompted 
Berkeley to inform the Foreign Office and declare a litany of complaints against Ennals who 
he felt was deceptive and lacked political sense and administrative ability. Berkeley also 
outlined to the Foreign Office how he wished to remove Ennals from his post.140 The 
Ennals/Berkeley split was a long drawn-out and public ordeal that had serious implications 
explored more fully in chapter four. For Whitehall, the UN secretary-general U Thant’s 
doubts as to whether he should visit UNA during the row caused concern.141  
Ministers and officials agreed that the government should steer clear of the 
‘unedifying’ dispute. Neither Berkeley nor Ennals made it easy.142 In February 1968, Ennals 
wrote a letter on the subject of the Vietnam War directly to the Prime Minister without the 
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knowledge of UNA Executive Council.143 Furthermore, in September 1969, Berkeley 
circulated a list of criticisms of Ennals among the Executive Council that he felt should be 
taken in consideration before Ennals faced a motion of confidence in the Council. The most 
notable allegation was Ennals’s background of communist connections which prevented him 
from sitting on an unofficial advisory committee on UN affairs for the Foreign Secretary that 
included representatives of UNA, Chatham House, parliament, universities and 
newspapers.144 This prompted the intervention of John’s brother, the now Minister of State for 
Social Services, David Ennals who wished to clarify with the Foreign Office why exactly his 
brother was not on the committee.145 Worse, the internal strife did not stop at the 
Berkeley/Ennals dispute. UNSA was threatening to split from UNA in the belief that budget 
cuts had unfairly fallen on the student organisation, while Berkeley disputed the eligibility of 
the UNSA President on the grounds that he had not been a student within two years of his 
appointment. Again – as the UNSA’s honorary President Caradon minuted – government 
wished to steer clear.146 Similarly, in April 1970, Jeremy Thorpe warned Wilson, as one 
Honorary President of UNA to another, about another dispute arising between Berkeley and 
Jeffrey Archer concerning allegations over Archer’s expenses claims. Wilson assured Thorpe 
that he had no wish to get involved.147     
Yet despite the government’s wish not to be embarrassed by UNA’s internal strife, 
officials recognised that they had a real interest in UNA. They backed its aims and were by no 
means indifferent. One official feared that it was now raising more money than ever before, 
thanks to Berkeley, just at the time though that it was in danger of falling apart 
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organisationally.148 There was also great sympathy with Berkeley, particularly with regards to 
his opinions of John Ennals. Peter Hayman professed to know Ennals quite well and noted 
that he subscribed to what Berkeley said about him: ‘I have found him lacking in frankness on 
occasions. I am quite sure that he has no fire and I think he is a poor administrator.’149 
Hayman also spied an opportunity in Ennals’s departure. While Ennals’s end at UNA was 
becoming increasingly apparent in August 1969, Berkeley was receiving applications for the 
position of Secretary. Berkeley intended that the holder of the post would eventually succeed 
Ennals as Director. Michael Robb, the British Chargé d’Affairs in South Africa was one of 
the applicants who Hayman recommended. He acknowledged that there would be suspicion of 
Foreign Office involvement, but believed that the Foreign Office need not raise objections on 
that score and that they stood ‘to gain a great deal if he was successful’.150 Robb did not 
receive the position, but Ennals was asked to resign by the Executive Council in November 
1969. Eventually, as outlined in chapter four, both Berkeley and Ennals would be made to 
resign in 1970. However, UNA’s troubles went beyond a clash of personalities and shared 




Money – or the lack of it – featured prominently in both Chatham House and UNA’s 
discussions with Whitehall in the sixties and seventies. By 1963, Younger was reporting that 
businesses were losing interest in the work of Chatham House and were cancelling their 
corporate subscriptions. The bulk of Chatham House funds were provided by the Rockefeller 
Foundation, but there was increasing competition with universities and newly formed 
institutes. It was also feared that the Foundation would soon withdraw funding in favour of 
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projects in poorer countries.151 Why should a US foundation pay for British programmes that 
British organisations could fund? Hard times were reflected in the sixties, when the Institute 
made significant cuts to its press library and research programme, while the Survey of 
International Affairs was terminated.152 Younger thus approached the Foreign Office to see if 
he could solicit interest in funding new projects, including that of informing public opinion on 
Europe as noted in chapter two. The Foreign Office was not forthcoming. Nevertheless, it did 
again offer to become a corporate subscriber and this Chatham House accepted, but at £200 a 
year, it was small comfort.153  
Amid the rising costs of the 1960s, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence 
became keen on an idea of a merger of Chatham House with the Royal United Services 
Institute, which was also suffering financially. The institutions were less keen and sceptical 
that it would in fact help.154 The question of European integration, however, aided Chatham 
House. Between 1967 and 1976, the Ford Foundation funded the European Series, a joint 
project with the think-tank Policy and Economic Planning. Furthermore, in the early 
seventies, Chatham House was one of a number of NGOs to benefit from a government fund 
of £6 million designated to improve cultural contacts with Western European countries under 
the management of the minster tasked with negotiating Britain’s entry into the EEC, Geoffrey 
Rippon. The Institute received funds to cover the expenses of conferences such as ‘India and 
the Enlarged EEC’ and ‘The External Relations of the Enlarged European Community’, along 
with the travel expenses associated with a new development whereby some of the Institute’s 
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study groups benefited from regular representation from experts on the Continent.155 Chatham 
House’s input on the European question was recognised by the BBC when the new Director 
of the Institute was asked to deliver the 1972 Reith Lectures on Europe.156 Nonetheless, it was 
not enough to deal with a growing deficit. In 1968, shortly after pound sterling was devalued, 
the Institute had a surplus of £4,000. By the financial year 1971/72, there was a deficit of 
£50,000.157  
UNA had reached a ‘serious financial crisis’ before pound sterling was devalued in 
November 1967. Berkeley explained to Wilson, four months before the prime minister’s 
infamous ‘pound in your pocket’ speech, that on an income of less than £60,000 per year, 
UNA had to maintain a staff of 40. Furthermore, a lack of funds constantly hampered the 
Association’s ability to publish pamphlets and provide sufficient support to the work of the 
CEWC, to which 1,300 schools were affiliated, and UNSA, that with a membership of 10,000 
over 100 branches made it the largest student body outside the National Union of Students. 
UNA was also the second largest body within the British Volunteer Programme (the 
forerunner of the Duke of Edinburgh Award). Yet in 1967 they were expecting in a deficit of 
£10,000, while their total reserves only amounted to about £22,000.158  The dinner held at 
Downing Street in 1968 was in large part designed to help, but the government went a step 
further. UNA’s financial situation was so bleak that Berkeley and Ennals requested a grant-in-
aid from the Foreign Office. The request coincided with a renewed interest in the Foreign 
Office for improving the propagation of the UN within the UK. ‘We have come to the 
conclusion’, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, George Thomson wrote to the Treasury, 
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‘that the United Nations Association is perhaps our most valuable means of doing this, and 
that as such it deserves more governmental encouragement than it has so far received.’159 The 
Treasury agreed and UNA received £37,500 over five years on a tapering scale (£10,000 for 
1967/68; £10,000 for 1968/69; £7,000 for 1969/70; £5,000 for 1970/71; £5,000 for 1971/72).  
The tapering scale was designed to provide an incentive toward ‘sensible planning and 
financial management’.160 UNA’s financial crisis had proved that, for all their disagreements, 
Whitehall valued the work of UNA.   
Similarly, the growing financial crisis that Chatham House was facing in the seventies 
provides the clearest indication as to how the Foreign Office perceived the Institute. After a 
failed attempt by Younger in 1971, Andrew Shonfield, his replacement, had a discussion with 
PUS Thomas Brimelow. Shonfield believed there to be two separate aspects to the work of 
Chatham House. The first was research and the second was that it was a club for people 
interested in international affairs (note the lack of reference to public engagement). 
Shonfield’s instinct was to concentrate on the first. Brimelow disagreed. He felt that the 
Institute’s value lay with providing a forum.161 Talks were had with Shonfield and he 
appeared to have got the message. In his second application, Shonfield informed the Foreign 
Office that without a subsidy, Chatham House would need to make cuts and that these would 
fall on the services which the Institute provided as a forum.162 A Foreign Office memorandum 
for the Treasury detailed the value that they ascribed to the Institute, stating that it  
 
(a) Provides a unique and effective milieu for the informed public discussion of foreign 
affairs; 
(b) Assists in the projection of British views abroad; 
                                                             
159 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/216: G. Thomson to J. Diamond, 28 Jul 1967. 
160 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 58/216: J. Diamond to G. Roberts, 6 Oct 1967. 
161 TNA: Foreign Office Archives: FCO 49/403: T. Brimelow to J. Cable, 24 Mar 1972.  





(c) Serves as a quasi-diplomatic function as a rostrum for distinguished foreign visitors.163 
 
The aforementioned head of the Foreign Office’s Planning Committee, James Cable 
valued the public meetings, seminars and study groups, but was critical of the Institute’s 
research and publications. Cable felt that the library facilities and the research programmes 
only duplicated the larger and better organised facilities of the Foreign Office itself.164 
Toynbee’s FORD was understood to have outgrown its parentage. Cable also thought that 
Chatham House should focus more of its attention on questions over future policy and less on 
‘the backwaters of our imperial past’.165 Similarly, Brimelow felt that Chatham House ought 
to take account of the field of International Relations that was growing in strength in the 
academic world.166 Ultimately, Alec Douglas-Home, then Foreign Secretary, submitted an 
application to the Treasury that focussed on the forum aspect of Chatham House, warning that 
without it there would be difficulty in reaching opinion formers. The Treasury approved and 
in 1972 paid a grant of £20,000, subsidising Chatham House for the first time in its history.167  
There was real concern within the Foreign Office over the impact on public opinion 
should bodies such as Chatham House and UNA become extinct as a result of inflation. The 
Director of Research, Edward Orchard, feared that erosion of the serious cultural and 
intellectual establishment would only lead to the wider encroachment of sensationalism and 
the ephemeral media.168 His comment was made in relation to the Slater Report produced in 
1973. The report was produced by the ex-high commissioner to Uganda, Richard Slater, and 
was the Foreign Office’s response to Edward Heath’s advocacy of strengthening the 
partnership between government and NGOs. In December 1971, Heath announced a doubling 
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of direct grants to voluntary organisations.169 Citing the Plowden Report, the Slater Report 
recommended greater use of external expertise and countered the habitual argument that those 
outside the Foreign Office were unable to make a useful contribution to policy as they did not 
enjoy access to classified information. It stated that the basic facts were publicly available – at 
least in the medium to long term – and detachment often aided perspective. Furthermore it 
recognised the importance of the transnational networks that NGOs operated within, stating 
that ‘closer association will enable us to exercise at least a marginal influence’. The report 
also noted that the value of NGOs had been ‘explicitly recognised’ in Rippon’s fund: ‘What is 
true of Europe is true of other parts of the world also’. Finally, Slater appreciated the value of 
bodies engaged in promoting the understanding of international affairs: ‘[t]he backing of 
informed public opinion helps to sustain the credibility of our policies abroad.’ Chatham 
House was frequently referred to and was the first listed think-tank in the annex of known 
NGOs of interest to the Foreign Office. UNA was the first listed interest group of four whose 
aims were compatible with foreign policy and deemed to be of high value.170 The PUS 
approved all of the recommendations of the report, the main one being that a specific position 
be made with the responsibility of liaising with NGOs.171  
Ostensibly, the 1970s appear to have seen a marked improvement in the relations 
between the Foreign Office and NGOs. In 1974, the Foreign Office spent £1.6 million on 
grants for 42 NGOs.172 However, the Home Office’s response to Heath’s drive to narrow the 
gap between officialdom and non-officialdom was the Voluntary Services Unit (VSU) on 
which the Foreign Office’s new liaison officer commented on enviously in 1974 for having a 
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budget of £2-3 million.173 Furthermore, the Slater Report was classified and written for the 
internal purposes of the Foreign Office, it was not intended for distribution among NGOs.174 
Nonetheless, as both Chatham House and UNA’s financial situation failed to improve 
quickly, the Foreign Office continued to provide grants to them. In 1974, the Foreign Office 
listed Chatham House as first priority for funding and officials would continue to attach high 
value to it throughout the 1970s.175 In 1975, an unavailing proposal was discussed within the 
PUS’s planning meeting whereby approaches would be made to grant-aided institutions to 
integrate under the auspices of Chatham House. Given high inflation and there being no new 
money forthcoming from the Treasury, the proposition seemed to make sense and had the 
added bonus of enabling the Foreign Office to provide further financial assistance to Chatham 
House.176 However, the level of prioritisation applied to Chatham House did differ between 
minsters and officials. The Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, and the Minister of State, 
Goronwy Roberts were impressed by the work of the Welsh Institute of International Affairs 
(WIIA) and wished that a grant be made to it ‘even at the expense of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs’.177 Given that the Treasury was saying that the Government must reduce 
its activities, Brimelow worried that such a grant to the WIIA could only be prejudicial to 
Chatham House, feeling that it would be wrong to deflect money from national organisations 
to regional ones.178  Callaghan pressed it, stating that he saw no reasons why money should be 
limited to London based organisations. 179 In the end the WIIA received a small grant of 
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£1,000.180 The value to which the Foreign Office attached to Chatham House was further 
demonstrated by sympathy given to the Institute’s reluctance to cover its deficit through its 
reserve capital, which included stocks and shares valued at £1.2 million in 1972 and the 
freehold of 6 Duke of York Street.181 
UNA was hit harder by rising inflation than Chatham House. The fundraising 
campaign in the late 1960s had certainly raised a lot of money, but unfortunately much of it 
could not be used where it was needed. It appears that a serious administrative error took 
place. More than half of the £250,000 raised was paid to UNA Trust. As a result of changes in 
the definition of charities in the Charities Act of 1960, UNA agreed with the Charity 
Commission that their previous charitable status should end due to the political nature of their 
work. Subsequently money for their educational and humanitarian work was channelled into a 
separate charitable trust, UNA Trust. The political side of their work was run on a non-
charitable basis. Thus money paid to the Trust could only be used for the CEWC and UNA’s 
contribution to the British Volunteer Programme. The money could not be used for paying 
salaries or the rent on UNA’s headquarters at 93 Albert Embankment. Of the remainder, 
£45,000 was spent on Berkeley’s membership campaign, but this had largely failed; it 
managed to attract only 9,000 new members rather than the hoped for 35,000. The rest of the 
money (£59,000) had been transferred into the Association’s reserves and was used to help 
balance the budget.182  By the end of the 1970s UNA’s financial situation only got worse. In 
1977, rising rent costs forced the Association to leave its headquarters at 93 Albert 
Embankment and move across the river to a more cramped set of offices at 3 Whitehall Court 
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where it remains today. Moreover, in the same year the CEWC also separated from UNA as it 
could no longer provide it with sufficient support.183  
The Heath, Wilson and Callaghan governments were sympathetic and provided grants 
to UNA throughout their terms. UNA may have been aided, however, by Labour’s return to 
office, again committed the UN and the new minister at the Foreign Office. In 1974, David 
Ennals, now Minister of State, had the peculiar experience of seeing the tables turned, and 
received a deputation from UNA requesting another government subvention of £5,000 per 
annum for two years. It was noted that the government was already funding similar 
organisations including the British Atlantic Committee whose aim was to assist in the 
promotion and understanding of NATO. Furthermore, the Foreign Office understood that the 
cost of living had risen between January 1968 and February 1974 by 57.7% and that UNA 
was particularly vulnerable to inflation given the non-charitable status which meant it had to 
pay many taxes including value added tax. They also recognised that it would be 
counterproductive for UNA to pass on its costs to its membership.184 After UNA lost its 
headquarters and the CEWC, a delegation led by Jeremy Thorpe, was successful in securing a 
rise of the government grant from £6,000 in 1977/78 to £29,775 in 1977/78 to underwrite a 
fixed proportion of its budget.185  
However, the government’s financial assistance to Chatham House and UNA did not 
equate with a new appreciation or adoption of ideas that originated from outside the confines 
of Whitehall. Just as the Foreign Office had done in the past (and as the VSU did 
concurrently), it sought to condition NGO activity; this was only facilitated once government 
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contributions featured prominently on NGOs’ balance sheets.186 Government funding had its 
effect on Chatham House’s activities. In 1978 Chatham House formed the Policy Studies Unit 
(PSU) that produced papers (the Chatham House Papers) headed by Lawrence Freedman, 
intended to be of direct interest to people engaged in formulating policy in government, 
commerce and industry. Although the decision to establish the PSU was taken independently 
of government, the Foreign Secretary, David Owen, agreed with Shonfield’s successor, David 
Watt, that the Foreign Office would commission studies and it is likely – as a Foreign Office 
official noted – that this influenced the decision to form the PSU.187 This emphasis on “policy 
relevance” was present in Chatham House’s future research. In February 1979, the Chatham 
House Research Committee met to discuss a new direction, the minutes of which are tellingly 
held within the National Archives. Reference was made to ‘the poverty of academic research 
in Britain in international relations and area studies’ in Toynbee’s time, which enabled 
Chatham House then a broad field to cover. Now that related work was done elsewhere in 
other institutes and universities, the Research Committee was able to define its ‘priorities 
rather more tightly’ and the first criteria for defining the Chatham House research programme 
was ‘relevance – to current debates among policy makers and others’.188 In the 1980s, “policy 
relevance” became the watchword and Chatham House’s libraries shed their historical 
collections.189 Chatham House was becoming much more like the conventional think-tank.   
Neither did government funding of UNA necessarily demonstrate that the government 
was any keener to support UNA (or UN) aims, or have great faith in the Association. In 1974, 
while Chatham House was priority number one, UNA was number 15.190 In the same year, 
following UNA’s deputation to Ennals, the Treasury did not consider the grounds for 
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continuing the grants was very strong, given that they were still operating a deficit in spite 
seven years of government assistance. Nevertheless, even the Treasury understood that 
criticism would be levelled at the government if it refused to assist UNA given its 
commitment to the UN.191 The returning Minister of State Goronwy Roberts also had mixed 
feelings when Ennals proposed that the Association be given an additional £1,000 onto its 
£5,000 grant in 1975. Roberts hoped that UNA would do more work ‘in the grass roots, i.e. 
outside the Albert Embankment’. Roberts also compared UNA unfavourably with the WIIA: 
‘UNA is simply non-existent in extensive areas of England. Its Welsh counterpart does 
operate among the people.’192 Nevertheless, when UNA was compared with its counterparts 
within the WFUNA in 1975, West Germany’s received 90% of its budget from the 
government in Bonn while the Swedish association received a grant of £30,000 with a 
promise to pay the salaries of ten staff members.193  
In 1979, there was a new regime that was much less sympathetic to the Foreign 
Office’s grants in aid. Douglas Hurd, the new Foreign Secretary, had agreed to a cut of 
£500,000 in the Foreign Office programme for 1980/81. Amid cuts, Parliament’s Public 
Accounts Committee felt that it was not appropriate for Chatham House to receive 
government funding due to its large reserves. Reluctantly the Foreign Office stopped the grant 
to Chatham House. In the face of strong opposition from the Foreign Office’s UN 
Department, UNA also saw a cut from £31,000 in 1979/80 to £10,000 for 1980/81. The 
Thatcher government had little time for the provision of public money for NGOs. It did not 
have much time for liberal internationalism either. In 1985, unlike Eden who had been keen to 
be seen as a supporter of the UN and UNA lest liberal opinion be offended, Thatcher 
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boycotted UNESCO igniting a UNA campaign against the government.194 The voice of liberal 





When Woodhouse held the directorship at Chatham House between 1955 and 1959, he found 
it most unnerving to find himself drifting into the membership of the establishment. There 
were international conferences, embassy receptions and broadcasts on radio and television. 
His advice was sought on Cyprus, on who should be the next Regius Professor of Modern 
History at Oxford, and who should be the next editor of the Economist. But in his words: 
‘very prudently, no one ever acted on my advice’.195 It would be inaccurate, to state that the 
opinion of either Chatham House or UNA was not valued within Whitehall. Whitehall 
continued to fund Chatham House projects in the 1980s and in 1979 it was noted within the 
Foreign Office that UNA was still an ‘important body of opinion’, especially given its 
patronage.196 This should not be underestimated. Kenneth Younger recalling his time as 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs admitted that he could not recollect an occasion when he 
or his superiors had been especially affected by public opinion in reaching important 
decisions. Nevertheless, he did feel that public opinion affected ministers subconsciously. He 
gave the example of the Korean War where the reason why ministers spent little time 
considering public opposition to war was because the ‘long drama’ that surrounded the 
League of Nations, the Peace Ballot and the Munich Agreement ‘had so conditioned Ministers 
and public alike, that a public revolt against supporting the United Nations in its first military 
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test was unthinkable’.197 Chatham House and UNA were helping to shape public debate and 
this was the primary reason for why they elicited interest within Whitehall. However, just as 
Nicholas Crowson has observed with regards to the voluntary sector concerning 
homelessness, there were limitations to Chatham House and UNA’s influence within 
Whitehall.198  
Both the Plowden and Slater Reports had recommended that the Foreign Office 
engage more with external bodies, it appears to have shown little real enthusiasm for doing so. 
Government remained reluctant to release information. In 1963, D.C. Watt complained of ‘an 
official obscurantism’ with regards to the Official Secrets Act and the demise of the 
publications of diplomatic blue books’ for parliamentary debate.199 One of the first initiatives 
of the British government in the EEC was to press fellow members to tighten security on the 
policy discussion. Even the privileged information that insider groups, such as Chatham 
House and UNA, were privy to was unsullied by the terms of internal debate within 
Whitehall.200 There is little evidence to suggest that the ideas of Chatham House and UNA 
actually directly altered policy. Whitehall still distrusted external expertise. Even the historian 
Michael Howard who sat on Chatham House’s research committee admitted that Whitehall 
did not find the Institute ‘exactly a hotbed of new and inspiring ideas’.201 Furthermore, 
although the Foreign Office was obviously interested in public opinion, it did not actively 
inform it. Witness the decreasing government contribution to UN Day in the late 1940s. The 
postwar relationship between Chatham House, UNA and Whitehall shows that when there 
was collaboration between officialdom and non-officialdom it was constrained by the need for 
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both organisations to appear independent from the other. Furthermore, this constant redrawing 
of the line tended to favour Whitehall. The Foreign Office ‘nationalised’ the FRPS, shaped 
Chatham House’s position at the IPR and in the seventies encouraged the Institute to pursue 
the activities that it found useful. Arguably “policy relevance” is what the Foreign Office 
deems relevant and the subsequent danger is that alternative perspectives are not explored.   
Did the same old diplomacy reign? Chatham House and the UNA were important 
democratisers of foreign policy and Whitehall worked through them to inform public opinion, 
but it also sought to control opinion rather than engage with it. Old diplomacy is too crude a 
term. Diplomats accepted the need and value of listening to external opinion; just how 
successfully they did so is another matter. What is certain is that advocates of new diplomacy 
had reasons to be disappointed. Chatham House and UNA’s role as an agent for the 
democratisation of foreign policy – and that of other NGOs – was confined. Recently, Donald 
Abelson discussed the difficulties of determining how much or little influence foreign affairs 
think-tanks wield and concluded that we need to more critically evaluate the contribution 
made by them.202 Any such critical evaluation, must also assess what they are attempting to 
influence and determine how much or little influence that Whitehall possesses over the think-
tanks themselves. Kedourie made the error of paying little attention to this, devoting three 
pages of forty-four to how influential Chatham House was in the corridors of power with little 
explanation other than its close connections to officialdom.203 As shown here, insider status 
could be a double edged sword, it did not necessarily equate with influence and there was a 
great danger of being influenced by government. As the next chapter details, Chatham House 
and the UNA also had to be alive to the dangers of being influenced by party politics. 
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Fighting for Consensus:  
Party Politics and Internationalism 
 
The General Election atmosphere seems awful. No symptoms of recognition of the great 
dangers we are in...the Labour Manifesto with its perfunctory reference to Foreign affairs & 
Winston’s broadcast even worse – and the Liberals entirely absorbed by this loathsome Party 
fight! Are we in UNA doing all we can to correct this? 
Robert Cecil to Kathleen Courtney, 24 January 19501 
 
[On entering parliament] I ceased automatically to be an expert and became a party hack. This 
did not save me from being justly mocked by George Brown, in my first foreign affairs debate, 
for having once been an ‘expert’. The contemptuous quotation marks were audible in his 
voice.  
Christopher Montague Woodhouse, Something Ventured (1982)2 
Internationalism, liberal or otherwise, is political. Soon after the end of the Second World 
War, it would have been easy to presume the contrary. Politicians from all parties flocked to 
UNA rallies and branches to prove their internationalist credentials; to reassure their 
constituents that they would fight for peace, the UN and no repeat of the hardships that 
accompanied war. UN Day saw party leaders make dedicated radio broadcasts while their 
disciples unfurled UN flags over public buildings all over the UK. Politicians addressed all-
party meetings within their constituencies organised by local branches of UNA to do battle 
with their opposing candidates and demonstrate their exceptional grasp of international 
affairs. Internationalism appeared to be conventional, uncontroversial and non-party.  
Appearances can be deceptive. As one shifted across the British political spectrum, 
one encountered varying degrees of commitment to internationalism that went beyond crude 
party divisions. Of course, this was to be expected. The variant of internationalism that was 
embodied in such supranational organisations as the UN, the EEC and the Bretton Woods 
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institutions was liberal. This form of internationalism was the centrist solution to peace, 
prosperity and social justice. It believed that there was little to be gained from conflict be it 
international, social or party. Consensus was the watchword. Politicians and officials may 
have preferred to imagine Chatham House and UNA as apolitical or ‘non-party’. Indeed, often 
the organisations presented themselves as such, in order to avoid perceptions of partisanship. 
However, their motivation is more accurately described, as many UNA supporters did, as ‘all-
party’. Cecil’s disdain for the lack of reference to foreign policy in the 1950 general election 
campaign was directed at all three main parties. Unlike CND, UNA was focussed on rallying 
all of the mainstream parties to its cause, not just one.  This was not as naive as it may sound. 
Helen McCarthy has shown how during the interwar years, LNU was successful at appealing 
across the political spectrum and not just to Liberals. LNU attracted progressive 
Conservatives and members of the Labour Party who sought to project themselves as capable 
of moderate government and as heirs to the Gladstonian tradition.3 UNA enjoyed similar 
successes after the Second World War, while Chatham House followed a conscious strategy 
to attract previously neglected members of the labour movement and subsequently attained a 
stronger all-party status. 
Nonetheless, the task of internationalising British political discourse at a cross-party 
level was highly complex. There were reasons, as Cecil well-knew, why politicians were 
reluctant to draw attention to international affairs and the need for internationalism. The tenets 
of internationalism, especially liberal internationalism, wore away at the sovereignty of the 
nation-state and invited uncomfortable questions over Britain’s right to maintain an empire, 
global interdependence and perceptions of a homogenous culture. Furthermore, those who 
were attentive to international affairs were reminded that British power had limits and 
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consequently so did Britain’s political leaders. Nationalism was also more easily reconcilable 
with an a priori understanding of international affairs than internationalism. Liberal 
internationalists tended to hold reasoned argument in high regard. Party politics did not. As 
new liberals had feared at the turn of the century, party politics was given to emotional 
appeals rather than rational ones.4 As Woodhouse discovered when becoming a Conservative 
MP in 1959 and clashing with the future Labour Foreign Secretary George Brown, expertise 
could be treated with suspicion, especially when combined with political affiliation. Naturally 
Chatham House, ever keen to preserve its intellectual legitimacy, was happy to avoid 
becoming enmeshed in party politics. The UNA was not so lucky in avoiding perceptions of 
partisanship. Although there were a number within the organisation who were uncomfortable 
with the term being applied to them, for all intents and purposes, UNA was a multi-issue 
pressure group, it was actively political. This had significant implications especially when it 
was compelled to condemn policy, such as during the Suez Crisis.  Liberal internationalism 
did not readily interconnect with either the images that party political machines desired to 
conjure up or their methods. 
Fortunately for those politicians who supported aspects of liberal internationalism in 
principle but who flinched at its implications, international affairs often appeared deceptively 
distant to the electorate and indeed to politicians themselves. Unconsciously or otherwise, 
politicians thus treated foreign policy and domestic policy as separate entities, preserving the 
illusion of distance between them. Furthermore, the political structures in which they operated 
restricted proper exploration of international affairs and played a significant role in pushing 
foreign policy down the political agenda. 
                                                             






This chapter will explore these issues by firstly examining the extent to which 
Chatham House and UNA could claim all-party status, demonstrate why such a status was 
necessary and indicate the damage caused by steering away from it. It will then assess the 
impact that the two bodies had within Westminster and the limited facilities and incentives 
politicians had to pursue foreign policy issues. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to 
exploring the relationship that Chatham House and UNA had with the three main parties, 
revealing how they helped influence the policy directions of the parties, but also how party 
politics complicated their navigation of the political landscape. Ultimately, it demonstrates, 
especially when taken in combination with the preceding chapter, that Susan Pedersen’s 
observation made with regards to the League, that ‘statesmen might react to mobilised public 
opinion not by altering what they did but simply what they said’, remained the case with 





Both Chatham House and UNA had strong all-party credentials. The Conservative Research 
Department, the Labour Party International Department and Liberal International – the world 
federation of liberal political parties – were all corporate subscribers to Chatham House. For 
the majority of the period between 1945 and 1975, representatives from the three main parties 
also acted as the Institute’s Presidents.6 In 1946, there was also a relatively balanced 
representation among the MPs who were members of Chatham House. 51% were 
Conservative; 42% Labour; 4% Liberal and 3% were Independent.7 Furthermore, figure 4.1 
when taken as a whole similarly displays a relative degree of balance on the Institute’s 
Council in its representation of MPs until 1960.  It should be emphasised,   
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Figure 4.1. Balance of party affiliation among the MPs sitting on the Chatham House Council, 1945-
1975. 
Source: CHA: 1/4 : Annual Reports, 1944/45 to 1974/75. Note that no MPs sat on the Council between 1960 and 1967 and in 
1974/75. 
 
Figure 4.2. Balance of party affiliation among the MPs sitting on the UNA Executive Committee, 
1945-1975. 
Source: UNA Mss: UNA/25/6/1: Annual Reports 1945/46-1975. Note that the 1958 report is not contained within the file and 
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however, as is also apparent in figure 4.1, Chatham House considered the presence of MPs on 
the Council to be a luxury it could afford to be without.  
UNA, however, given its lobbying activities had a strong incentive to secure their 
presence on their executive in order to utilise their experience and contacts. The significance 
of such was affirmed in 1963 when a special committee set up to consider the future of UNA 
concluded that ‘the closest possible connection with Parliament is extremely useful’.8 Indeed, 
figure 4.2 displays a consistently large number of MPs present on UNA’s Executive 
Committee. The average total was 4.8, while Chatham House’s was 1.7.  But such 
connections made UNA’s all-party credentials all the more important and yet, as will be 
explored in more detail later on, it is apparent that the balance tended to favour Labour 
especially later in the period.  
The all-party stance necessarily percolated through much of UNA’s activities. 
Throughout the period, the three Presidents of UNA were the three leaders of the main parties. 
Its Vice-Presidents also included representatives from the three parties as did UNA rallies in 
the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1960s the General Council was addressed by leading members of 
both the Conservative and Labour parties. At the dinner held at Downing Street designed to 
raise money for UNA in 1968, the leaders of the three parties were present.9 On particularly 
controversial issues, UNA publications also gave space for opposing views. For example, in 
1959, Denis Healey presented in The World’s News the case for the creation of a neutral belt 
of countries across central Europe, which featured next to the Conservative MP Gilbert 
Longden’s case against.10 In the 1960s Harold Wilson, Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe 
detailed their parties' position on the UN during election campaigns and provided New Year’s 
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messages on the front pages of New World.11  During general election campaigns UNA 
branches were keen to include all of the parliamentary candidates at meetings to discover their 
positions and attempt to engender the UN and foreign policy more generally as electoral 
issues. UNA’s all-party stance was also important in its coordination of coalitions for its 
humanitarian campaigns. It was evident in UNA’s coordination of the Refugee Campaign in 
1956, which brought together 48 organisations with a variety of political leanings. 12 When 
David Ennals, then Secretary of UNA, received advice from Transport House that there would 
be a bigger response to the campaign among Labour supporters if the party leader Hugh 
Gaitskell were to produce a special leaflet, Ennals refused after he was notified by 
Conservative Central Office that resisting the suggestion would ‘help considerably to 
strengthen UNA’s claim that it is a non-party organisation’.13 Moreover, as Ennals, later 
noted, it would have been inconceivable for the Foreign Office to receive deputations from 
UNA or to have provided it with grants in the late 1960s and 1970s had UNA jeopardised its 
all-party credentials.14  
Many within UNA and Chatham House were only too aware of the dangers of 
dabbling in party politics. Chatham House, largely in order to prove its all-party credentials 
attempted to muster balanced representation. One of the arenas through which these 
endeavours took place was within the executives of both bodies, as shown by figures 4.1 and 
4.2. It should be emphasised, however, that the figures only reveal the party affiliation of 
those MPs who were members of the respective executives of Chatham House and UNA. 
They do not indicate the political sympathies of the other members of the executives. The 
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figures do not take account of, for instance, the Chairman of the Liberal Party, Leonard 
Behrens who sat on UNA Executive Committee or the former Liberal MP Henry Graham 
White, a member of the Chatham House Council. Nor do they take account of trade unionists 
such as Herbert Bullock (UNA) or the Secretary of the Labour Party International Department 
and future minister Denis Healey (Chatham House). Nor the Vice-Chair of the Conservative 
Party Organisation Marjorie Maxse (UNA) or indeed the future Conservative MP and 
Director of Chatham House Christopher Woodhouse.15  
For Chatham House it was not just about securing intellectual legitimacy. In the 1950s 
an extreme example of the potential dangers of appearing to be politically partial was brought 
alive to the Institute when the IPR became embroiled in McCarthyite paranoia. Although the 
IPR attributed its eventual demise in 1961 to more than just the ‘demagogic attacks’ made by 
McCarthy, they were recognised as ‘perhaps, the principal’ cause.16 Furthermore, it was fear 
that Chatham House would be charged with political partisanship that spelled the end of 
Woodhouse’s directorship when in 1959 he was elected an MP. Anticipating his successful 
election, the Institute’s Council ruled that it was impossible for anyone who was politically 
committed to be its Director and made discreet enquiries to find a new appointment. 
Eventually, as Woodhouse later sardonically noted the new Conservative MP was replaced by 
Younger, a retiring Labour MP.17 The Institute could not completely escape party politics. 
Nevertheless, escape was much easier for a think-tank that possessed no corporate opinion, 
than it was for UNA.   
Unfortunately, for UNA escape often proved nigh on impossible. UNA did not only 
have to deal with party politics at the national level, but at the local level too. In 1946, at the 
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first meeting of the Carlisle UNA branch, the local trades council reported that the platform 
was ‘decorated with individuals who certainly do not look with favour upon working class 
organisations & I am given to understand the prominent positions were filled by such 
persons’.18 A year later the Taunton and District Trades Council complained that the 
prospective local Conservative candidate, the ex-diplomat Henry Hopkinson – had used a 
meeting of the Taunton UNA branch as a party political broadcast that was deemed too anti-
Soviet. This was deemed inappropriate as it understood the UN to be ‘Non-Party’.19 
Conservatives too felt alienated from their local UNA branches. In 1950, Marjorie Maxse 
informed Leonard Behrens that she had received complaints that Conservatives were being 
cold-shouldered in UNA branches in Manchester, Salford and Liverpool.20 In 1960, the 
Manchester UNA branch, of which Behrens was Chair, was described by the secretary of the 
local trades council as ‘an appendage of the Liberal Party’.21 As UNA Secretary Charles Judd 
explained in 1946, the problem was that in areas where one political party was strong, UNA 
branches tended to reflect it. Judd’s solution was that the opposing parties should join up and 
get involved with UNA activities and seek to redress the balance.22 Unfortunately, many, such 
as the Manchester and Salford Trades Council, feeling neglected, ignored their local branch.23 
UNA struggled to be all-party everywhere. 
Neither could UNA be all-party at all times. The Suez Crisis provided UNA with no 
choice but to condemn the Conservative government. For many within UNA (and of course 
elsewhere), it was a first-rate diplomatic blunder. Britain had blatantly breached the UN 
Charter, which the British had done much to help draft only twelve years before. On news of 
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the invasion of Egypt the UK’s permanent representative at the UN Pierson Dixon found 
himself in the dock attempting – with grave reservations – to defend British action. He faced a 
furious reaction from the usually calm and collected UN General Secretary Dag 
Hammarskjold, who was greatly disappointed that Britain in particular was undermining the 
UN’s authority. Greater anger followed once Britain used its Security Council veto for the 
first time on two resolutions labelling the Israelis as aggressors and calling for an immediate 
ceasefire. The Norwegian UN representative described it as ‘an appalling blow to Western 
unity’. Indeed, the invasion of Egypt had prevented the Soviet Union from incurring the full 
weight of the UN’s moral opprobrium in the wake of its suppression of the Hungarian 
Revolution. In New York the hostility was such that Dixon – along with Britain’s allies – 
even feared that the UK could not continue as it was and remain a member of the UN.24 UNA 
could not let the situation pass without condemnation. 
 Yet not all within UNA agreed. When British troops moved to the Mediterranean, a 
colleague of David Ennals explained to him that UNA could ‘never be the same again. It will 
make us or break us’. Ennals argued to readers of The World’s News that although he 
recognised some within UNA were ‘aching to get back to good old fashioned non-
controversial educational work – lectures on W.H.O. [World Health Organisation] and the 
like’, that not to have acted ‘would have been utterly to shirk our responsibilities’. 
Nevertheless, an emergency meeting of UNA General Council in November 1956, called for 
the first time in UNA’s history, revealed a significant minority who disagreed with Ennals’s 
stance. UNA branch delegates were called upon to vote on a resolution passed by the 
Executive Committee that demanded that attacks on Egyptian territories cease immediately. 
The General Council approved the resolution by 358 to 22, but Ennals acknowledged that it 
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was not an accurate reflection of where UNA membership stood. Many of the branch 
delegates reported that their branch committees were deeply divided; on discussion of the 
Executive’s resolution some branch officers felt so strongly opposed that they felt it their duty 
to resign.25 Even Gilbert Murray one of the LNU’s founders and a Joint President of UNA 
gave the government his ‘conditional support’.26  
In terms of total membership, between 1956 and 1957 there was a decline of nearly 
3,000 members.27 However, UNA’s annual report in 1957 did boast of having also attracted 
new members and attributed some of the loss of membership to branches being too distracted 
by the 1956 Refugee Campaign to collect all renewal subscriptions.28 Furthermore, divisions 
along party lines were not as distinct as had been feared. The aforementioned Executive 
Committee’s resolution was arrived at unanimously with the consent of the two Conservative 
MPs on the Committee, Walter Elliot and Nigel Nicolson. This was not enough to assuage the 
doubts of UNA’s critics who accused UNA of pursuing a party political line that favoured the 
Left.29 It was thus understandable, as shown in chapter two, that there were plenty of 
members who ached to focus on seemingly less politically controversial work, especially 
humanitarianism.  
Politicians were sensitive to UNA’s protests. In 1968, the United Nations All Party 
Parliamentary Group (UNAPPG) – which UNA formed in 1960 and continues to administer 
today – lost 80 members due to a mistaken belief that membership implied support for all 
UNA policy resolutions.30 It is unclear as to whether there was a particular policy resolution 
that inspired the exodus. It could have been for a number of reasons. UNA was in 
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disagreement with both the Labour Government and Conservative Opposition on a number of 
issues, including race relations, Vietnam, Rhodesia, South Africa, disarmament and 
decolonisation. Concerns over charges of partiality were not limited to the impact it might 
have in enlisting support. In 1965, Nicolson feared that the split between the parties over 
sanctions on the Smith regime in Rhodesia ‘may be duplicated by a split within UNA, as at 
the time of Suez’.31 Nicolson was right to fear the potential damage of an internal split along 
party political lines, but it was not to be realised in relation to Rhodesia. 
Party politics helped fuel the split that came at the very top of the organisation 
between the Left-wing Director John Ennals and the ex-Conservative MP Chairman Humphry 
Berkeley. Even without the party politics the clash of personalities was damaging enough. 
Neither Berkeley nor Ennals felt that their respective positions ought to be subservient to the 
other and neither was easy to work with. As outlined in chapter three, Ennals made 
controversial decisions without reference to the Executive Committee, whereas even a neutral 
observer found bound to admit that Berkeley ‘had become so convinced of John’s disloyalty 
that the DG [Ennals] could not sneeze without it being interpreted as an affront’.32 Frank 
Hooley a member of the Executive Committee, Labour MP and part of the Ennals faction was 
less complementary about Berkeley: ‘His personal behaviour...has aroused in me a bitter 
contempt and dislike such as I have never felt for any other person in my life.’33 The Ennals 
faction claimed that their opposite numbers gerrymandered votes on the Executive 
Committee.34 Berkeley claimed that Ennals and his supporters had forged press notices and 
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had even tapped his phone.35 Neither party limited the airing of their grievances to the 
confines of UNA headquarters; both parties went to the press. Ennals involved his trade union 
and his solicitor.36 Berkeley involved the police following press leaks.37 Even the local pub 
could not escape the unedifying spectacle. Scrawled within the gentlemen’s toilets read the 
words: ‘ENNALS IS OK IF YOU LIKE SHITS’. Next to it were the words: ‘ENNALS IS A 
RUSSIAN SPY’.38  
Ennals struggled to escape his reputation as a fellow traveller. Berkeley certainly 
considered Ennals to be a communist sympathiser.39 In February 1969, Berkeley made a press 
statement in which he condemned ‘a small band of people’ within UNA who were 
‘determined to use our organisation as a vehicle for their advancement and as a perversion of 
its true aims. I am determined to see that the association is kept on its proper course as an all-
party organisation.’40 The most significant item on the document listing criticisms of Ennals 
that Berkeley circulated to the Executive Committee in September 1969, referred to in chapter 
three, was the allegation that Ennals’s suspected communist affiliation prevented him from 
sitting on the Foreign Secretary’s unofficial advisory committee on UN affairs.41 By 
November, the Executive Committee had decided it had had enough and produced the ‘Peace 
Plan for the Future of UNA’. It called for the resignation of both Ennals and Berkeley.42 At a 
special meeting of the General Council in January 1970 the Peace Plan was ratified and both 
                                                             
35 The National Archives, Kew, London (hereafter TNA): Prime Minister’s Office Archive: PREM 13/3538: 
Note for the record by N.J. Barrington, 24 Sep 1969. Specialists did find that Berkeley’s phone had been tapped, 
but it was unclear as to who did it. 
36 See file TUC Mss: MSS.79/1988/110. 
37 Hooley Mss: U DMH/17: F. Boyd to H. Berkeley, 28 Jul 1969.  
38 Hooley Mss: U DMH/17: J. Ennals to F. Hooley, 10 Apr 1969.  
39 TNA: Prime Minister’s Office Archive: PREM 13/3538: Note for the record by N.J. Barrington, 24 Sep 1969. 
40 ‘UN Association Being Misused, Says Berkeley’, The Daily Telegraph, 17 Feb 1969 in TUC Mss: 
MSS.292B/921.9/2. 
41 TNA: Prime Minister’s Office Archives: PREM 13/3538: I. McCluney to E. Youde, 19 Sep 1969; Foreign 
Office Archives: FCO 58/409: ‘Secretary of State’s Unofficial Advisory Group on United Nations Affairs, 1 Jun 
1969’. 
42 TUC Mss: MSS.79/1988/110: Minutes of UNA Executive Committee Meeting, 15 Nov 1969; ‘Peace Plan for 





Ennals and Berkeley resigned their position in April. The Executive Committee did, however, 
decide to set up an enquiry into the allegations made against John Ennals, headed by the 
Liberal peer John Foot.43  
At the enquiry, the preponderance of the attacks made by Berkeley and his supporter 
Nicolson condemned Ennals for attempting to move UNA towards the Left. Nicolson 
criticised Ennals’s ‘leftward speeches’ at a WFUNA conference in 1966 and claimed that they 
had precipitated concerns among American delegates that the British UNA was becoming 
politically partisan. Berkeley had also accused Ennals of filling a meeting of the General 
Council in April 1969 with UNA affiliated trade union representatives in order to reverse a 
decision made by the Executive Committee to place Ennals on sabbatical. On the allegation 
made that the Foreign Office considered Ennals persona non grata at confidential meetings, 
Nicolson stated that a minister had confided in him the information. Berkeley also stated that 
a minister had informed him that Ennals was ‘politically suspect’, but would not disclose 
which minister because it had been stated in strict confidence. However, Denis Greenhill, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, gave no indication as to Ennals’s reputation 
in the Foreign Office and stated that he had no issues dealing with him. Ultimately, Foot 
censured both Nicolson and Berkeley and the enquiry found in favour of Ennals.44   
Nonetheless, Ennals’s support was largely among the Left-wing elements of UNA, 
particularly among young people inspired by his oratorical talents. UNA’s National Youth 
Conference in December 1969 rejected the Peace Plan, called for Berkeley’s resignation and 
that Ennals be allowed to perform his normal duties.45 Earlier in the year, a banner had been 
displayed at UNA Youth Summer School bearing the words ‘Ennals our Dubcek’.46 This was 
hardly the all-party image UNA was striving for. Furthermore, Berkeley’s accusation that 
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Ennals filled a meeting of the General Council in April 1969 with trade union representatives 
to attempt to get the Council to vote in his favour perhaps had some substance. In advance of 
the meeting in January 1970, Ennals’s own union, the Association of Scientific, Technical and 
Managerial Staff, did encourage fourteen other trade unions affiliated with UNA to attend in 
order to oppose the Peace Plan. Whether Ennals was aware of this is unclear.47   
Ennals also had among his supporters the Labour MPs Frank Judd who was the 
Chairman of the UN Parliamentary Group and Frank Hooley who had a significant position 
within the organisation as chair of its financial committee. The latter was at least aware of 
endeavours to frustrate Berkeley in 1968. A member of the Executive Committee wrote to 
Hooley in October detailing how she would ‘tie Humphrey up in red tape until he screams for 
mercy’.48 In the summer of 1969, Hooley, convinced that a great deal of the feeling against 
Ennals was derived from ‘political prejudice’ attempted to get Price-Holmes to realise that 
Berkeley had to go. Hooley abortively attempted to oust Berkeley by putting his own name 
against his in a re-election of Berkeley as Chairman.49 
To the majority within UNA who were not aligned to either faction, the damage of 
party politics was clear. Eric Price-Holmes, the Chairman of UNA General Council and 
successor to Berkeley, summed up their attitude as ‘a plague on both your houses’.50 Price-
Holmes feared that Westminster divisions had spilled over into UNA and wished that both 
sides would ‘stop “playing politics”’.51 A member of the Weymouth UNA branch concurred, 
expressing his dissatisfaction that ‘factions within UNA have allowed personal or political 
                                                             
47 TUC Mss: MSS.79/1988/110: M. Turner to G. Drain, 1 Jan 1970. Attached to the front of the letter is a list of 
the fourteen unions the letter was sent to.  
48 Hooley Mss: U DMH/16: J. Blackman to F. Hooley, 27 Oct 1968. See also U DMH/17: J. Blackman to F. 
Hooley, 21 Apr 1969. 
49 Hooley Mss: U DMH/17: E. Price-Holmes to F. Hooley, 20 May 1969; F. Hooley to E. Price-Holmes, 22 May 
1969;  E. Price-Holmes to F. Hooley, 27 May 1969; F. Hooley to E. Price-Holmes, 29 May 1969; E. Price-
Holmes to F. Hooley, 2 Jun 1969; F. Hooley to E. Price-Holmes, 4 Jun 1969. 
50 Hooley Mss: U DMH/17: E. Price-Holmes to F. Hooley, 27 May 1969.  
51 Hooley Mss: U DMH/16: E. Price-Holmes to F. Hooley, 5 Aug 1968; U DMH/17: E. Price-Holmes to F. 





motives to influence their decision to the detriment of the wellbeing of our Association’.52 
‘We are simply fed up with the situation’, wrote a UNA lecturer in an open letter to all 
members, ‘and want to get on with our work without being hampered by antics in high 
places’. He feared that, amid declining membership, that the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 
UN was threatened with ‘total paralysis’ from UNA.53 On that anniversary in 1970, Price-
Holmes was elected as Berkeley’s successor. Price-Holmes’s election was symptomatic of a 
body fighting hard to maintain its all-party credentials. It did not mean, however, that UNA 
was now freed from party politics. A member of the Scottish UNA Assembly sympathised 
with Hooley but advised against him running for Chairman of the Executive Committee. He 
explained that that those on the Left accept Conservative or Liberal chairmen, but that 
Conservatives would not accept a socialist one. ‘[I]f we are to maintain the (possibly 
mythical) ALL PARTY image and contain as many “right-wing progressives” as possible, 
then I’m afraid we are stuck with the ‘establishment-type’ Chairman.’54 Party politics was 




In order to assess the influence of both Chatham House and UNA within Westminster, it is 
necessary to examine parliamentary attention toward international affairs more broadly. The 
unyielding atmosphere of bipartisanship within Parliament, especially within the House of 
Commons, was not well-suited to international affairs. Where there was consensus, it was 
usually to be found between the two respective front benches of the Government and 
Opposition; where there was division, it was usually within the political parties themselves. 
Parliamentary discussion of international affairs thus had the potential to be distinctly 
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embarrassing. Subsequently, the toughest debate on international issues often took place away 
from parliament in the party committees on foreign affairs. What debate that did take place 
within Westminster was hardly exploratory. Debates would begin with a general summary of 
the situation by the Foreign Secretary, which would be followed by a similar speech by his 
(until 2006, it was always his) counterpart in the Opposition, a series of contributions from 
backbenchers, and finally speeches from the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister 
with little reference made to the intervening speeches. If all this sounds rather familiar, it is 
because little has changed since. However, one development that did come about was the 
establishment of the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs that Opposition members during 
this period frequently called for, but were denied by successive governments until 1979.55 The 
objections to such a select committee were summed up by the former (and first) Cabinet 
Secretary, Maurice Hankey who felt that it would put ‘an almost unendurable strain’ on the 
Foreign Office and, worse, would risk ‘widespread knowledge on vital secrets’.56   
Amid such obscurantism, as revealed in chapter three, information on international 
affairs provided by official channels to MPs and peers was limited. It has already been stated 
that before 1914 the command papers known as the diplomatic blue books were produced 
annually, prompting a parliamentary debate and that after 1914 they were only produced 
intermittently.57 Neither was much information on international affairs forthcoming from the 
small House of Commons Library, where the emphasis of its Research Division was on the 
rapid collection of information in order to prevent MPs from being caught out, rather than on 
methodical research in the academic sense. Nevertheless, MPs made little use of the resource: 
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in 1960 the average number of queries per MP was only 1.5. The Research Division was thus 
correspondingly small, only eight graduates served on it staff. Furthermore, translation 
facilities, obviously crucial for the study of international affairs, were not available.58  
 The most utilised source of information by MPs was housed within the respective 
headquarters of the political parties. However, party research departments largely neglected 
international affairs. Between 1964 and 1970 only a small team of researchers within the 
Conservative Research Department were responsible for publishing the monthly Overseas 
Review. Yet the publication was the main crutch from which party spokesmen could draft 
their speeches. All the while the research staff had to provide details to support developing 
policies on Europe and the party’s position on maintaining Britain’s military position East of 
Suez. The Labour Party International Department was similarly small and yet had even more 
functions including developing contacts with sister parties overseas, a task assigned to a 
separate body within the Conservative Party.59 Furthermore, in 1967, after interviewing 
Labour MPs, the political scientist Peter G. Richards noted that between 1945 and 1963 the 
International Department had an inconsistent status within the party organisation. The post of 
Head of Department had been left vacant for several months on a number of occasions and 
while Gaitskell tended to ignore Transport House, Wilson, when Leader of the Opposition, 
made greater use of it. He made less use of it when in Whitehall. Finally, between 1965 and 
1969, the Liberal Party, had the smallest number of staff tackling international issues with 
only one member of its Research Department working on foreign and defence policy.60  
The scant information available to MPs reflected their modest collective interest in 
international affairs. For much of the period, foreign policy was not perceived to be a vote 
winner. This was probably an astute analysis. Gallup polls from 1960 to 1975 indicate that 
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generally, with the exception of crises that had the potential to involve Britain in war, the 
public usually felt that there were more pressing concerns than those issues occurring outside 
Britain’s borders.61 In 1957, the Labour MP George Jeger revealed to his parliamentary 
colleagues his priorities. 
 
I asked my constituents...which they would rather I did – endeavour to catch Mr Speaker’s eye 
in the grand foreign affairs debate tomorrow or raise the question of their bus shelter...They 
told me that any fool can speak on foreign affairs and no doubt several would, but that if I did 
not speak about their local bus shelter, then nobody else would.62 
 
Jeger’s position is endowed with a satisfying logic. Naturally, MPs should represent 
the concerns of their constituents and bus shelters are important. However, little parliamentary 
attention was devoted even to those international issues that had significant social and 
economic implications for their constituents. Richards complained in 1973 of how few MPs 
took an interest in UN agencies and also tariffs, particularly when compared with the 
beginning of the century.63 It was a theme that UNA was highly aware of and frequently 
lamented. UNA consistently complained in their post-mortems of general elections that most 
candidates gave insufficient consideration to international issues. In November 1974, New 
World stated on its front page that the recent election held the previous month was 
‘outstanding for one thing – its total lack of interest in international affairs’. The article found 
few signs of recognition that the British people were part of a wider world and quoted UNA’s 
Director Frank Field declaration that it was ‘the selfish election’.64 That politicians had little 
information on international affairs – and little inclination to explore them – when such issues 
were becoming ever closely intertwined with domestic ones, helped to fuel, in the words of 
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Chatham House’s future Director of Studies William Wallace, ‘the myth that foreign policy is 
a separate field, a “mystery” outside domestic politics’.65 Moreover, the implications in terms 
of the democratic accountability of foreign policy, was that there was effectively a 
significantly smaller legislature influencing the executive’s foreign policy than that which 
held domestic policy to account. Paradoxically, this – combined with the small number of 
NGOs concerned with foreign policy – may have helped NGOs and specifically prominent 
insiders such as Chatham House and UNA to influence foreign policy. Of course, not all MPs 
shied away from international affairs and among this small legislature both Chatham House 
and UNA did exercise influence.  
To those MPs who were particularly interested in a more academic understanding of 
international affairs, Chatham House provided an important source of information.66 Again, 
this group did not command the majority of MPs. In 1946 only 57 MPs were members of 
Chatham House.67 This number may have declined afterwards – although it is impossible to 
properly ascertain due to the absence of membership records after 1946 – as the Second 
World War featured less prominently in people’s minds. Nonetheless, given that 57 MPs 
amounted to 9% of the House of Commons, this was not an insignificant figure, especially 
given the aforementioned relatively small body of MPs who concerned themselves with 
international affairs. However, no MPs enrolled on Chatham House courses as Waldorf Astor 
had hoped.68  
Nevertheless, it is apparent from their private papers, and indeed Chatham House’s 
own records, that many politicians participated in the Institute’s activities and read its 
publications. The Unofficial Commonwealth Relations Conferences were valued by 
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politicians who attended.69  Chatham House was also responsible for distributing the secretive 
Report on Foreign Affairs. The publication was produced by the Empire Parliamentary 
Association (EPA) and was only available to MPs in Great Britain and the Dominions. A 
leaflet circulated in 1945 noted that the EPA attached ‘the highest importance, that it should 
be treated as a confidential document’; MPs had to sign a form to acknowledge that they were 
not allowed ‘on any occasion’ to refer to it in print or quote it by name.70 By 1969, the 
publication – since named the Report on World Affairs was no longer confidential, but ‘its 
external circulation has been extremely limited’. The now Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association decided to cease publication. Chatham House, noting dismay among its readers, 
took over the production of the report. Transport House was ‘delighted’ and its library took 
out a subscription.71  
It is difficult to ascertain from the archival record the extent to which politicians acted 
upon the findings of Chatham House study groups and publications and/or to which they 
contributed to politicians’ understanding of international affairs and foreign policy.72 
However, it is evident from parliamentary proceedings that the Institute was solicited to 
provide evidence for select committees and that MPs and peers used its findings to add 
legitimacy to their arguments. Figure 4.3 shows the limited but relatively consistent number 
of mentions that the Institute received. Of the total 62 debates and written submissions, 81% 
of the references were made in connection to one of Chatham House’s publications, a speech 
made at the Institute or an activity organised by it such as the Unofficial Commonwealth 
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Conferences. Throughout the period there was no direct reference to the Institute which was 
condemnatory. The remaining 18% of the references used Chatham House as an example 
institute that others might follow, alluded to colleagues’ past employment at the Institute, or 
recommended that the Institute pursue a certain project. As shown by figure 4.4, Chatham 
House also relatively regularly received mentions within command papers and – despite the 
absence of a select committee on foreign affairs – within parliamentary committee reports too. 
The command papers and reports concerned decolonisation, agriculture, the UN and the BBC, 
race relations, immigration, government administration, international aid, European 
integration. When the Foreign Affairs Select Committee was established in June 1979, 
Chatham House staff were regularly consulted.73 In November, Wallace detailed how the 
Institute could be of assistance on a variety of topics including British cultural and 
information policy (the BBC’s external services and the British Council); refugee policy; 
European integration; international aid policy; and the problems surrounding the remaining 
dependent territories, such as Hong Kong and the Falkland Islands.74 It is evident that 
parliament did utilise the expertise of Chatham House in a variety of ways, but it was hardly 
capitalised on as a potential ‘rival civil service’ keeping the Foreign Office accountable, as 
mandarins had feared after the Institute’s creation.75  
Neither had the Foreign Office much to fear from the UNA. Although, politicians 
were keen to exploit the benefits of affiliation with UNA, they were more often motivated by 
the desire to attain political rather than intellectual capital. In the 1940s and early 1950s 
prominent politicians attended UNA rallies, spoke at branch meetings and got involved with   
                                                             
73 Carstairs, ‘The Foreign Affairs Committee’, 169. 
74 Records of the House of Commons, Parliamentary Archives, London: HC/CP/8234: W. Wallace to J.R. Rose, 
6 Nov 1979.  
75 K. Younger, ‘The Study and Understanding of International Affairs’, International Affairs, 50th Anniversary 





Figure 4.3. Number of parliamentary debates and written submissions that made reference to Chatham 
House, 1945-1975. 
Source: Millbank Systems, Hansard 1803-2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ (accessed 12 May 2015). 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Number of command papers and reports of committees that made reference to Chatham 
House, 1945-1975. 

































































































































































































































































its UN Day activities. Rallies and branches were addressed by the likes of Clement Attlee, 
Anthony Eden, Violet Bonham Carter, Selwyn Lloyd, Herbert Morrison, Hugh Gaitskell and 
David Maxwell Fyfe.76 On UN Day in 1950, the UN Flag was ceremonially unfurled over six 
hundred civic centres. Attlee made a public broadcast while messages from Churchill and 
Bonham Carter were read on the radio.77 Nevertheless, just months before, the Executive 
Committee had conveyed their frustration to the party leaders that international issues had 
been ignored in the election campaign that year. To help correct this, during the campaign, 
UNA Branches had organised all-party meetings in which parliamentary candidates were 
pressed for their views on the UN. An annual report boasted that the candidates involved 
addressed some of the largest meetings held during the election. Furthermore, hundreds of 
UNA branches interviewed candidates or addressed questionnaires to them and their replies 
were published in the local press.78  
In 1951, UNA’s task of placing international affairs at the top of the election agenda 
was made easier when polling day was the day after UN Day. The UN Flag still flew over 
balloting stations from the previous day’s celebrations. Churchill in his message for UN Day 
noted that ‘the flag of the United Nations, flying over all our towns and cities, should remind 
us that greater than all the issues that divide us is the cause of International Freedom, Justice 
and Peace’. The questionnaires and all-party meetings were continued and would become a 
regular feature.79 Amid the Korean War (the UN’s first military test) and Britain’s subsequent 
controversial rearmament, international affairs featured relatively prominently during the 
election. The first page of all three main parties’ manifestos made reference to the 
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international situation.80 As Kenneth Younger recalled it would have been ‘unthinkable’ for 
politicians to oppose the UN at this time.81 Subsequently, as the Leamington Spa Courier 
noted after the hustings, ‘[t]he United Nations has not been a controversial issue in this 
election. It is the province of no one political party and receives all-party support.’82 
 International affairs were not often afforded such attention from politicians, but the 
UN and UNA were not devoid of political clout. The 1955 UNA annual report only 
committed a paragraph to comment on the election that year. It congratulated UNA branches 
that had managed to draw to its all-party meetings ‘far larger audiences than most candidates 
and even some Cabinet Ministers and Opposition leaders were able to command for their own 
party meetings’, but lamented that ‘not nearly enough were held’.83 The 1959 annual report 
again complained that the number of all-party meetings during the election was 
‘disappointingly small’, while expressing dissatisfaction that the UN’s prospective Ten Power 
Disarmament Conference to occur in 1960 had received little attention during the election.84 
The 1964 annual report claimed that during the election campaign at least 111 all-party 
meetings had taken place around the UK and that 400 candidates had submitted answers to 
UNA questionnaires. Furthermore, the majority of those candidates had promised to join the 
UNAPPG.85 The group’s membership reached its peak in 1966 with a sizeable total of 241 
MPs; 38% of the 630 MPs in the House of Commons.86 However, as UNA stated after the 
aforementioned exodus from the group in 1968, membership was not supposed to imply 
support of UNA policy resolutions. Nevertheless one year before, for the first time, UNA 
organised meetings at the annual party conferences that were addressed by the Foreign 
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Secretary George Brown and his opposite numbers in the Conservative and Liberal parties.87 
In the same year in another first for UNA a party leader, Wilson, addressed UNA General 
Council, to be followed by Heath in 1968 and Thorpe in 1969. As figure 4.5 shows UNA 
received relatively frequent mentions in Hansard between 1945 and 1975. Similarly, figure 
4.6 reveals that reference was also made to UNA in command papers and committee reports 
throughout the period again despite the absence of a Foreign Affairs Select Committee. UNA 
was referred to on colonial matters, agriculture, education, the BBC, race relations, 
immigration, international aid, European integration and naturally the UN.  
Nevertheless, in a contest between party politics and loyalty to the UN, the former had 
the nasty habit of triumphing. For example, UNA’s all-party meetings were by no means a 
universally welcomed addition to the election hustings. One Conservative MP objected to 
participating in such a meeting in 1950 despite his professed support of the UN and UNA and 
Conservative Central Office advice to attend. He reasoned candidly that he did not wish to 
attend as his he was fighting in a safe Conservative seat and worried that his attendance would 
simply have provided ‘a platform for opponents who otherwise will have great difficulty in 
getting a decent sized meeting’. He added that he felt the same applied to many other 
constituencies, and that were he campaigning in Labour or Liberal strongholds his ‘view 
would be entirely different’.88 CND too struggled to persuade MPs to place unilateralism 
before their party. In 1961 the future Labour leader Michael Foot, a leading CND supporter, 
declared that he would not vote for a unilateralist candidate from the Conservative or Liberal 
party against a Labour candidate who was in favour of Britain’s possession of the Bomb.89  
The remainder of this chapter will examine this tension between loyalty to the party and 
attitudes towards international affairs.  
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Figure 4.5. Number of parliamentary debates and written submissions that made reference to UNA, 
1945-1975. 
Source: Millbank Systems, Hansard 1803-2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ (accessed 12 May 2015). 
 
Figure 4.6. Number of command papers and committee reports that made reference to UNA, 1945-
1975. 


































































































































































































































































THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
 
Since Rhiannon Vickers complained in 2000 of the scholarly neglect of attitudes to 
international affairs within the labour movement, a number of historians have worked to 
correct the trend.90 The previous neglect can be attributed to the party’s fixed focus on 
domestic affairs, to the bewilderment of its continental counterparts. As Andrew Thorpe 
notes, the first majority Labour government’s establishment of the National Health Service is 
far better remembered than its contribution to the development of NATO.91 Yet Labour’s 
halcyon electoral victory in 1945 was credited by contemporaries to its proposed foreign 
policy as much as to its domestic.92 Neither was concern for international affairs merely 
confined to senior members of the movement’s political wing.93 As will be shown here, trade 
unionists took a relatively strong interest in international causes at both a local and national 
level. Approximately 44% of the Fabian Society’s tracts between 1945 and 1975 were 
concerned with international policy.94 This is before we get to the notorious infighting over 
relations with NATO, the Soviet Union and Europe. Foreign policy debate played an 
important role in the development of the labour movement, even if many of its members had 
little interest in it. Yet the international thought that had the greatest influence on the party 
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was not socialist.95 Labour’s internationalism was largely guided by the liberal and radical 
thought of the likes of John Bright, Richard Cobden, William Gladstone, T.H. Green, Leonard 
T. Hobhouse and John A. Hobson.96 Subsequently, Chatham House and the UNA exercised at 
times some considerable influence on the Labour Party, if not as much as they would have 
liked. Thought and policy are unusually one and the same.  
 When Kenneth Younger became a member of Chatham House in 1937, he was warned 
that he would hear ‘some very queer views’ there and meet some ‘very left-wing people’. Yet 
one of Younger’s earliest experiences at Chatham House was of nearly walking out in protest 
from a well-attended meeting at which ‘a leading establishment figure was preaching the pure 
doctrine of appeasement then favoured by the Conservative administration’. As Younger 
noted, it was possible to hear all sorts of views at Chatham House.97 Nevertheless, it is 
apparent that in the interwar period liberal and conservative members of Chatham House 
outnumbered Labour Party members. The ideas of Chatham House’s founders certainly 
clashed with the more radical UDC that had influenced Labour international thought in the 
1910s and 1920s. Chatham House rejected the explanatory categorisation of global politics in 
terms of class and understood Britain’s participation in the First World War as both justifiable 
and wise.98 However, members of the Labour Party, such as Younger, who were less inclined 
towards the UDC’s conception of international affairs, did enter the Chatham House fold 
during the interwar period. Philip Noel-Baker was a founding member. William Gillies, the 
Secretary of the Labour Party International Department, had sat on Executive Committee 
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since the early 1920s. Ernest Bevin attended the Commonwealth Relations Conference in 
1938.99  
 Nonetheless, during the Second World War having recognised the shortage of Labour 
members, a concerted effort was made to attract them. In 1942, the Institute approached the 
TUC and intimated that their lack of contact with the trade union movement had meant that its 
publications and study group reports were found wanting insofar as reflection on industrial 
matters. Chatham House thus suggested that the TUC invite its affiliated unions to take up 
corporate membership with the Institute. The TUC General Council took up a corporate 
subscription and encouraged affiliated unions to do the same.100 By 1943, nine TUC 
associates subscribed to Chatham House and by 1949 the total was twelve.101 There were 
obvious financial benefits for Chatham House in securing the subscriptions of Trade Unions, 
but the Institute’s eagerness to obtain closer contact with the labour movement must also be 
considered within the context examined in chapter two. The Institute was seeking to capitalise 
on what Macadam described as the ‘rapidly increasing interest in international affairs which 
the War has produced among the organised workers of this country’.102  
Astor was particularly keen to secure closer contact with the trade unions in order that 
the Institute might reach a larger audience. In 1943, Astor made enquiries with Walter Citrine, 
the General Secretary of the TUC, as to how to attract young trade unionists and with John 
Price of the Transport and General Workers Union (and member of the Chatham House 
Council) as to whom he suggested among Labour MPs should be considered for membership 
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of the Council in order to provide balance against the existing three Conservative MPs.103 In 
1946 when discussing his successor as chairman, Astor did not recommend a member of the 
labour movement as such, at least not one who was very welcome within it. He recommended 
either the former National Labour MP, Malcolm MacDonald or the future chairman of UNA 
Ronald Adam. (Astor may well have deemed Adam suitable due to his hopes for Chatham 
House’s educational activities and Adam’s close involvement with ABCA). However, Astor 
did want a Labour MP or trade unionist to be Vice-Chairman.104 The next Vice-Chairman was 
actually Astor himself who was asked to take on the post once he felt obliged to resign his 
position as Chairman in 1949 for health reasons. A year later when he felt he ought to resign 
from the Council altogether, he again made it known that he preferred the Vice-Chairman be 
someone from the labour movement and recommended Citrine over the ultimately successful 
candidate Ian Jacob, the Director of the BBC Overseas Service.105 Nevertheless, in 1952, the 
year Astor died, Jacob shared his position of Vice-Chairman with a Labour MP, Kenneth 
Younger.  
 The relationship between the Labour Party and Chatham House also improved during 
the Second World War through the work of Toynbee’s FRPS. The failure of the League of 
Nations to prevent the war had essentially deprived Labour of a foreign policy. During the 
war, senior Labourites pushed the party through a transitory phase, moving from what Ray 
Douglas refers to as a ‘Whig’ internationalism of the likes of Philip Noel-Baker to the 
muscular internationalism of Ernest Bevin. The transition fragmented Labour’s commitment 
to national self-determination and its contentment with the existence of small states. In its 
place was a paternalistic faith in the large powers to keep the peace.106  
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Chatham House played an important role in that transition and in providing the Labour 
Party with a foreign policy. Unsure of what internationalist principles would look like after 
the war, Labour ministers pressured their coalition colleagues from the onset of Churchill’s 
administration in 1940 to address the issue of war aims as a matter of urgency. In the face of 
significant resistance from the Prime Minister and other senior Conservative ministers, it is 
probable that without Labour’s intervention that no serious examination would have been 
conducted before 1942. However, the Labour Party was not the originator of ideas for British 
policy planning for the postwar world order, rather it facilitated and nurtured them. The 
process of coming up with the ideas themselves were left to others and, in particular, the 
FRPS. What would result were the British specifications for what would become the UN.107 
Eventually, not without reservations, Churchill consented to the establishment of the Cabinet 
Committee on War Aims, chaired by Attlee. The committee also included the current and 
future foreign secretaries Lord Halifax and Ernest Bevin. During the Battle of Britain, 
Toynbee was asked to draw up a statement on war aims which was deliberated over at its 
second meeting – at which Toynbee was present. It was both Bevin and Attlee who seized 
upon Toynbee’s statement. While Bevin derived from it the importance of international 
economic cooperation, Attlee understood that ‘a satisfactory society of nations’ could only be 
established upon a consensus among nations that accepted ‘certain fundamental principles of 
liberty for their subjects’ and ‘a certain minimum surrender of sovereignty’. Attlee went 
further suggesting that the matter be dealt with on the following lines: 
 
First, there are certain fundamentals which, in our view, are essential for human life. 
Secondly, to secure these fundamentals involves certain principles, or conditions. Thirdly, 
certain political machinery is necessary to give effect to those principles.108  
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Attlee had derived from Toynbee’s statement – albeit vaguely – the importance of 
institutionalising what would become known as human rights. Toynbee’s statement was one 
of very few wartime official papers that dealt with human rights.109 The committee eventually 
agreed upon a paper drafted by Toynbee and Halifax recommending that the British 
Commonwealth ‘become the bridge of greater world unity’ between large and small powers. 
It was hoped that the document would form the basis of a Christmas or New Year broadcast 
made by Churchill. The Prime Minister, however, dismissed the document for resembling ‘the 
Sermon on the Mount and the remainder an election address’. Given Churchill’s opposition, 
the War Aims Committee no longer convened and in January 1941 its remit became that of a 
newly formed Committee on Reconstruction Problems chaired by the Labour Minister 
without Portfolio, Arthur Greenwood. However, most Conservative ministers gave their seats 
to civil servants from their respective departments; it was a significant downgrade from the 
ministerial committee that preceded it. Attlee could only urge Eden to utilise the FRPS in 
drawing up plans for the postwar order. Toynbee did continue to produce significant 
memoranda that met the approval of Attlee and were combined into a draft entitled ‘British-
American World Order’ in June 1941 that would later influence Britain’s UN policy and, 
indeed, the Labour Party’s foreign policy.110  
Ray Douglas notes that Attlee’s decision to enlist Toynbee’s FRPS was a ‘natural 
one’. In part this was due to the aforementioned connections that Chatham House had been 
building with the party during the interwar period, but also it was due to the Institute’s 
independence from both government and the political parties.111 The intense foreign policy 
debates of the 1930s were still fresh and were made fresher still by the Left Book Club’s 
recent polemic Guilty Men published in July 1940, denouncing the Conservative dominated 
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National Government. Among the fifteen strong Guilty Men ‘Cast’ were Halifax and Howard 
Kingsley Wood, both members of the War Aims Committee.112 That the current cadre of civil 
servants were responsible for the Hoare-Laval Pact and the Munich Agreement, as Douglas 
notes, may also have influenced Attlee’s decision to enlist Toynbee. Furthermore, at its peak 
the FRPS contained 177 specialists in foreign affairs.113 Transport House could not compete. 
Chatham House’s intake of members from the labour movement appears to have benefited 
from the contacts nurtured during the Second World War through the FRPS/FORD and the 
overtures made from St. James’s Square. Ten of the 24 Labour MPs who were members of 
the Institute in 1946 joined after 1939.114  
The Labour Party continued to utilise the facilities of Chatham House after the war. In 
1952, the same year Younger was made Vice-Chairman, the party became a corporate 
subscriber. In the 1950s its nominated members included Barbara Castle, Herbert Morrison, 
Hugh Dalton, Arthur Greenwood and the long-serving Party Secretary Morgan Phillips.115 In 
1956, Aneurin Bevan was made one of the nominees and informed Phillips that he was 
‘delighted’, deeming Chatham House’s facilities to be ‘very valuable indeed’.116 It was during 
Labour’s time in opposition that its international department made the greatest use of 
Chatham House. In large part this is attributable to Denis Healey holding the post of 
International Secretary between 1945 and 1957. In 1948, the year before Attlee addressed the 
Institute’s thirtieth anniversary banquet, Healey was co-opted to the Chatham House 
Council.117 He remained an active member until he became the Secretary of State for Defence 
in 1964. In his memoirs, Healey, if a little derogatory of Toynbee’s ‘Anglo-Spenglerism’, 
referred to the Institute as ‘a major source of my education in world affairs, since it enabled 
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me to meet people with a knowledge and experience far removed from what was available to 
me in my work for the Labour Party’.118 He made use of its publications too. Over an eighteen 
month period in the mid-1950s, Healey ordered 28 Chatham House publications for the 
International Department.119  
Of course not all politicians or indeed international secretaries took such an academic 
interest in international affairs as the Oxford double-first graduate who co-founded the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1958. Indeed, Healey’s academic 
tendencies could leave his colleagues uninspired. The firebrand Leader of the House of 
Commons Richard Crossman imagined that Healey’s introduction to a debate in 1967 over an 
amendment to the previous year’s controversial Defence Review would have pleased IISS 
members, but ‘it left our back-benchers sitting solemn, listless and bored’.120 Nevertheless, 
David Ennals, Healey’s successor as International Secretary in 1957, was also involved with 
Chatham House and was co-opted to its Election Committee in 1960.121 However, while 
Ennals held office, Labour’s National Executive Committee voted to reduce the Chatham 
House corporate subscription from £250 to £75 and thus cut the number of nominated 
members from six to three.122 Of course, this did not necessarily reflect on the value that 
Ennals himself attached to the Institute. What is more certifiable is that more senior members 
of the Labour Party attached wavering value to the International Department – and indeed the 
research done by other quarters of Transport House. Ennals objected to Phillips in 1959 that 
the heads of departments rarely met, preventing them from discussing the work of Transport 
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House as a whole and from sharing ideas.123 In 1969, the then International Secretary, Tom 
McNally was asked to simply ‘“okay”’ a section on overseas affairs in the handbook for 
Labour candidates, which he had only just seen at the page proof stage. McNally disliked the 
section and thus felt unable to approve and rewrote it. Tellingly, however, he noted that he 
would have much preferred the handbook to only highlight domestic achievements.124 
Subsequently, it did not necessarily follow that the utility of Chatham House to the 
International Department led to other sections of the party indirectly benefiting from the 
Institute’s expertise.  
Nonetheless, figure 4.8 reveals that more Labour MPs and peers (41%) brought up 
Chatham House within a parliamentary debate than any other party. Moreover, the references 
made were frequently positive. Typically, as with members of all parties, Chatham House 
publications, or speakers at conferences or lectures organised by Chatham House were 
referred to lend authority to politicians’ arguments. For instance, in 1958 the Labour MP 
James Johnson emphasised the intellectual weight and impartiality of the Institute when 
referring to a book by Chatham House’s Phillip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (1958), about 
Rhodesia to support his argument (and Mason’s) that European settlers must make 
concessions to the indigenous population: ‘This is Phillip Mason of Chatham House, not 
[Northern Rhodesian and Zambian nationalist] Harry Nkumbula  of the Illa [people], who is 
speaking.’125 Occasionally critical references were made about individual publications, but 
within this period, Hansard contains no significant critiques directed at the Institute itself. In 
1956 Labour MP Harold Davies wryly described a publication produced by a Chatham House 
study group entitled Defence in the Cold War (1950) to the Commons as a ‘very erudite   
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Figure 4.7. Party affiliation of MPs or peers who first mentioned Chatham House within a 
parliamentary debate, 1945-1975. 
Source: Millbank Systems, Hansard 1803-2005, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/ (accessed 12 May 2015). 
 
Figure 4.8. Party affiliation of MPs or peers who first mentioned UNA within a parliamentary debate, 
1945-1975. 
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document’ that ‘tells us that the atom bomb is a myth, and that we must not create fear of 
it’.126 Yet in 1972, then a peer, Davies was clearly still engaged with Chatham House’s 
activities and praised the attention given by the Institute to South American affairs.127 
However, as figure 4.9 shows, the period in which Labour MPs and peers made the most 
references to Chatham House in parliament was when it was in Opposition in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. The number of mentions dramatically reduced when Labour was in government 
in the 1960s, largely explaining the limited mentions within Hansard in these years shown in 
figure 4.3. 
 The pattern can be attributed to the intensity of the foreign policy debate within the 
Labour Party during its thirteen years in opposition, but, of course, also to the absence of a 
civil service. When Labour returned to Whitehall, its members would have been considerably 
less inclined to use alternative – potentially conflicting – sources of information. 
Nevertheless, when Labour returned to the Opposition benches, the pattern was not continued, 
at least not as dramatically. Given that this correlates with a decline in the use of Chatham 
House by the International Department in the 1960s, it suggests that Chatham House had a 
smaller impact on Labour thinking than it had in the 1940s and 1950s. It could also have been 
precipitate of a general disinclination to discuss international affairs, as Tom McNally 
demonstrated when faced with the handbook for candidates in 1969. As Labour Party 
attitudes towards European integration during the 1970s showed, foreign policy debate could 
be embarrassingly divisive.  
On the question of Europe there was an obvious ideological divide between many 
within the Labour Party and the senior members of Chatham House. Although it should be  
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Figure 4.9. Number of mentions of Chatham House in parliament by party and government, 1945-
1975. 














































stressed that the Institute was precluded from possessing corporate opinion, its leaders from 
Curtis to Shonfield were strongly in favour of a political union of Europe that included 
Britain. In World Revolution in the Cause of Peace (1949) Curtis condemned Dalton and 
others within the Labour Party ‘who seemed to think that socialism was of greater importance 
than peace’.128 The pamphlet had been written soon after the Hague Congress in 1948 to 
which the Labour leadership had refused to send a delegation and had agreed with other 
socialist parties within Europe that they should all boycott the conference. Ultimately, 
however, other socialist parties ignored the boycott. Forty-one Labour MPs published their 
intention to attend, but following a stern circular from Party Chairman Morgan Phillips 
informing MPs that ‘[w]e are not a coalition party’ and reminding them of an NEC resolution 
declaring that any association with the Congress would only ‘serve the interests of the British 
Conservative Party’, only 27 Labour MPs eventually attended.129 Political and ideological 
rivalries prevented Curtis from seeing Britain join the European project in his life time.  
Younger became far less ambivalent and far more favourable toward Britain joining 
Europe between the time of writing a pamphlet for the Fabian Society entitled Britain’s Role 
in a Changing World in 1960 and producing Changing Perspectives in British Foreign Policy 
for Chatham House in 1964.130 The view he expressed in May 1962 to the alarm of the 
Colonial Office, noted in chapter three, that Britain had to choose between Europe and the 
Commonwealth – to which he preferred the former having written off the latter – was at odds 
with Gaitskell’s conference speech in October, which denounced accession to the EEC on the 
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grounds that it would damage the Commonwealth.131 Younger’s successor Andrew Shonfield 
also strongly supported European integration amid Labour’s hostility in the early 1970s. 
Shonfield’s support was based, naturally as an economist, upon international economics. 
Recognising a rapidly developing international political economy, Shonfield felt that the 
‘Community politics’ of the EEC was far superior for improving international economic 
relations than the ‘alliance politics’ of organisations such as the Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation and the International Monetary Fund. ‘International pressure’, he 
wrote in 1976, ‘can often be brought to bear most effectively on a nation by a group of 
intimate partners who are deeply committed with it to other common enterprises.’132  
In 1976, after the recent referendum in which British public opinion approved EEC 
membership, Chatham House arranged a trilateral discussion between it, the Foreign Office’s 
Planning Staff and Transport House to examine Labour foreign policy outlined in Labour’s 
Programme (1976). Shonfield, who chaired the meeting, wished to start with the chapter on 
European community, but the issue was dodged by the Labour team who took up most of the 
meeting discussing vaguer foreign policy aims, much to the irritation of the Foreign Office 
officials. When eventually Europe was briefly discussed, Shonfield expressed his 
disappointment ‘to find so little...to indicate that the Labour Party intended that Britain should 
contribute something to the Community or had an interest in its success rather than just taking 
out all we could get’.133 It represented an ideological schism between many within the labour 
movement and Chatham House. The solution endorsed by leading members of Chatham 
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House for growing economic interdependence and the negative aspects of globalisation 
(including social injustice) was stronger political and economic integration. Labour’s 
infighting was hindering that. The fact, however, that members of the Labour Party thought it 
profitable to use Chatham House as a sounding board for its policies in 1976 as it used the 
FRPS during the Second World War, suggests that the party still attributed significant value 
to the Institute.  
 The policy of muscular internationalism adopted by the Labour Party during the 
Second World War and after, personified by Bevin, did not bode well for UNA. As outlined 
in chapter three, Bevin was much more reluctant to engage with UNA rallies than his civil 
servants would have liked. Bevin confided in UNA chairman Lord Lytton in 1946 that when 
he did speak about the UN in public he had meant only to ‘ventilate’ the subject. He 
confessed that he had no clear idea as to how world government was to be achieved, 
especially not in his lifetime, but thought that the younger generation should begin to think 
about it; ‘[t]hat was all he had in mind.’134 In an uncirculated personal memorandum written 
in 1945, Bevin predicted that instead of world cooperation overseen by the UN, ‘we are 
rapidly drifting into spheres of influence on what can be better described as three great 
Monroes’.135 In colonial affairs, not unlike their Conservative counterparts, Labour policy-
makers recognised that they were obliged by the UN Charter to develop self-government and 
economic, social and educational conditions in non-self-governing-territories. But the 
responsibility for doing so was perceived to properly belong to the administrative power, not 
from any UN initiative. Instead the UN’s role in colonial matters was understood to be simply 
one of preventing abuses.136  
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Neither did Labour possess a grand timetable for decolonisation. In 1945 Bevin and 
Dalton even had designs to expand the empire by seeking trusteeship of the former Italian 
colonies Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, but were vetoed by probably the greatest proponent of 
the UN within the Cabinet, Attlee. Even those on the Left of the party, such as Michael Foot, 
assumed that Britain’s world power status – founded upon its empire – enabled the creation of 
a welfare state. Those within the party who believed that there were significant gains to be 
had in maintaining the Empire became dominant after 1945. UN interest in British colonial 
affairs was thus only too often unwelcome.137 Just as the labour movement was influenced by 
liberal internationalism, so it was by liberal imperialism.138 
 Nevertheless, affiliation with UN goals was considered to be a useful electoral 
weapon. Hence the aforementioned attendance of senior members of the Labour Party at 
UNA rallies in the late 1940s and early 1950s. A common theme of Labour foreign policy 
campaigns was that the Conservatives had betrayed the League of Nations and that the “guilty 
men” should not be forgotten.139 The perceived utility of support for the UN, however, was 
not confined to the immediate postwar years. As Labour attempted to end its years in 
opposition, the UN played a central role in its proposed foreign policy. Not without 
significance was the selection of the successor to Denis Healey’s role of International 
Secretary in 1957. David Ennals was chosen for the role in light of his success at raising the 
profile of UNA as its Secretary since 1952.140 It also followed Ennals’s spearheading of 
UNA’s condemnation of Eden’s Suez policy. The basis of the Labour Party’s own censure of 
the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt was similarly centred on Eden’s failure to secure the 
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support of the UN beforehand. That UNA – an all-party organisation of which the Prime 
Minister was an Honorary President – had denounced the Conservative government for 
violating the UN Charter, was a point seized upon by Labour MPs in the Commons.141 
Operating as ‘almost a one-man band’ due to the limited resources of the party, Ennals was 
the principal source for professional advice on foreign policy before the party regained power 
in 1964.  He was responsible for the brief space allotted to international affairs in the manual 
for Labour candidates before the election, Twelve Wasted Years (1963).142 Unsurprisingly, 
Ennals devoted an entire chapter to the UN that was largely concerned with spelling out the 
perceived differences between Conservative and Labour UN policy. In this, Alec Douglas-
Home, the Foreign Secretary, gifted Ennals with a speech he made to UNA’s Berwick-on-
Tweed branch in December 1961. Home announced his concern that the UN was diverging 
from its original and principal purpose of ridding the world of war, largely as a result of 
differing aims shared by the 51 founder members and the 53 newly independent nations. 
Home alleged that a large number of the latter were 
 
putting their campaign for acceleration of independence for colonial territories before the main 
purpose of the Charter which is to provide peace and security. They are more concerned to 
impose their views on “colonialism” on others than to fulfil their primary duty which is to 
“harmonise the actions of nations”...Unwittingly they play the Communists’ game.143 
 
 Ennals used the gift to good effect. In Twelve Wasted Years, he accused the 
Conservatives of being ‘fair weather friends of the UN’; of only being happy to support it 
when the UN was not challenging what Conservatives perceived to be British interests. 
Ennals disagreed with Home over the new member states. He felt – similarly to UNA – that 
they had in fact ‘brought new strength’ to the UN in helping to stabilise the world in the face 
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of the Cold War from which many were neutral and thus prepared to condemn acts by either 
side, be it Soviet suppression in Hungary or British and French aggression in Egypt. On the 
latter, when Home charged the UN with ‘falling away from the principles of the Charter’, 
Ennals highlighted the hypocrisy given that the Foreign Secretary had been in the Cabinet 
during the Suez Crisis. Neither did Ennals neglect to remind Labour candidates that Home 
was an adviser to Neville Chamberlain at Munich.144 However, Ennals should not be 
considered as some sort of UNA double-agent serving behind enemy lines at Transport 
House. When Wilson agreed to receive a UNA deputation in November 1963, UNA asked 
Ennals to join them. The concept seemed ‘rather absurd’ to Ennals and he requested that 
Wilson allow him to sit on his side and ‘see what performance they put up’. Wilson agreed.145  
 The deputation went well. Wilson informed them of his intention to appoint a senior 
minister as the permanent representative at the UN; to make a coordinated response to the 
Development Decade and create a Ministry of Overseas Development; to take an independent 
line in breaking the deadlock for general disarmament; and he stressed – in the same year as a 
UN resolution to its effect – the importance of a complete embargo on arms to South Africa. 
UNA Chairman Nigel Nicolson, a member of the deputation, informed the Executive 
Committee that they had been ‘received in a most friendly and co-operative way and that 
there was no point upon which they were in disagreement’. The mood of the meeting 
contrasted starkly with that of a recent deputation received by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, Duncan Sandys who was on the defensive and complained that 
UNA was ‘a little unreasonable’. The deputation had hoped to learn how the Minister 
intended to proceed after the government raised objections to the UN discussing the question 
of Southern Rhodesia; it had not intended to meet the minister in order to necessarily criticise 
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the government.146 Six months later, the leaders of the three parties published their respective 
UN policies on the first page of New World in anticipation of the coming election. Wilson 
spelled out the policies he outlined in November to the UNA delegation. It outshone both 
Home’s uninspiring statement that the UN should keep solvent and Jo Grimond’s non-specific 
avowal that the UN had the Liberals’ ‘full and unqualified support’.147 Tellingly, it was the 
last section of the Labour manifesto that was devoted to international affairs, but it pledged 
that ‘our most important effort will be concerned to revive the morale and increase the powers 
of the United Nations’.148 
 As John W. Young observes, and chapter three corroborates, Labour’s commitment to 
the UN – although stronger than their Conservative counterparts (at least in public) – waned 
during the Wilson governments between 1964 and 1970. The Overseas Development Ministry 
was indeed set up in 1964 to coordinate government efforts at international aid. It was headed 
by Barbara Castle who was provided with a Cabinet seat. However, just thirteen months into 
her tenure, Castle was promoted to the Ministry of Transport, and her former position ceased 
to hold Cabinet rank. The position of Minister for Disarmament was also created and filled by 
Alun Gwynne Jones, recently ennobled as Lord Chalfont. The role of the future Chairman of 
UNA was to represent Britain at international disarmament negotiations, mostly within the 
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.149 Chalfont’s task started 
inauspiciously. Healey, now Defence Secretary, ‘almost automatically’ disputed any of 
Chalfont’s proposals for Britain’s negotiating position in Geneva and ‘seemed nervous that 
we might make too much progress’. In 1967 Chalfont took charge of the negotiations for 
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British entry into the EEC and his former position passed to Fred Mulley with a reduced 
profile.150   
Hugh Foot, the permanent representative at the UN, was also newly ennobled in 1964, 
as Lord Caradon, and given ministerial rank. However, his position in New York was made 
difficult by the government’s foreign policy, particularly over South Africa. Labour had 
controversially compromised on its promise to end arms sales to the apartheid regime. Its 
embargo was significantly stricter than that of the Conservative government, but an order for 
aircraft made before the UN resolution in 1963 went through early in the administration, 
because of a fear of the consequences to Britain’s surrounding colonies and the Royal Navy’s 
use of Simonstown. The existing embargo came under threat in 1967 when Denis Healey, 
James Callaghan and George Brown pushed to end it in the wake of the devaluation of 
sterling. Wilson, however, managed to prevent them.151 When Heath took office in 1970 the 
position of permanent representative to the UN was no longer endowed with ministerial rank. 
Wilson did not reinstate the rank in 1974. Nevertheless, as shown in figure 4.8, 62% of MPs 
or peers who first mentioned UNA within a parliamentary debate belonged to the Labour 
Party.  
 The TUC also did much to support UNA, particularly in its early days. Although the 
TUC initially rejected affiliation with the LNU in June 1945, after the ratification of the UN 
Charter the Congress passed a resolution reaffirming ‘its profound belief that Social Justice 
for all peoples and the guarantee of permanent peace are inter-related, and declares that all 
citizens have a solemn obligation to acknowledge this indivisibility’. In light of the resolution, 
the future President of the TUC and future UNA Executive Committee member, Herbert 
Bullock, proposed the motion for affiliation  with the new UNA to ‘fulfil the letter and spirit 
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of the resolution’ in March 1946.152 It is unclear as to why LNU’s initial request was denied. 
They may have sensed the lack of permanence of the League or it may have been considered 
in light of the absence of an explicit commitment to social and economic responsibilities in 
the League Covenant, unlike the UN Charter. Nonetheless, UNA’s relationship with the TUC 
was a highly rewarding one. In May 1946 Vincent Tewson, the Assistant General Secretary of 
the TUC, initiated a tradition whereby he issued a circular to affiliated unions and trade 
councils encouraging them to support UNA activities at a national and local level.153 By 1964, 
57 of the 84 national organisations affiliated with UNA were trade union bodies.154  
Moreover, although, as examined earlier, there were trades councils unconvinced of 
the merits of UNA, there were others, such as the Penrith and District Trades Council who not 
only got involved with their local UNA branch, but also helped to set them up.155 In 1946 the 
Lancaster Trades and Labour Council deemed UNA to be of ‘vital necessity’ and similarly 
noted their willingness to take the initiative in forming a local branch.156 Local trades councils 
proved to be of particular assistance during UN Week. In the first such week, Letchworth 
Trades Council, which had given ‘the fullest publicity to the principles of UNA so that as 
many trade unionists as possible would become members’, helped to treble the membership of 
the local branch.157 Furthermore, the TUC sent annual circulars inviting affiliates to donate to 
UNA’s UN Day appeals from the 1950s through to the 1960s.158 The peak number of 
donators was reached in 1967 when 76 trade unions and trades councils collectively 
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contributed £847.159 However, it is unclear whether the Congress continued to solicit 
contributions from its affiliates into the 1970s.  
 Of course, this hardly indicates that UNA had managed to take hold of the trade union 
movement. Shortly before retiring as UNA’s Director General in 1964, Charles Judd lamented 
that few trades councils played an active part in the work of UNA branches.160 Neither was 
there always an enthusiastic response to UNA activities within TUC headquarters. In 1954, 
Tewson feared that there was ‘a real danger of the Association undertaking political pressure 
group work’. Tewson felt it desirable that it was made clear that the TUC ‘must be master of 
its own policy’.161 A year later, when UNA organised its Citizens’ Enquiry to celebrate the 
UN’s tenth anniversary, although the TUC found itself in broad agreement with the pamphlet 
that accompanied it, it raised issues of policy that it felt were within its own province. It did 
accept, however, that if trades councils in receipt of the questionnaire should ask the TUC for 
advice as to how to respond, it could not tell them to ‘buzz off’. However, the TUC decided 
not to circulate copies of the enquiry to its affiliates.162  
Furthermore, in 1966 it was even suggested within the TUC’s International Committee 
that UNA’s main activities were concerned with ‘political questions unrelated to trade union 
issues’ and that the TUC General Council ought not to be associated with an organisation 
‘whose membership was miscellaneous’. The suggestion was rejected by the rest of the 
Committee and it was pointed out that the main functions of UNA were to promote and 
maintain interest in the UN which was concerned with wide range of economic and social as 
well as political matters. A year later, the TUC found that its membership of UNA proved 
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useful in pointing out an inaccuracy in a motion before UNA’s AGM which was deemed 
critical of TUC policy in regards to race relations legislation. The ‘offensive part of the 
motion’ was withdrawn.163 Just as with the political wing of the labour movement, there were 
both pros and cons involved with affiliation. Nonetheless, ultimately their first loyalty was to 





In the classic 1947 conservative text, The Case for Conservatism, Quentin Hogg wrote that 
‘Conservatives are neither militants nor pacifists. They reject as equal and opposite heresies 
the doctrine that might is right, which seems to deny all morality, and the doctrine that right is 
might, which seems to them to fly in the face of all experience.’164 In order for liberal 
internationalism to gain purchase within conservatism, it had to emphasise its short term 
prudence rather than its visions for the future that appeared too fanciful to many 
Conservatives, particularly its rank and file membership.165  With regards to European 
integration and international cooperation more generally, Nicholas Crowson identifies two 
broad traditions in Conservative conceptions of the balance of power. The first can be 
illustrated by the thinking of the Locarno Treaty (1925) architect, Austen Chamberlain: 
Britain could not escape Europe. It had to commit to it and not retreat into isolationism. The 
tradition was alive in the opponents of appeasement and advocates of Britain joining Europe 
after the Second World War, such as Churchill, Macmillan and Heath. However, this group 
was by no means a concrete ally of liberal internationalism. Austen Chamberlain sat on the 
LNU Executive Committee, but was criticised by his colleagues for regarding the League as a 
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mere revival of the old Concert of Europe. This tradition did not share the liberal 
internationalist penchant for paying precedence to the UN or federalism. Limited pooling of 
sovereignty and intergovernmental cooperation, however, was acceptable, even prudent.  
The liberal internationalists had more to fear though from the tradition that 
underpinned Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement that held that Britain should avoid 
continental commitment and focus on empire. After the Second World War, his supporters – 
such as Somerset de Chair, Robin Turton and Derek Walker-Smith – would oppose Britain’s 
accession to the EEC and apportion greater priority to the Commonwealth and the Anglo-
American relationship. Although Neville did not even regard the League as a revival of the 
old Concert of Europe like his half-brother, he did appreciate it as a moral force; Somerset de 
Chair sat on the UNA Executive Committee. For many Conservatives, like another supporter 
of Neville, Alec Douglas-Home, especially before the UN General Assembly expanded amid 
decolonisation, the UN was an extension of British institutions and values deemed naturally 
superior for having stood the test of time and two world wars. Human rights were understood 
to be more relevant in relation to other countries as, with the exception of some utopian tenets 
that did not require urgent attention, their collective sentiment were perceived to be in keeping 
with existing British values. It was this group that most viewed international integration and 
harmony as fanciful. Worse still for liberal internationalists, this tradition had the greatest 
purchase among the grassroots conservatism that would later find representation in the form 
of Margaret Thatcher.166  
Nevertheless, Chatham House enjoyed some success in attracting the attention of 
Conservatives from both traditions. In 1938 Clement Jones confided in Waldorf Astor his 
wish that they could elect on to the Chatham House Council ‘fewer of those earnest fervent, 
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high brow, London School of Economics young men & more of the sound young 
Conservatives’.167 Conservative sympathies and influence was certainly present within 
Chatham House; 51% of the MPs who were members in 1946 were Conservative. Of course, 
Jones was writing to a former Conservative MP. But, as has been detailed, Astor would help 
to secure a greater balance of political influence from the labour movement. As figure 4.8 
shows, only 26% of the MPs or peers who first mentioned Chatham House within a 
parliamentary debate were Conservative as opposed to 41% who were Labour. This does not 
mean that Conservatives necessarily utilised the Institute less in the postwar period; MPs and 
peers were hardly likely to announce all of their reading habits and diary commitments. 
Nevertheless, although it is possible to identify potential avenues through which Chatham 
House could influence the Conservative Party – and vice versa – it is much more difficult on 
the strength of the evidence available to establish the overall significance of said avenues.   
 One of these avenues was R.A. Butler, the postwar ‘philosopher-in-chief’ of the 
Conservative Party.168 Butler belonged to the Neville Chamberlain tradition. He, like 
Douglas-Home, would be a somewhat half-hearted European.169 Nevertheless, he certainly 
identified the utility of Chatham House, if not for its advocacy of international integration. 
Butler played a significant role in establishing the credibility of the FRPS within Whitehall. In 
1941, in the face of parliamentary pressure to justify its expenditure, Eden enlisted Butler, 
then Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to undertake an enquiry into FRPS 
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activities.170 Butler reported back that the work of the FRPS was of ‘a high quality’. It 
complemented its staff and its Review of the Foreign Press, and stated that ‘this reservoir of 
knowledge should be better known and more freely utilised by the Foreign Office’.171 
Furthermore, Butler pressed that greater use of the FRPS should be made throughout 
Whitehall, including Arthur Greenwood’s aforementioned committee on peace aims. 
Greenwood duly made it known his plan ‘to make considerable use of the services of 
Chatham House as regards reconstruction problems in the international field’.172 It is evident 
too that Butler saw utility in making use of the services of Chatham House with regard to 
determining Conservative postwar policy. In 1941, Butler was made chairman of the 
Conservative Party’s Post-War Problems Central Committee that largely filled the vacuum 
left by the closure of the Conservative Research Department at the outbreak of war.173 Butler 
was keen to involve ‘figures who, though in general sympathy with the party faith, are not of 
the machine’.174 Academics were thus largely employed; in addition to himself only three 
other representatives from Westminster sat on the committee. One of the academics Butler 
recruited was the head of the FRPS, Toynbee.175  
 Among the papers submitted to Butler, were one authored by an FRPS sub-committee 
and another that was a statement of Toynbee’s personal opinion. The first was that which had 
met Attlee’s approval, the FRPS’s ‘British-American World Order’. The second, authored by 
Toynbee, accompanied the first and was entitled, ‘The Oceanic versus the Continental Road 
to World Organisation’. In the first paper it was noted that ‘peace and economic welfare can 
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only be maintained if the world achieves a much greater measure of political unification, 
commensurate with the economic unification which has already come about’. Chatham House 
recognised globalisation. The resultant need for political unification, the paper argued, could 
be met in two ways: ‘by the establishment of some form of constitutional world-order, in 
which all nations would collaborate for the common benefit; or by the establishment of a 
world tyranny, in which world-unity would be imposed and maintained by force’. Of course, 
the latter, was Hitler’s solution. The FRPS’s solution was the former established under the 
auspices of an Anglo-Saxon bloc, what Toynbee referred to in ‘The Oceanic versus the 
Continental Road to World Organisation’ as ‘Pax Americano-Britannica’. In ‘British-
American World Order’, doubt was cast upon the possibility of a federal union of the USA 
and Britain, but instead recommended as a practicable course, ‘mixing up’ through ad hoc 
agreements. The paper suggested something that would have a strong resemblance with the 
soon-to-be established NATO: the setting up of joint naval and air bases and ‘machinery 
along the lines of the present U.S.-Canadian Joint Defence Board’. Crucially, however, both 
papers recognised that such an order could not rely on strategic means alone. ‘British-
American World Order’ recommended that there ‘might also be joint arrangements for world-
wide economic reconstruction, for the control of the trade-cycle, and for the promotion of 
material welfare and social security especially in industrially backward countries’.176 Toynbee 
and the FRPS were advocating international development agencies and Keynesian macro-
economics on a global scale; what would become the UN agencies and the Bretton Woods 
system.  
 While Attlee was interested in FRPS work in terms of international politics, Butler’s 
interest, appeared to have been mostly concerned with international economics. Butler’s 
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deliberations had a significant impact upon postwar Conservative policy. After Labour’s 
electoral victory in 1945, Churchill appointed Butler chairman of the revived Conservative 
Research Department. It was from this position that Butler – whose political hero had always 
been Robert Peel – helped to successfully reconcile the Conservative Party to a mixed 
economy, culminating in the Industrial Charter in 1947 ‘the most memorable concession a 
free enterprise Party ever made to the spirit of Keynesian economics’.177 It would be 
inaccurate to say the least to solely credit Chatham House with this turnaround. For example, 
months before the production of the two FRPS papers, Butler recognised that the role of gold 
– that would later be much constrained under the Bretton Woods system – was ‘the great 
problem between ourselves and America’. Butler thus sought greater education on the topic 
and received advice from none other than Keynes himself.178 Nevertheless, much of the 
deliberations of Butler’s committee on postwar problems were in line with Chatham House 
thinking and there were other correspondents who were close to the Institute, including the 
middleman between Butler and Keynes, Frank Ashton-Gwatkin, the Foreign Office official 
who contributed towards Eden’s reforms of the department in 1944. Ashton-Gwatkin was part 
of the Chatham House Council and on leaving the Foreign Office in 1947 became the 
Associate Director of Studies at Chatham House under Toynbee.179 His own notes to Butler 
on foreign policy correlated with the concerns of those at Chatham House who called for 
greater education of the public in international affairs. ‘Statesmen (who should have known 
better)’, Ashton-Gwatkin argued, ‘have given way to popular misconceptions of policy in 
order to get votes...The only cure (other than Hitler’s method of suppressing democracy) is to 
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educate it so that it will demand the right policy of its rulers instead of the wrong one.’180 In 
1944, at a meeting of the Chatham House Council, it was Ashton-Gwatkin who seconded the 
resolution to form the planning committee that deliberated on the future of the Institute, with 
particular regard to its educational activities.181 Furthermore, one note made in relation to 
Conservative postwar planning, whose author is alas unclear, was positively Greenian in their 
denunciation of laissez faire economics, albeit with a conservative twist: ‘In the sphere of 
social relationships, it acted as a great emancipator but also as a great annihilator of traditional 
values. It broke down social cohesion & produced an “atomised” society.’182 These were 
people that Chatham House could do business with.  
 However, the extent to which the Conservative Research Department utilised the 
services of Chatham House after the war – despite being a corporate subscriber – is unclear 
from the party’s archives. While Butler attempted to remake the Conservative Party, it is 
probable that he left international thought to Churchill who took to the international stage 
during the party’s time in opposition.183 However, Churchill was hardly prone to 
intellectualising. His assertion that Britain should situate itself at the centre of three 
interlocking circles – the English speaking world, Europe and the commonwealth – was good 
rhetoric, but it invited scepticism in International Affairs and later, as chapter three details, 
from Kenneth Younger.184 It was also noted in International Affairs that Churchill’s zeal for 
the promotion of European unity did not extend to federalism.185 Nevertheless, Churchill was 
a patron and active user of the Institute. Indeed, his membership in 1931 resulted from a 
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request by Macadam in respect of his ‘considerable use’. After the war, he requested at least 
ten items from the Information Department pertaining to events in the 1930s that were likely 
used for the purpose of informing his first volume of his history of the Second World War, 
The Gathering Storm (1948).186  
However, there is little to indicate that the Conservative Party used Chatham House’s 
services at an organisational level. For instance, before Labour’s 1967 application to the EEC, 
a Policy Research Committee on Europe was set up, but unlike Butler’s committee in 1941 it 
solely consisted of MPs and its interests were distinctly party political. When the suggestion 
was made that the committee should include the Conservative Europhile Ursula Branston, it 
was dismissed as there were doubts that she would be able to aid with ‘day-to-day 
Parliamentary affairs’ given that she lived away from London.187 There appears to have been 
little desire for academic reports from bodies such as Chatham House.  
 Similarly, with regard to UNA, the Party was eager that its members were provided 
with a clear Conservative message on matters of foreign policy unsullied by external 
cogitations. In 1955, when UNA issued its Citizens’ Enquiry, a bulletin was issued from 
Central Office to party agents advising:  
 
that those who are studying these subjects should do so and should say that they prefer to do 
so on the basis of Conservative publications and as part of Conservative activities. All agents 
will appreciate that in our dealings with U.N.A. we must be most careful and tactful.188 
 
The Party’s wariness of the Enquiry may have been informed by their experience of a 
precedent, the 1934/35 Peace Ballot. Then a debate ensued over the information that 
accompanied the questionnaires, which many within the party – but certainly not all – merely 
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considered to be socialist propaganda. Subsequently, the Conservative Party refused to 
cooperate with the ballot. It proved to be a serious political miscalculation that only 
encouraged many to get involved and helped Labour to paint the Conservatives as opponents 
of the League.189 Opposition within the Party towards the LNU was exacerbated in 1936 
when the LNU formally associated itself with the International Peace Campaign (IPC), which 
aimed to coordinate the work of peace organisations across Europe. The body was perceived 
by many – not necessarily inaccurately – to be run by communists. Association with the IPC 
‘fatally undermined’ the LNU’s all party model; it served to alienate not only Conservatives, 
but also a number within the labour movement.190 However, by the 1940s the Conservative 
Party, fearing past political retribution, had learned its lesson and its approach to UNA was 
more conciliatory. In 1955, the Conservative Party did not boycott the Citizens’ Enquiry.    
 Nonetheless, Conservative anxiety over the extent to which UNA was infiltrated by 
the Left remained a persistent concern, and just as UNA attempted to influence Conservatives, 
so too did they try to influence them. ‘There is a strong communist influence at work in 
U.N.A.’, wrote the Vice-Chair of the Conservative Party Organisation Marjorie Maxse in a 
circular to constituency agents in 1948, ‘which we are fighting back’. The circular encouraged 
agents to obtain an undertaking from their respective UNA regional headquarters that when an 
impending visit of a speaker at a UNA branch was announced that he or she was ‘not a 
Communist and will not put forward communist or extreme left views’.191 It followed a 
controversial debate within UNA Executive Committee as to whether communist 
organisations should be allowed to be affiliates. In April 1948, it was resolved that they 
should not be, but Maxse, a member of the Committee herself, perceived that nonetheless the 
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executive was now split into two factions ‘with moderate Labour and Conservatives on one 
side and Liberals and Communists on the other’. Maxse believed that communists had 
captured both the CEWC and UNSA and complained about the ‘unending stream of 
communist speakers to the branches’.192 Her hyperbolic concerns were symptomatic of 
widespread anxieties within the Conservative Party over communist infiltration in British 
institutions. As a result of a resolution passed at the 1947 party conference calling for greater 
publicity of ‘subversive and undemocratic activity in this country, whether Communist or 
Fascist’, a committee was set up that reported on the prevalence of alleged fellow-travellers in 
key positions. In order to combat their influence, the report recommended that Conservatives 
‘play a vigorous part in the various organisations which purport to be non-party but which 
Communists make every effort to control’.193  
 Maxse sought to do just that. A year later, when the former Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs Richard Law made his intention known to step down from UNA Executive 
Committee, Maxse soon sought another Conservative MP to replace him. Law resigned owing 
to an increased workload but also told Maxse that he had ‘not a very great deal of sympathy 
with the body itself’.194 His former reason, and quite plausibly the latter, also prevented a 
number of other Conservative MPs from taking up the post. Tufton Beamish, Maxse’s first 
choice, originally agreed, believing that the ‘U.N.A. is something which ought to be 
penetrated in a big way in order to keep it on the straight and narrow’.195 However, he had to 
retract his offer on further consideration due to a timetable clash.196 Requests were sent to 
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three other MPs, but none accepted.197 No replacement was found in the form of an MP, but 
nonetheless, a certain future MP Christopher Woodhouse became a member of UNA 
Executive Committee that year. The following year in 1950 Woodhouse was joined by 
leading Conservative MPs; one of whom belonged to the Austen Chamberlain tradition, 
Duncan Sandys, and another who belonged to the Neville Chamberlain tradition, Somerset de 
Chair.198  
 Maxse also saw votes in UNA. In 1950, election year, Maxse encouraged 
Conservative candidates to take part in UNA all-party meetings, fearing that non-attendance 
would put their opponents at ‘a very advantageous position’.199 A document complete with 
suggested replies to UNA’s election questionnaire was circulated, with the positive responses 
desired from UNA with few qualifications. Naturally, the opportunity was not lost to align 
Conservative policy with that of UNA.200 In June, Maxse hoped to ‘cash-in on U.N.A. and its 
adherents’ in light of the Labour’s Government’s ‘incredible foreign policy statement’. This 
was likely a reference to the government’s refusal to endorse the Schuman Plan that was made 
all the more controversial by the simultaneous publication of the Labour Party pamphlet 
European Unity authored by Denis Healey and Hugh Dalton which asserted that both the 
USA and the Commonwealth were the principal partnerships Britain should concern itself 
with, rather than Europe. Maxse obviously interpreted strong support for European integration 
within UNA. Given the prevalence of liberal opinion within the Association and that the 
Schuman Plan proposed a regional association of nations provided by the UN Charter, this is 
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not surprising.201 Finally, later in the year, Maxse issued a circular advising constituency 
agents to ‘give as much support as possible’ in connection with UN Day.202  
 Nevertheless, although the party was actively engaged with the organisation, the 
Conservative relationship with UNA did not prove to be smooth sailing. In 1952, the 
Conservative constituency agent for Reigate complained that nearly all of the local UNA 
branch’s programme could be taken ‘as indirect blows’ at the Conservative Government. 
Chief among the planned events was a meeting to be addressed by Seretse Khama.203 A 
similar complaint was made in 1955 pertaining to a UNA branch providing no opportunity for 
exploring the Government’s case for the Central African Federation. Instead the case against 
the Federation was made in a series of meetings ‘which bordered on a triumphal 
procession’.204 Concerns were also expressed within the Party that year with regard to the 
Citizen Enquiry. There were fears that it would attract Left-wing organisations answering its 
questions, in the words of one Conservative agent, ‘in the sense that we should disarm, ban 
the bomb, give self-government to everybody, give all our money to backward people and 
form an international army’.205  
 However, it was the Suez Crisis that would prove the greatest test for the Conservative 
relationship with UNA. Decades later, David Ennals recounted his time as UNA Secretary 
during the crisis. He recalled that before Suez UNA had not experienced difficulty in 
maintaining the support of all parties, but that after an impression emerged among the general 
public that UNA was ‘somehow on the left, however hard we tried to maintain the political 
balance’.206 Ennals recounted that the crisis resulted in many Conservatives feeling that they 
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had to resign from UNA. He regretted the resultant loss of several good officers and 
committee members at both a national and local level. Nevertheless, there was no official call 
from the Conservative Party on its members to resign from UNA or to boycott its activities, 
quite the opposite. In November, it was agreed ‘that there should be no question of mass 
resignations by Conservative MPs’, but guidance was sought from Eden as to a definite 
course of action.207 Neither did Eden recommend any resignations. Eden may have been 
deterred from such an action for fear of offending liberal opinion, the same reason he advised 
Salisbury against resigning over UNA’s protest against the Government in relation to Seretse 
Khama detailed in chapter two. Such action could also have been more widely interpreted as a 
change in Conservative policy – and indeed government policy – towards the UN, especially 
given Eden’s position as President of UNA and as a frequent supporter of its activities. It was 
also noted there was a variety of opinion within UNA, for instance the Exeter branch had 
given its full support to the government’s Suez policy.208 The party did equip Conservative 
members of UNA with a collation of opinions from supporters of the UN who, nonetheless, 
sided with the government, including the Bishop of Exeter, Robert Mortimer and indeed 
Gilbert Murray.209 Beyond this, Central Office took little action against UNA.   
 So what was the impact of the Suez Crisis on UNA? No Conservative UNA Presidents 
or Vice-Presidents resigned. Indeed, the Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd spoke at UNA’s 
annual appeal dinner at Mansion House in 1957.210 There was a decline in total UNA 
membership between 1956 and 1957, from 62,646 to 59,772. However, although the decline 
may have been offset by new members who joined UNA as a result of their condemnation of 
the government, the figures are hardly conducive with a mass Conservative exodus from the 
organisation. The decline was also attributable to the disrupted branch collection of renewal 
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subscriptions due to the unprecedented demands placed upon branch officials for the Refugee 
Campaign that year.211  
The damage that the Suez controversy did to UNA’s relationship with Conservatives 
is not best measured in terms of immediate impact on membership figures. Rather it is better 
understood in terms of preconceptions of UNA. Following the crisis, the Conservative MP 
Charles Waterhouse, a Vice-President of UNA, concluded that UNA was ‘marching rapidly in 
the footsteps of the League of Nations Union’. He was particularly concerned that the 
documents justifying UNA’s decision to condemn the government included Eden’s name in 
the header, a result of him being a President. However, more significantly, it is apparent that 
the absence of UNA’s deference greatly perturbed Waterhouse. He had written to Ennals 
arguing that it was the ‘duty’ of organisations such as UNA ‘to explain the policy but not to 
take sides, least of all against their own Government’. Waterhouse reported to a colleague that 
he received a ‘saucy letter back telling me that magnificent men like Lord Robert Cecil could 
never be wrong’.212  UNA was not just an educational organisation as Waterhouse imagined. 
It was not like Chatham House, unable to express a corporate opinion. UNA was also a 
pressure group. To those who were not already in the know, the Suez Crisis lifted the veil.  
The reveal made UNA’s relationship with the Conservative Party more difficult 
because many within the party found themselves at odds with the direction of the UN and the 
central issues on which UNA campaigned. Ennals asserted that after Suez, Conservative 
governments attached a lower priority to the UN than that of successive Labour governments. 
UNA’s central concerns – ‘anti-colonialism, anti-apartheid, disarmament, environment 
protection, multilateral economic aid and debt relief’ – were mainly issues for the Left.213 Of 
course, Ennals’s analysis was coloured by his party affiliation; members of his own party 
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grew frustrated with the activities of UNA, as noted here and in chapter three. Politicians 
picked the UNA mission statement that suited them at any one particular time. However, at an 
ideological level, it was the Conservatives who more often found themselves at loggerheads 
with the UN and UNA. It was apparent in Douglas-Home’s 1962 Berwick upon Tweed 
speech in its anxiety that the UN was becoming dominated by newly independent countries in 
Africa and Asia. It was also to be found in the thought of some Conservatives more intimately 
attached to UNA. In 1967, Conservative MP and former member of UNA Executive 
Committee Gilbert Longden was asked to contribute to a meeting of the Watford UNA branch 
within his constituency to pay tribute to Human Rights Year. The mayor read a note by 
Longden that stated that although he supported the concept of human rights, it was for other 
nations to develop and maintain. British institutions were beyond reproach. 
 
We in these Islands have happily no cause to complain that our ‘human rights’ are in jeopardy: 
in fact I sometimes think that a “Human Duties Year” would be more appropriate for us. But 
in too many other Countries citizens still have cause to fear each other...It is for their sake that 
I send my best wishes for the success of Human Rights Year214 
 
Again this exceptionalism applied to British institutions was not exclusive to 
Conservatism. In the 1955 Citizen’s Enquiry, the TUC’s recommended response to the 
question on human rights was that ‘without qualification all men and women should enjoy 
social and economic rights’, but political rights, with an eye to the colonies, were to be 
granted only when they could be ‘responsibly exercised’.215 Nonetheless, the image of UNA 
became increasingly associated with the Left and the Labour Party. In 1958 the Conservative 
MP John Hughes-Hallett complained that UNA’s disarmament policy outlined in a UNA 
campaign – calling upon the government to end the testing of hydrogen bombs and suspend 
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the implementation of any agreement for the establishment of missile bases – was identical to 
that of Labour’s. Charles Judd insisted that Gaitskell and the TUC had ‘pinched’ the policy 
from UNA rather than the other way round. Hughes-Hallett replied that ‘it would be 
impossible to convince Conservatives that there had not been some collaboration’.216  
Once again, however, the policy of the party machine in the wake of the Suez Crisis – 
careful not to repeat the mistakes made with the LNU – was not to disengage from UNA. 
Indeed, it advocated the contrary. Although, Hughes-Hallett was not alone in the Conservative 
party in objecting to UNA’s disarmament campaign, the then Party Chairman, Viscount 
Hailsham, encouraged Conservatives to engage with UNA activities. 
 
In spite of this experience, or rather because of it, I am most anxious that Conservatives 
should not withdraw their support from the Association. On the contrary I feel, and I hope you 
will agree, that the true moral is that we should all be stimulated to take a more active part in 
its proceedings and thus ensure that the Conservative point of view is able to exercise a more 
effective influence.217  
 
In 1960, Central Office was pleased to secure both Hughes-Hallett and a returning 
Woodhouse on UNA Executive Committee who promised to play an active part.218 Figure 4.2 
shows that the greatest balance between Labour and Conservative MPs on the committee was 
achieved in the early 1960s. Central Office also sought to take advantage of having Nigel 
Nicolson as UNA chairman from 1961. Nicolson obliged. For instance, he stressed the 
advantage of securing non-parliamentary names on the UNA executive who could be relied 
upon to be sympathetic to the Conservative cause.219 Moreover, the party still recognised 
there to be political capital in affiliation with UNA. Later in 1968, Heath spoke to UNA’s 
General Council and his government did nothing to cease UNA’s public subsidy.  The decline 
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in Conservative MPs on the Executive Committee in the late 1960s and early 1970s, shown in 
figure 4.2, does not necessarily indicate that party headquarters was less interested in UNA. In 
1966, a circular was issued stating that the party was very much in favour of local 
Conservatives playing a ‘full part’ in UNA’s activities. Enclosed with the circular was a 
memorandum on UNA written by the Conservative Research Department stating the 
desirability ‘to inject a bit more realism into a movement whose basic aims we are fully in 
sympathy’. It also wanted Conservatives to stress the contributions made by the Macmillan 
government towards disarmament, namely to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.220 The extent to 
which Conservatives at a grassroots level, however, responded to such encouragements 
requires more in-depth research at a local level than can be provided here. However, one can 
surmise from the necessity of the repeated attempts made by Central Office to get 
Conservatives involved, that the party was struggling to keep its members interested in the 
Association. Indeed, Hailsham’s circular in 1958, received a positive response from some 
Conservative UNA members precisely because of the apathy demonstrated within the 
movement by Conservatives.221 Furthermore, those Conservatives who were active within 
UNA and strongly supported the UN, were often at risk at being alienated from fellow 
Conservatives.  
Two prominent examples were the Conservative Chairmen of UNA in the 1960s, 
Nigel Nicolson and Humphry Berkeley. In November 1956, Nicolson, then a member of 
UNA Executive Committee, was one of a group of Conservative MPs who defied the party 
Whip, Edward Heath, and abstained from voting in support of the Government’s invasion of 
Egypt.222 This group, ‘heavily liberal intellectual in character’, also included Waldorf Astor’s 
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son John Jacob Astor, Frank Medlicott and Robert Boothby.223 Nicolson, son of the 
(in)famous liberal intellectuals Harold Nicolson and Vita Sackville-West, had a reputation for 
being ‘ideologically unreliable’ among Conservative MPs as a result of his opposition to the 
death penalty that only worsened with Nicolson’s stand on Suez.224 However, it was among 
grassroots Conservatives that Nicolson would encounter his fiercest critics. The day before 
Nicolson abstained, he made a speech to the UNA branch within his Bournemouth 
constituency condemning Eden’s actions at which Conservative members of the audience 
called him a ‘conceited traitor’.225 Nicolson’s opposition to the death penalty and liberal 
intellectualism had already irritated his local Conservative Association, but his protest during 
the Suez Crisis led to a two year battle that ultimately cost Nicolson his seat.226  
Berkeley experienced a similar trajectory. In 1965 Berkeley introduced an 
unsuccessful private members bill to legalise homosexual acts between consenting male 
adults along the lines of the Wolfenden Report, two years before the actual decriminalisation. 
In the next election in 1966, Berkeley lost his seat. He attributed it to his bill.227 That year he 
succeeded Nicolson as Chairman of UNA Executive Committee. Before he had lost his seat, 
Berkeley was dissatisfied with the direction of his party. It was R.A. Butler’s reshaping of the 
Party that had originally attracted him to joining. Indeed, Berkeley was a member of Butler’s 
staff in the 1940s. He had wanted Butler to replace Eden as Prime Minister and attributed 
Butler’s misgivings over Suez to him not being made so.228 Similarly, he had hoped that 
Butler would replace Macmillan and that Iain Macleod (part of Butler’s circle) would replace 
Douglas-Home. It was Douglas-Home’s successor that Berkeley found himself most at odds 
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with. Berkeley felt that Heath had moved the party to the Right and that this was particularly 
apparent in the party’s foreign policy. It should be noted, however, that Douglas-Home was 
the Opposition spokesman on foreign affairs. Berkeley disagreed with his party’s opposition 
to the application of sanction on Smith’s regime in Rhodesia. During his time as UNA 
chairman, Berkeley also found Heath’s support of UNA to be lacklustre. At the UNA 
fundraising dinner at 10 Downing Street in 1968, he complained that Heath sullenly stood in 
the corner avoid people, in stark contrast to the Prime Minister. That year, Berkeley resigned 
from the party over its opposition to the Race Relations Act and – on what he perceived to be 
interrelated issues – the party’s continued opposition to sanctions on Rhodesia and its policy 
of resuming the sale of arms to South Africa.  
Berkeley’s party would only go further to the Right. In 1975 the grassroots Right-wing 
of the party would find a representative in the new leader Thatcher. She had supported Suez, 
criticised the British withdrawal East of Suez and was opposed to the sanctioning of Ian 
Smith’s regime. Worse still for liberal internationalists, the only intergovernmental 
organisation Thatcher spoke fondly of was NATO. She perceived international structures and 
ideals as ‘either impractical or Left-leaning or both’.229 Berkeley would not witness this as a 
Conservative Party member. In 1970 Berkeley joined the Labour party shortly after its 
electoral defeat and became a member of the SDP in 1981, only to later rejoin the Labour 
Party.230 A number of Conservatives – and Labourites – who supported the UN and were 
more conscious of foreign policy were torn between their parties and their policies. Little 
wonder then that numerous supporters of UNA – and of Chatham House – were not averse to 
wandering the centre ground.  
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THE LIBERAL PARTY AND CENTRISM 
The party whose international thought most correlated with that of Chatham House and UNA 
was also the party that did not get the opportunity to translate that thought into policy. The 
Liberal Party advocated the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in both 
domestic and colonial legislation a month after it was adopted by the UN General Assembly. 
It argued for the development of representative self-government in the colonies; the creation 
of an international police force; greater aid to developing countries; the strengthening of UN 
agencies; an end to the maintenance of military bases East of Suez; the admission of the 
People’s Republic of China onto the Security Council; multilateral nuclear disarmament; and 
that the energies of the British people, and particularly the young, be canalised politically 
toward internationalism. Furthermore, the Party looked forward to world government while 
acknowledging that it was not an immediately practical possibility and was strongly in favour 
of the establishment of a European union, even a federal one, with Britain at the heart of it.231 
The party could legitimately claim – and frequently did – to be consistent advocates of the 
above decades before the Labour and Conservative parties.232  
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 There were ideological reasons. In the 1930s, two of the most influential contributors 
to the Liberal Party’s international thought were the liberal intellectuals Walter Layton and 
Ramsay Muir who enunciated the idea of global ‘interdependence’. The ‘supreme difficulty of 
our generation’, Layton wrote in 1930, was ‘that our achievements on the economic plane of 
life have outstripped our progress on the political plane to such an extent that our economics 
and politics are perpetually out of gear with one another’.233 The inevitable political problems 
that arose from the economic interdependence of nations could only be solved through 
strengthening the League of Nations.234 This was the same solution proffered by Ramsay 
Muir when he developed Layton’s notion of interdependence, explaining that it was not just 
economic, but technological and cultural too. Although nationalism was useful for forming 
unified states, if left unchecked it led nations to be too assertive and the negative aspects of 
interdependence – such as world war – kicked in during struggles for self-determination, tariff 
wars, monetary instability or social revolution.  Internationalism was thus to be encouraged 
by limiting state sovereignty in a variety of areas, be they international trade through the 
creation of a new monetary standard, the prohibition of certain weapons or the establishment 
of regional free trade areas.235   
In an age when a shot in Sarajevo echoed around the world, it was recognised by 
liberals that however far away an event took place it had the potential to have a huge impact 
on the lives of those at home and in a myriad of ways. These ideas were not entirely new; 
both John Hobson and Norman Angell spoke in similar terms.236 However, in the 1930s it 
appears that ideas surrounding interdependence had a greater hold over the Party, possibly as 
a result of it being brought home with the Wall Street Crash, but also the practical solutions 
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proffered by the likes of Keynes, Layton and Muir. Furthermore, the small size of the Party 
may well have secured in it a more cohesive epistemic community than that which was 
afforded to the mammoth ideological coalitions that were the Conservative and Labour 
Parties. Anyhow, the Liberal Party had a much stronger ideological incentive to support 
international integration and organisation than their rivals did.  
 The Liberal Party’s interwar appreciation of global interdependence naturally 
correlated with and was influenced by thinkers connected to the LNU and especially Chatham 
House. As noted above, Toynbee recognised globalisation. But this recognition was not 
limited to his wartime papers. Michael Lang outlines how ‘Toynbee’s entire career as a 
historian and political analyst can be read as a massive reflection on what came to be called 
globalisation’, which Lang attributes to the combining of British idealism and Darwinism 
noted in chapter two.237 The multi-talented, unstinting long-time editor and senior 
administrator at Chatham House Margaret Cleeve recalled in 1955 that in the 1930s the 
production of Toynbee’s Survey of International Affairs was made difficult not only by the 
expanding volume of diplomatic business but also by the growing number of issues that 
constituted international affairs, including economics and the ‘interdependence of 
international affairs with domestic affairs’.238 Another of the more influential contributors to 
the Liberal Party’s international thought was one of the founders of Chatham House Philip 
Kerr, or from 1930 Lord Lothian, who did much to dent the reputation of the concept of 
national sovereignty in the Party.239 Lothian’s appreciation of the varying extent of global 
interdependence is apparent in his argument for federalism. Lothian’s federalism was not only 
aimed at bringing an end to war, but also at stemming poverty and unemployment. In his 
seminal 1935 lecture Pacifism is Not Enough Nor Patriotism Either, while the effects of the 
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Wall Street Crash were still being felt, Lothian proclaimed that by ending international 
anarchy with federalism, economic nationalism that preceded tariff wars and professions of 
autarky would cease and countries could coordinate the division of labour to secure full 
employment and rising living standards.240 Global interdependence was such that 
internationalism was necessary to combat social injustice.  
Global interdependence was also such that social injustice in one country could 
embroil other countries in conflict. This was the reasoning behind the report of one of the 
more famous liberal intellectuals, federalists, and short-lived Liberal MPs, William 
Beveridge. The Beveridge Report was a response to the Atlantic Charter’s object of obtaining 
‘social security’ for all.241 Beveridge reasoned that democratic regimes were less likely to go 
to war, but that unless democracy could solves society’s ills, society in despair would look to 
dictators for answers. ‘[T]he world cannot be made safe for democracy’, Beveridge wrote in 
1945, ‘except by showing that democracy can conquer the social evils of Want, Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor, Idleness and Inequality’.242 The liberal internationalist motivation behind 
Beveridge and his work should not be overlooked.243 In 1950, Beveridge’s colleagues within 
the Liberal Party also placed the significance of global interdependence at the top of the 
agenda. The first chapter of the parliamentary candidates’ handbook was concerned with 
world affairs and opened with a quotation from Roosevelt’s 1945 inaugural address.  
 
We have learned that we cannot live alone; that our well-being is dependent on the well-being 
of other nations, far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches nor as 
dogs-in-the-manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human 
community.244   
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Unsurprisingly, members and supporters of the Liberal Party were natural allies of 
Chatham House and UNA. The Liberal presence within the figures contained within this 
chapter is small, but the figures are largely based upon the contributions made by MPs and 
peers, among whom, of course, there were far fewer Liberals. Similarly, there is little 
reference to be found to either Chatham House or UNA in the Liberal Party Archives. 
However, neither pattern is indicative of the involvement of Liberal politicians within the two 
organisations. The absence of material may well be a result of the aforementioned limited 
resources of the party; it is telling that the corporate subscriber to Chatham House was Liberal 
International rather than the Liberal Party Research Department.  
Yet those Liberal politicians who were involved with the two organisations were often 
very senior members of the party. Beveridge was a participant in the wartime Chatham House 
World Order Study Group and authored one of its publications. Andrew McFadyean, who 
helped found Liberal International and was its Vice-President from 1954 to 1967 served on 
the Chatham House Council between 1933 and 1967 and was a president in 1970. 
Furthermore, from 1944 he was the Chairman of the IPR Committee.245 In 1967, the same 
year that he stood down as leader of the Liberal Party, Jo Grimond became the only MP to sit 
on the Chatham House Council and did so until 1974.246 With regards to UNA, Leonard 
Behrens a member of the Liberal Party Foreign Affairs Committee and president of the party 
from 1955 to 1957 played a very active role within the Association. He was a chairman of 
UNA’s Political Committee that deliberated on UNA resolutions and of Manchester District’s 
UNA Council; a Vice-President both of UNA and the WFUNA; and a member of the 
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Executive Committee from 1945 to 1968.247 In 1954, the conclusions of the Liberal Party 
Foreign Affairs Committee praised the ‘invaluable assistance’ provided by Behrens to a report 
on proposed revisions to the UN Charter, making reference to his similar work in connection 
with UNA.248 Jeremy Thorpe, Grimond’s successor, became Chairman of UNA in the same 
year he resigned as party leader in 1976 amid the Norman Scott scandal. Thorpe was a 
passionate internationalist whose ideas again were much aligned with that of UNA’s. He 
spoke out against the formation of the Central African Federation; he was close friends with 
Seretse Khama and Kenneth Kaunda; an active opponent of apartheid; and campaigner for 
British citizenship for East African Asians from Kenya and later Uganda. Indeed, Thorpe took 
a Ugandan Asian family into his home while helping to secure them employment and 
citizenship.249 More cynically, party politically, the Liberal Party’s internationalist foreign 
policy was one of the main areas in which Liberals could distinguish themselves from the 
Labour and Conservative parties.250 Given how the Party fared electorally, such distinctions 
were particularly important.  
In 1945 the Liberal Party suffered its most disastrous electoral result since its 
formation in 1859. Of the 306 parliamentary candidates the Party managed to field, only 12 
successfully obtained a seat. Only 9% of the electorate voted Liberal and the three biggest 
figures within the Party Percy Harris, William Beveridge and the party leader Archibald 
Sinclair had been defeated. No Liberal seat was safe.251 Labour’s adoption of the Beveridge 
Report prevented its author’s party from accruing any political capital from it. By 1947 
Labour was embracing Keynesian economics in its attempts to finance the Welfare State by 
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means of demand management.252 In the same year Butler produced the Industrial Charter 
signalling that a Conservative government would not overhaul many of the policies 
implemented by that of Attlee’s. Neither Labour nor the Conservative Party could be 
described as wholehearted supporters of Keynsianism, but when it did not alter their deeds, it 
often altered their rhetoric.253 David Dutton notes the irony that while the two main parties 
were competing with each other in terms of their espousal of the ideas of the two most 
prominent liberals – Keynes and Beveridge –  the Liberal Party suffered.254 The split within 
the Liberal Party that Cecil noted in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter was likely a 
reference to the subsequent division among Liberal politicians that could crudely be described 
as one between those who were anti-Tory and those who were anti-socialist.255 It was the 
unenviable task of Clement Davies, Sinclair’s successor, to halt the diasporisation of not only 
Liberal voters, but of Liberal politicians too. The severity of the problem was made 
conspicuous by the defections of Lloyd George’s own children. While Gwilym successfully 
won a seat in 1951 as a National Liberal and Conservative candidate, Megan joined the 
Labour Party in 1952.256 Gwilym Lloyd George’s designation as a National Liberal and 
Conservative was indicative of the Conservative attempts to swallow the Liberal vote. There 
were 53 candidates with the same and similar designations in the 1950 general election, all of 
whom were pledged to support the Conservative Party. Their defeat in the election only 
motivated Conservatives to push harder at trying to attract Liberal voters so that they might 
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unite the anti-socialist vote. Such endeavours contributed to the Liberal Party’s electoral nadir 
in 1951 when only 6 Liberal MPs were returned.257 
The poor electoral fortunes of the Liberal Party and inadequacies of the first-past-the-
post electoral system in reflecting ideological divisions have helped to mask the influence of 
liberalism on British international thought and politics more generally. Both Chatham House 
and UNA attracted a number of centrist politicians who had sympathies with liberalism and 
the Liberal Party or had a past loyalty to it. Waldorf Astor, a Conservative MP, before he 
inherited his father’s viscountship and gave his seat to his wife Nancy in 1919, was part of the 
idealist school and a progressive conservative. He was independent of the party machine, was 
a strong advocate of social reform, had little time for aristocratic conservatism and 
approached affairs with liberal empiricism. Since their days at Oxford University, he was a 
close friend of Lothian whose ideas made a significant impact upon his own, and his politics 
often seemed more at home within the Liberal Party. For instance, he voted against his party 
in favour of Lloyd George’s Health and Unemployment Insurance Bill in 1911.258 Similarly, 
although Robert Cecil never formally became a Liberal, his politics often appeared to reside 
within the Liberal Party. In 1921 he held abortive discussions with Asquith, Grey and other 
senior Liberals over a proposed centrist coalition.259 In their memoirs both Woodhouse and 
Berkeley felt it necessary to justify why they did not join the Liberal Party. Woodhouse, 
whose family had mostly been made up of Liberals, ‘found those whom the post-war Liberal 
Party attracted unattractive’.260 Berkeley’s reasoning behind him leaving the Conservative 
Party in the late 1960s was Heath’s destruction of ‘that part of the Conservative Party which I 
belonged – namely the liberal wing’. He wished his decision to be judged in relation to the 
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issues he cared most for: ‘immigration, race relations, Africa, the Commonwealth, and the 
United Nations’. Nonetheless, despite Thorpe’s invitation, Berkeley had no intention of 
joining the Liberal Party. Although he revered the liberal tradition – to which his father 
Reginald Berkeley made a contribution as a Liberal MP – he felt that ‘a radical, such as 
myself, is more likely to find a base for action within the Labour Party’.261  Nevertheless, he 
would go on to join the SDP in 1981 and then later rejoin Neil Kinnock’s Labour Party in 
1988 when the SDP merged with the Liberal Party to form the Liberal Democrats.262  
Another significant defector, but one who never held a parliamentary seat, was Gilbert 
Murray who from 1950 ceased voting Liberal and voted Conservative. Just as he was for the 
LNU, Murray was a highly active UNA President, rarely missing a meeting of its Council or 
its Executive Committee. Nevertheless, much of his activity was devoted to preventing UNA, 
with aid from the Conservative supporter Kathleen Courtney, from steering too far to the Left. 
However, Murray had not lost his liberalism. Instead, he considered that the best way to 
promote liberalism was to vote Conservative. He found himself at odds with much of UNA 
and liberals when he supported Eden’s actions in the Suez Crisis. He deemed the UN too 
weak to prevent Nasser from forming an anti-Western coalition of Arab states who in reality 
were led by the Soviet Union. He also found himself in disagreement with his former son-in-
law, Toynbee, when in his Reith Lectures in 1952 Toynbee had not asserted that Western 
civilisation was superior to those of Asia or Africa.263 
Berkeley and Murray were not alone in roaming the centre ground among those who 
worked for UNA and/or Chatham House. David Ennals ran as a Liberal parliamentary 
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candidate in the 1950 and 1951 general elections before joining the Labour Party later in the 
1950s.264 Peter Calvocoressi also ran as a Liberal parliamentary candidate in 1945 and was the 
first secretary of Liberal International, but from 1950 ‘regularly and unhesitatingly’ voted 
Labour.265 Furthermore, the UNA Executive Committee contained a number of MPs or peers 
who in the past or in the future defected, in addition to Berkeley they included: Megan Lloyd 
George (Liberal to Labour), Joan Vickers (National Liberal to Conservative), Christopher 
Mayhew (Labour to Liberal), John Roper (Labour Cooperative to SDP and later Liberal 
Democrat), Lord Chalfont (Labour to Liberal) and Reginald Prentice (Labour to 
Conservative).266 Mayhew also served on the Chatham House Council between 1950 and 
1952, while Roper would later be the Director of Studies succeeding William Wallace, now, 
like Roper, a Liberal Democrat peer.267  
Yet for the significance attached to international affairs among liberal and centrist 
politicians, even the Liberal Party was forced to come to the conclusion that matters of 
foreign policy were not the primary concern of voters come election time. Following a 
disastrous election in 1970, the Liberal Party began to take seriously the utilisation of an 
electoral strategy known as ‘community politics’ that had proved effective in gaining the 
party council seats, especially in Liverpool. The Party’s autumn assembly a few months after 
the election passed a resolution stating that it should focus its campaigning efforts at a 
community level, to help people take power and improve their communities. In theory this 
would enable to build upon local power bases, which would pay dividends at a parliamentary 
level.268 There was unease within the party, including from the former leader Jo Grimond, 
who helped develop the philosophy. He worried that such a policy could encourage activists 
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to merely taking up local grievances, for instance cracked pavements. Grievance politics 
could mean merely addressing the individual localised concerns of people without reference 
to national issues and indeed international issues.269 An early example was the Sutton and 
Cheam byelection in 1972, which was won by the Liberal candidate Graham Tope with a 
remarkable swing of 33%. Tope attributed his victory to persuading voters that he was ‘the 
local “action man” who got things done’. During the campaign, close attention was paid to 
local issues including traffic problems, which met some criticism within the Party down to 
fears that national issues, largely European integration, were being neglected. However, on 
the same day at a byelection in Uxbridge, the Liberal candidate who fought on such national 
issues lost his deposit.270 UNA encountered the new Liberal strategy in the 1974 general 
election. In its election postscript, New World lamented that ‘so long as the Liberals – and 
every other party in effect – can say in their election post-mortem “there are no votes in South 
African issues,” UNA hasn’t done its work half well enough. (For “South Africa” you can 
also read “the UN in general”)’.271 Internationalism and party politics were not ready 




In Chatham House's King-Hall model, there were two actors that were relied upon to inform 
the public understanding of international affairs, journalists and politicians. Chapter two 
detailed how the media performed poorly in this task. This chapter demonstrates that 
politicians were equally bad. Liberal internationalists had a strong understanding of 
globalisation that incentivised their attention to international affairs and the precedence they 
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paid to multilateral solutions. Party politics in Britain, given its inherently combative two-
party electoral system, was not well suited to emphasising global interdependence. It was very 
well suited to encouraging the impression of the bifurcation of foreign and domestic policy. 
Politicians were often ignorant about international affairs and unwilling to engage with them. 
Limited resources were in place to convince them otherwise. After the Second World War, 
international affairs slipped further and further down the political agenda. By the 1970s, while 
the world was being exposed for being as small as many liberal internationalists had already 
supposed, the political parties, even the Liberal Party, frequently treated foreign policy as an 
afterthought. The general consensus was that foreign policy did not win votes. Furthermore, 
foreign policy had the embarrassing habit of exposing internal party divisions or revealing 
uncomfortably similar attitudes between two main parties, be they on colonial self 
government or a wavering commitment to human rights. There was little incentive for 
politicians to explore every-day international issues. Those who did take an active interest in 
international affairs – the small legislature – were more likely to be already engaged in the 
activities of bodies such as UNA and Chatham House, but efforts to internationalise British 
political discourse, required a much greater number of converts.  
This need for many converts and consensus among politicians, justified UNA’s 
attempts to secure all-party status. Such a status provided both UNA and Chatham House with 
insider privileges and for Chatham House, greater intellectual legitimacy. However, while 
Chatham House attained greater balance of affiliation among the parties as more members of 
the labour movement became involved, UNA’s all-party status came under attack as its 
resolutions came into disrepute among Conservatives. The importance of maintaining such a 
status would appear to have been neglected on occasion by UNA’s own staff as apparent in 
the Berkeley/Ennals split in the late 1960s. The advice provided to Frank Hooley that 





have the ‘establishment type’ (non-socialist) chairman was an uncomfortable truth and 
perhaps members of UNA staff should have done more to attempt to both attract 
Conservatives and prevent them from resigning their membership. However, such a task 
would not have been easy given the Rightward direction the Conservative Party was taking 
illustrated by Home’s Berwick-upon-Tweed speech and Heath’s objections to the Race 
Relations Act. The task would become even harder under Thatcher.  
Nevertheless, it should not be understated how both Chatham House and UNA held 
significant sway within the three parties. Chatham House in particular was an important 
resource for politicians who were otherwise woefully underequipped. The Institute received 
regular mentions in parliamentary debates and reports, and was utilised by party research 
departments, especially Healey’s in the 1950s. Moreover, it contributed to the long term 
direction of foreign policy by helping to determine the climate in which the executive 
operated within. Toynbee acted as an advisor to R.A. Butler’s committee tasked with 
establishing Conservative postwar policy. Furthermore, Attlee keenly used the FRPS to help 
determine war aims and its papers notably assisted the party in its transition toward the 
adoption of muscular internationalism, exemplified by Bevin’s foreign policy. Although the 
extent of commitment varied, many politicians were consistently attentive to UNA activities. 
They joined UNAPPG, answered UNA questionnaires and debated within its local all-party 
meetings. Party leaders obviously recognised enough political capital within the organisation 
to contribute to its publications and address it General Council. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
while out of office, the policies of UNA and Labour were such for Conservatives to suspect 
collusion. This may, of course, have been attributable to David Ennals’s tenure as 
International Secretary, who might have been only too keen to improve the party’s links with 
a body of opinion that supported multilateral disarmament while the Left of the Party assessed 





limited resources, both in terms of MPs and administration, its members often had strong 
affiliations with both UNA and Chatham House. Moreover, its political ideology was the 
most aligned to UNA and Chatham House thinking. Furthermore, the centre ground in which 
Liberals operated was occupied by many of UNA and Chatham House’s political supporters, 
some of whom even defected, motivated in part by a desire to find a party whose foreign 
policy was more suited to their own thinking.  
However, such defections were symptomatic of the willingness of political parties to 
put party politics and political gain before their professed internationalist ideals. It hindered 
UNA’s endeavours to put the UN at heart of British foreign policy and stunted the hopes of 
those personnel within Chatham House who called for greater accountability of foreign policy 
in parliament and, of course, a stronger commitment to European integration. The political 
parties played a significant role in obscuring the liberal internationalist vision from the British 
people. It was a positive vision that sought to navigate Britain through increasing 
globalisation and improve people's lives at home and abroad. However, British party politics, 








Conclusion: Whatever Happened to  
Liberal Internationalism? 
 
In twentieth century Britain, the politics of foreign policy did much to create the impression 
that foreign policy was a lot more foreign than it actually was. On the relatively few occasions 
when international matters were presented to the public it was often done so in a skewed 
manner. Whitehall was guilty of obscurantism. Party politics encouraged the illusion that 
international and domestic affairs were separate. Liberal internationalism had already suffered 
an immense blow as a result of the Second World War, but was then soon followed by Cold 
War power politics. The lives of liberal internationalists were only made more difficult by the 
structures inherent within the politics of foreign policy that had the effect of shutting out 
much of the outside world from public view and discouraging them from engaging with it. 
UNA struggled to retain and attract new members, and secure the attention of the media, 
politicians and officials. Chatham House rejected Waldorf Astor’s vision for direct 
engagement with the public and instead placed too much trust in political, official and media 
elites to inform the public sufficiently in international affairs and convey its importance. 
Postwar liberal internationalism fractured and its adherents moved away from such traditional 
bastions. Others grew fatalistic and apathetic. Liberal internationalism failed to inspire the 
British public with their vision for Britain’s postwar international role. However, this final 
chapter is not an obituary. Liberal internationalism still lives in Britain as do Chatham House 










THE FRACTURING OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM 
 
In 1945, a British liberal internationalist who looked toward the postwar world order and the 
activities of Chatham House and the UNA could be forgiven for being cautiously optimistic. 
Out of the ashes of the old League of Nations came a new United Nations whose Charter and 
apparatus were designed to avoid the errors of the past. The Security Council would consist of 
wartime allies and the use of the veto, although controversial, would surely only be very 
rarely employed in the most extreme circumstances. There was talk that there could be a 
federal union of Europe and that Britain might even take a leading role and for once and for 
all end its peacetime isolationism against the continent.   
At home, the vast majority of members who had retained their membership with the 
LNU during the war, all 46,607 of them, had now transferred their patronage to UNA and 
were joined by nearly 30,000 new members within a space of months. There were large rallies 
addressed by the most senior statesmen of the age. UN Day was celebrated up and down the 
country. UN flags flew over town halls and various civil society groups lent their support to 
their local UNA branch where the public debated how to deal with the international 
challenges confronting this brave new world. Waldorf Astor laboured away to realise his new 
vision for Chatham House, one that directly educated the public in international affairs. The 
Institute’s collaboration with ABCA had been a great success and there was now to be a 
peacetime ABCA, the BCA, whose long life could only be assured by the extensive public 
interest in current affairs revealed during the war. Astor had many influential supporters 
within the Institute who advocated that it should produce publications for secondary schools 
and invite their teachers to its courses. Chatham House branches were also growing outside of 
London in Manchester, Newcastle and Durham. Recommendations were made that through 
such branches, and possibly later university branches, Chatham House could secure lecturers 





there should be a new category of membership that would welcome a broader section of 
opinion. Perhaps even ‘the man in the street’ could become a Chatham House member. Who 
said liberal internationalism was dead? Even E.H. Carr had felt that his pre-war concerns over 
the efficacy of international organisations had been largely addressed.  
Our liberal internationalist could also be forgiven for being quickly disappointed. 
Disagreements over the Iran Crisis in 1946 prompted the Soviet Union ambassador to walk 
out of the Security Council in an ominous sign of the power politics that would come to 
define the Cold War. 1949 would see the Soviet Union develop its own atomic bomb, igniting 
a nuclear arms race. Furthermore, neither Attlee nor Churchill’s government showed 
meaningful enthusiasm towards the idea of Britain joining a form of intergovernmental union 
with Europe. Britain took no part in the ECSC. Even if they had done, the Schuman Plan did 
not necessitate federalism as would be understood by Lionel Curtis or Astor.1 Perhaps our 
liberal internationalist would have, like Gilbert Murray, lamented the apparent retreat of 
liberal imperialism. Or perhaps they protested against the British government’s exile of 
Seretse Kharma from Bechuanaland and the plans to establish a Central African Federation 
without reference to the black majority. Likewise, again like Murray, our liberal 
internationalist could have supported Britain’s invasion of Egypt in 1956 and opposed the UN 
and UNA’s subsequent condemnation. They may have even, unlike Murray, left UNA. Or 
perhaps they emphatically supported UNA’s stance on the Suez Crisis and it had inspired in 
them a new fervour to get involved with UNA activities.  
Either way, in light of the fact that international politics was not working to our liberal 
internationalist’s favour, they might have welcomed the obvious appetite for humanitarian 
causes among the public in the 1950s, which UNA promoted on behalf of numerous UN 
agencies. International politics was not being brought to the public by the BCA, which had 
                                                             





dissolved in 1951, and Chatham House was proving reluctant to engage with the wider public. 
Politicians who saw few votes in foreign policy avoided the topic. At least through 
humanitarianism, the British people appeared to be engaging with the outside world. 
Nevertheless, like Kathleen Courtney, our liberal internationalist might have had some 
misgivings. They could have worried about the depoliticised nature of the campaigns on 
problems that ultimately rested upon politics. Perhaps they felt that NGOs such as Oxfam and 
Save the Children had failed to draw sufficient attention to this, or perhaps they had become 
so disillusioned with international politics that this factor contributed to a decision to join 
such NGOs. In the late 1950s and 1960s, they might have been alarmed by the rise of new 
social movements. CND may have sparked the interest of their children, but its faith in itself 
to provide a substitute form of political democracy for Westminster and its confidence in the 
merits of unilateral disarmament might have left our liberal internationalist unconvinced. 
Alternatively, frustrated with the political classes, they might have joined a march to 
Aldermaston with their children in tow.  
Another path was open to our liberal internationalist that was more focussed on 
domestic politics. Perhaps in the 1960s or the 1970s, during detente, when foreign policy 
crises seemed that little bit more distant and poverty was being rediscovered in Britain, they 
could have devoted their limited free time or money to supporting the Child Poverty Action 
Group or Shelter or any of the myriad of other NGOs who sought to end social problems at 
home. Perhaps such causes were more worthy of such devotion as they promised a greater 
chance of success than that of liberal internationalism. Even if the peoples of the world could 
find common ground, governments seemed incapable of doing so. What could the individual 
do? What even could UNA do? UNA’s last attempt to reach 100,000 members had failed in 





1970s, UNA’s membership would only continue to decline while it failed to plug the gap with 
new young members.  
If Chatham House’s executive still hoped to shape public opinion, it was certainly not 
by means of engaging the public directly. Unbeknownst to our liberal internationalist, its 
Director Kenneth Younger had attempted to get funding from the foreign office for public 
education on international matters such as on Europe in the early 1960s, but had been 
unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the functionalism he promoted did not necessitate the same public 
faith to ensure its sustainability that federalism did, at least not in the short term. Not long 
after Younger’s proposal to the Foreign Office, Younger put the responsibility for reversing 
public apathy towards international affairs at Parliament’s door. In 1970, the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Institute, Younger supported its founders’ decision not to engage with the 
wider public, judging that the interest of politicians and journalists must first be aroused. Yet 
in the same article, Younger recognised significant public apathy despite the efforts by these 
elites.2 Perhaps our liberal internationalist, unlike many others, would have retained their 
membership of UNA in the 1970s and read issues of New World lamenting that neither 
politicians nor journalists were willing to discuss international affairs. Perhaps she or he 
would have been worried by the lacklustre campaigns that surrounded the referendum on EEC 
membership. Perhaps they would have sympathised with Andrew Shonfield when he grew 
bewildered by the lack of such attention to international affairs while a new stage of increased 
globalisation was met with a failure to comprehend that international coordination was 
necessary to maintain a mixed economy.  The democratisation of foreign policy was proving 
increasingly important and yet increasingly elusive.  
                                                             






 Amid this fracturing of liberal internationalism, our liberal internationalist might have 
taken any one of these routes available to them or indeed they could have decided to leave all 
forms of activism altogether having grown apathetic with the postwar world. Not unlike the 
supporters and members of the Liberal Party, liberal internationalists became a diaspora. But, 
just as with those former supporters of the Liberal Party, this did not necessitate dramatic 
ideological changes. Liberal internationalists adapted to new environments and remained 
influential within them. Liberalism and liberal international thought helped condition CND, 
the anti-apartheid movement and, of course, Amnesty International.3 Furthermore, NGOs 
gravitated towards those international organisations that crowned liberal internationalist 
efforts, especially the UN and its agencies, to legitimise their aims and activities, and 
influence the intergovernmental organisations.4 As has been shown here, UNA was not the 
only NGO to organise the British response to the international campaigns of the UN’s 
agencies.5 What had changed, however, was the evasion of international politics, the declining 
faith in the merits or possibility of international political integration and the declining 
deference to Westminster and the political establishment. NGOs became far more involved 
with the UN’s agencies than they did with lobbying the British government to take day-to-day 
actions within the UN’s apparatus. This was exemplified in the trajectories of our two 
bastions of interwar liberal internationalism. UNA lost its claim to representing a mass 
membership. Chatham House rapidly backtracked from Astor’s vision of the Institute’s 
postwar direction, became decreasingly impressed by the power of public opinion and 
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focussed evermore on elite opinion and the need to become “policy relevant” within 
Whitehall. In the politics of foreign policy, as elsewhere, elites and the general public were 
disconnected.    
 
 
MORE SINNED AGAINST THAN SINNING? 
However, this does not invalidate the examination of Chatham House, UNA and liberal 
internationalism more broadly in a study of the democratisation of foreign policy. Chatham 
House and UNA provided important political participatory spaces for those elites outside of 
government and the wider public. Chatham House influenced the political parties and 
individual MPs. Most notably, through Arnold J. Toynbee it impacted upon the direction of 
the Attlee government’s international policy. It informed the media’s international coverage 
and provided a valued forum and unofficial representation for the Foreign Office. UNA 
maintained a significantly large membership for much of the period and its impact on public 
opinion was taken seriously within Whitehall, Westminster and the party political 
organisations. Ministers may have often ultimately only paid lip-service to the UNA’s aims, 
but they adapted their rhetoric accordingly and implemented some policies, however half-
heartedly, which were designed to obtain the approval of UNA supporters. Both Chatham 
House and UNA dynamised foreign policy debate within Britain and acted as important 
democratisers of a policy whose institutions were (and are) notoriously reluctant to be 
democratised. Additionally, their failures to democratise foreign policy further, despite the 
two organisations’ close connections with and continued deference towards the political 
establishment, afford valuable insights into what prevented them and other NGOs from being 
more effective at promoting greater public interest in international affairs, and at ushering the 





 By both examining Chatham House and UNA and the institutions which they 
attempted to influence, it is apparent that a series of informal and formal structures erected by 
the media, Whitehall, Westminster and party political organisations seriously hindered the 
democratisation of foreign policy. Chapter two shows that although the BBC and the 
“quality” press may have used the services of Chatham House to inform their output, the 
“popular” press had little interest in the Institute and in international affairs more generally. 
As is apparent in UNA’s relationship with the media, even the BBC and “quality press” were 
often reluctant to report international affairs. Such reportage was costly, logistically 
complicated and unpopular among the public. This was only exacerbated by the methodology 
behind news construction and selection that rested upon hooks designed to get the attention of 
their audience. It was believed that these hooks needed to be topical and easily relatable to the 
intended audience. The multifaceted nature of international affairs thus did not lend itself well 
to sustained commentary or in-depth analyses of countries or cultures with institutions 
deemed alien to Britons. This fuelled the crisis/non-crisis axiom and the general 
ethnocentrism of international coverage.  
 The public understanding of international affairs likely suffered as a result given its 
especial dependence upon media coverage of issues and places that many would never 
directly come into contact with. Ignorance naturally prevailed. The skewed picture that 
resulted from the emphasis on crises that divided peoples presented the outside world as 
dangerous, unfriendly and bizarre. The quickening pace of globalisation (and thus the 
significance of the political integration liberal internationalists were preaching) was shrouded 
from view as little attention was given to non-crises that largely defined it. International 
political and economic coordination were deemed far too uninteresting however much they 
impacted upon the everyday lives of the British people. The more comprehensive coverage 





affairs, such as David Astor’s Observer, and broadcasts for the BBC’s Third Programme and, 
if it was deemed topical enough for television, on shows such as Panorama. Chatham 
House’s ‘man in the street’ was the most neglected and yet likely the most vulnerable to 
international political and economic forces. Such media coverage encouraged nationalism not 
internationalism. Little help was on offer from Whitehall or Westminster.  
 Chapter three reveals that Chatham House was possibly the most influential NGO in 
the Foreign Office. However, this may tell us more about the Foreign Office than it does 
about Chatham House. After finding the FRPS’s work so valuable during the Second World 
War that it felt the need to nationalise it as FORD, it was quick to ensure that Chatham House 
staff departed without too many privileges. The Institute’s work remained respected, but the 
Foreign Office appears to have been more impressed by the use of the Institute as a forum for 
domestic and foreign elites than by its research. There was early promise with the 
establishment of the Planning Staff in 1964 that solicited the advice of Chatham House, but 
by the 1970s the Institute’s research came under criticism for not being ‘policy relevant’. 
However, as the Plowden and Slater reports had observed the Foreign Office earned much of 
the criticism that it dedicated too little attention to medium and long term planning and that it 
insufficiently engaged with NGOs. It thus seems doubly unfortunate that after Chatham 
House, on the encouragement of the Foreign Office, established the PSU and undertook 
inroads into international relations theory, that a Permanent Under-Secretary in the mid-1990s 
doubted the influence international relations theory had on practitioners. Its products were 
deemed ‘remote from the practical business of conducting foreign policy’. The Planning Staff 
drew on the expertise from organisations such as Chatham House, but policy-makers outside 
that department had limited time for extensive reading of academic work.6 As Zara Steiner 
                                                             





has noted ‘the cult of common sense’ prevailed at the Foreign Office.7 While Britain adjusted 
to a new world order after the Second World War, the Foreign Office did little to innovate.  
 The reactionary nature of the Foreign Office was hardly conducive with 
democratisation. UNA was respected within Whitehall as it was understood to represent a 
significant section of opinion engaged with international affairs. Civil servants took time to 
analyse UNA’s policy proposals in order to prepare their ministers for its deputations. 
However, they did little to meaningfully change policy. They nevertheless sought to 
encourage UNA so that it might help canalise opinion away from more radical positions. 
More generally, the Foreign Office opposed the creation of a Select Committee on Foreign 
Affairs; failed to revive the pre-1914 tradition of producing an annual white paper on the 
government’s foreign policy to enable regular parliamentary scrutiny; and proved highly 
reluctant to release information especially on potential policy alternatives considered within 
Whitehall. It was apt that one of Britain’s first initiatives on joining the EEC was to press its 
partners to tighten security on discussions of policy.  
  Chapter four has demonstrated that although politicians addressed UNA rallies, took 
part in UN Day celebrations and accepted invitations to debate international affairs with their 
opponents within UNA branches, both Chatham House and UNA struggled to internationalise 
British political discourse. MPs who were interested in international affairs often engaged 
with the publications and activities of Chatham House and UNA, but they were limited in 
number. A smaller pool of MPs to influence had its benefits. But it proved troublesome when 
attempting to get the legislature to hold the government to account and when endeavouring to 
stir interest in foreign policy among the electorate. The House of Commons Library was ill-
equipped to deal with international matters in the detail they required and often so were the 
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research departments of the political parties. Party politics also had a nasty habit of 
stimulating divisions among liberal internationalists. In those constituencies where there was 
much support for one party, the makeup of the local UNA branch tended to reflect this and 
this had the potential to alienate local internationalists who supported rival parties.  Party 
politics could also fuel existing personality clashes within UNA headquarters, notably 
between Humphry Berkeley and John Ennals.  
 Divisions within the political parties were even more damaging. Labour was divided 
on a number of key foreign policy issues such as disarmament, Europe, decolonisation and the 
Anglo-American relationship. Foreign policy became the weapon of choice to fight for the 
future direction of the party, be it between Gaitskell and Bevan or Jenkins and Benn. Leaders 
of the party worked hard to draw attention from foreign policy so as to not reveal the division 
within the party. As for the Conservative Party, many proved reluctant to see the end of 
empire and challenged the UN’s authority to intervene in areas deemed beyond their 
jurisdiction. UNA’s stance during the Suez Crisis lifted the veil on the political nature of 
internationalism and a good many Conservatives disliked what they saw. This hindered 
Conservative Central Office’s attempts to recruit Conservatives into UNA to offset the 
(exaggerated) influence of socialism upon the body. Finally, the Liberal Party was intimately 
involved with Chatham House and UNA and their objectives, but their small size and limited 
resources made it difficult to push international affairs up the agenda in political debate. 
When they did increase in size and number, although the community politics that helped their 
revival was intended (at least by Jo Grimond) to engage people with international affairs by 
showing them how it impacted upon their lives at the local level, in practice activists often 
avoided discussion of foreign policy. In the 1970s, many within the party appeared to have 
begun to adhere to the old maxim, shared by many of their rivals, that foreign policy does not 





 Through ignorance and political motivation, politicians were perhaps the worst 
culprits for promoting the illusory bifurcation of domestic and international affairs. In 
combination, Whitehall’s reticence to innovate and release its grip over the foreign policy 
process and party political and media disengagement with international affairs severely 
handicapped the democratisation of foreign policy. Furthermore, in a number of ways they 
prevented Chatham House, UNA and other NGOs from further democratising it. These 
restrictions imposed upon the democratisation of foreign policy prevented the proper 
engagement of the public with international affairs and undermined the sustainability of 
policy directions. Even in 1973 ministers and civil servants were arguing in private that public 
hesitancy over the EEC limited the government from pursuing anything but a minimalist 
policy within Europe.8 The restricted democratisation of foreign policy was not merely unjust, 




So were Chatham House and UNA more sinned against than sinning? Their efforts were 
certainly frustrated by the formal and informal structures erected by the above. However, the 
elitism inherent in both organisations that harked back to the days of Curtis and Cecil 
conditioned them to pay too much deference to institutions that were hindering liberal 
internationalism from gaining greater purchase over postwar Britain. Curtis hoped that by 
convincing the political elite of the merits of international integration, that they in turn would 
create ‘right’ opinion among the public. UNA adopted a less elitist strategy by mobilising the 
public and directly educating them. Yet although they campaigned for a myriad of causes, 
they did not do so, for instance, for greater accountability of the Foreign Office to the 
legislature or for a more internationalist school curriculum.  
                                                             





However, although both organisations had announced frustrations with the individual 
structures, there was little in the way of understanding of the structures inherent within the 
foreign policy process as a whole. It would have been difficult to have seen the wood for the 
trees, as indeed it is now even with the benefit of hindsight. Political scientists had only really 
attempted to see the policy process as a whole in the late 1960s and then there was a wait for 
the more comprehensive analysis, which was appropriately William Wallace’s The Foreign 
Policy Process published by Chatham House in the mid 1970s.9 Furthermore, suspicions over 
the limitations of influence were hardly something which the organisations would wish to 
broadcast to their respective memberships. Although, it should be noted that Wallace’s 
account of Chatham House observed the mixed attitudes towards its research within the 
Foreign Office.10  
 Of course, the freedom of the two organisations to criticise those institutions that were 
inhibiting the liberal internationalist cause was limited by the need not to endanger their 
insider privileges and all-party statuses. It is thus a shame that both organisations did not 
focus more on one of the safest, albeit slow, routes of influence, public education. The CEWC 
remained an agency of UNA when it should have arguably played a more central role. 
Furthermore, when UNA was experiencing financial difficulties in the 1960s, it was the 
CEWC and UNSA that were first to take the brunt of the cutbacks. In the 1968 membership 
campaign, it may have been a wiser course of action to focus its resources more on young 
people. Not only might this have swelled UNA’s membership and made it more sustainable, 
as the educational activities of the LNU did theirs, but it may have inspired young people to 
exert more pressure on their parliament, their government and their media outlets, to 
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dismantle restrictive structures and push for a more democratised foreign policy.11 In this, the 
abandonment of Astor’s vision for Chatham House also represented a lost opportunity. Astor 
did not seek to risk potentially counterproductive competition by supplanting existing 
educational organisations, instead he wished to support them; to “piggy-back” on their 
cultural authority. The King-Hall model provided an ineffective alternative. For example, 
Wallace’s The Foreign Policy Process was an often damning indictment of that process, yet it 
received little media attention. It appears that any debate it might have stimulated was largely 
limited to academia.12   
 Nonetheless, both organisations did have more direct methods at their disposal to 
make an impact on the obstructions that prevented a more democratised foreign policy. They 
were consensus builders, actors of ‘middle opinion’ and the rising professionals that had 
worked to make liberal internationalist ideas acceptable among elite opinion.13 The political 
establishment should not be understood as a monolithic and solely reactionary entity. 
Government did not think with one mind.14 Such an understanding can encourage a hazardous 
penchant to conceive the relationship between non-state and state actors or that between the 
public and elites as one that only exists within a “them” versus “us” axiom.15 Yet Chatham 
House and UNA made inroads to receptive audiences. Within the Foreign Office, UNA could 
rely on a sympathetic ear within the UN Department; while Chatham House could rely on the 
Planning Staff. There were also the many parliamentary contacts they enjoyed. Both 
organisations did valuable work in informing MPs and pushing international affairs on to their 
                                                             
11 See H. McCarthy, The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, Citizenship and 
Internationalism, c.1918-45 (Manchester, 2011), ch.4. 
12 See D. Spanier, ‘Mapping a future for the Foreign Office’, The Times, 1 Mar 1976, 1; N. Beloff, ‘Who needs a 
Foreign Office?’, Observer, 29 Feb 1976, 10. 
13 A. Marwick, ‘Middle Opinion in the Thirties: Planning, Progress and Political “Agreement”’, English 
Historical Review, lxxix (1964), 285-298; H. Perkin, Rise of a Professional Society: England Since 1880 (1st 
edn, 1989; London, 2002). 
14 See E.C. Page and B. Jenkins, Policy Bureaucracy: Government with a Cast of Thousands (Oxford 2005). 
15 For the dangers of such conceptions within a “them” versus “us” axiom, see D. Cannadine, The Undivided 





agenda. Chatham House staff did encourage the creation of a select committee for foreign 
affairs and (unsuccessfully) encouraged the revival of the annual white papers on foreign 
policy. Such innovations and proposed reinventions were hardly game-changers but were, and 
would be, valuable for democratisation. Again, however, although much work was done to 
promote certain foreign policy directions by UNA and Chatham House – even to the extent of 
offending elements of elite opinion on a number of occasions – comparatively little was done 
to promote change to the foreign policy process. 
 It would appear, however, that there was an approaching expiry date on such methods. 
Harold Perkin argued that as the economic crisis of the 1970s stimulated questions over the 
future of Keynesian economic practice, there was also a ‘much more general backlash against 
professional society in all of its aspects’. This was not an attack on professional society itself; 
rather what had been ignited was a cannibalistic struggle between the public and private 
sector professionals. The latter targeted the state supported professions, “big government” and 
special interest groups blamed for consuming national resources through government grants 
and subsidies. The attack on the last target amounted to an assault on corporatism, or at least 
those non-state actors who did not necessarily support the government’s view.16 Ultimately, 
neoliberal centralisation hindered the influence of ‘middle opinion’ that had helped to 
establish the Keynesian-Beveridgean consensus.  
 Anxieties over the governability of democracies that placed too much emphasis on 
social participation went into the ascendancy during the 1970s. In 1975, the Trilateral 
Commission, a group formed two years before that consisted of social scientists, government 
officials and businessmen from Western Europe, America and Japan, published a widely read 
report entitled The Crisis of Democracy. In it the French sociologist Michel Crozier 
                                                             






complained that ‘European political systems are overloaded with participants and demands’. 
Government was too open. It had abandoned the ‘traditional model of screening and 
government by distance’ and was now threatened by entropy. Too many resources had been 
devoted to satisfying the interests of the multitude of ‘intellectuals, would-be intellectuals, 
and para-intellectuals’ who frustrated cohesiveness and prevented strong moral leadership.17  
 The true extent of the impact that neoliberal thinking had on Chatham House and 
UNA’s relationship with Westminster, Whitehall and the media remains to be seen. However, 
Thatcher’s government was far less sympathetic to the Foreign Office’s spending habits and 
its grants in aid. Those grants provided to Chatham House and UNA by both Labour and 
Conservative government in the late 1960s and 1970s were quickly cut in 1979. Chatham 
House’s grant ended in 1980, UNA’s continued at least until 1990 though it only amounted to 
about one tenth of its income.18 It is also possible that the Foreign Office’s growing emphasis 
that Chatham House ought to be more “policy relevant” was encouraged by neoliberal 
concerns over regulating the use of external expertise in government. Things would only get 
worse before they got better. 
 
 
AFTER THE SEVENTIES 
Chatham House’s financial problems continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s and 
they served to exacerbate the conviction that the Institute was not “policy relevant” enough. 
The library, in particular, suffered from the resultant cuts and its staff was reduced from 
thirteen to five. The press cutting department, that had once been deemed highly valuable by 
Whitehall, was now totally abandoned. Furthermore, financial constraints forced the Institute 
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to let the strong links it had enjoyed with the United States in the past dwindle, while other 
thinks-tanks such as the IISS strengthened theirs.19 As has been demonstrated here, Chatham 
House was not insensitive to the perceived needs to be seen as more relevant and it continued 
to be so. In the 1980s, the library removed its ‘purely historical collections, while retaining 
essential material relating to current issues and unresolved conflicts’.20 It was also observed in 
the 1990s, that when the Institute chose topics to research that they were ‘closely tailored to 
perceived government needs and inhibited in posing unwelcome topics’. It was understood to 
be an informal hangover of the Institute’s FRPS days.21 In the 1990s, the Foreign Office was 
still known to ‘vet’ certain Chatham House papers before publication.22 
However, the emphasis on ‘policy relevance’ and the move away from historical 
analysis did create tensions. In 1995, Laurence Martin, the Director of the Institute (1991-
1996), contended that Chatham House’s ‘impact on the wider world of public and politicians 
might be greater if it more often risked the sweeping generalization’.23 Whitehall would 
appear, however, to prefer that the Institute not risk them. In government, the Institute’s 
central direction was perceived as ‘diffuse at a time when other mainstream think-tanks have 
focussed on the urgent complex challenges – in political, economic and defence terms – 
facing Britain’. Chatham House ‘gave the impression within Whitehall of being somewhat 
semi-detached with the dilettante interest of academe’.24 It would appear that the Foreign 
Office still prefers the big picture, at least as far as they can see it, to be left to them. Such an 
arrangement helps ensure that any innovations to be afforded by such a perspective are made 
within the more comfortable confines of Whitehall.  
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Nevertheless, the Institute’s ties with Whitehall remained relatively strong. Chatham 
House still enjoyed good relations with the Planning Staff into the 1990s.25 The authority of 
the Institute received a boost, especially in relation to European policy, when in 1992 it hosted 
a prestigious conference on the ‘Europe and the World after 1992’. The conference, in which 
over four hundred delegates took part from sixty-five countries, was convened in association 
with the Foreign Office and the European Commission. However, the Institute had little input 
on the selection of the speakers. Three years later, it convened a larger conference, ‘Britain 
and the World’, which was addressed by the Prime Minister John Major, the Foreign 
Secretary Douglas Hurd and Henry Kissinger.26 In the twenty-first century, Foreign Office 
diplomats occasionally take a year out for study and research at the Institute. The Foreign 
Office still possesses corporate membership and at least in 2004 it was providing a grant of 
£50,000 for research programmes.27 Today, in 2015, three members of the Chatham House 
Council are former British diplomats, including Jeremy Greenstock, the Chairman of UNA 
and former ambassador to the UN.28  
UNA’s direction after the 1970s is less clear; it tellingly attracted far less attention 
from contemporary scholars and commentators. In 1982 The Guardian was inspired to revisit 
UNA to gather its reaction to the Falklands War. Evidently, the media’s international output 
still rested on crises. The article began with a question: ‘Remember the United Nations 
Association?’ It reminded its readers of its opposition to the government with regard to 
Rhodesia in the 1960s and of the split between Berkeley and Ennals ‘whose mutual 
recriminations were as intense as those bartered at the average meeting of the Security 
Council’. Since then, it observed, that news from the ‘dwindling UNA’ had been very 
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scarce.29 Although it may have passed many within the media by, UNA still lived on and 
despite having relocated its headquarters to Whitehall Court, UNA’s relations with its new 
neighbours were not always easy. UNA launched a campaign against Britain’s decision to 
withdraw from UNESCO in 1985 that included many MPs from all parties, from UNAPPG 
and from the new Select Committee for Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office still 
received their deputations in the 1980s. UNA also campaigned on humanitarian aid and in 
light of the growing concerns surrounding it, the environment.30 Its relations with CND 
appear to have improved. Indeed UNA’s long-time Director Malcolm Harper (1982-2004) 
was also a member of CND. Harper argued that he had ‘never met a unilateralist who isn’t a 
multilateralist too’. 31 UNA still provided a home for those people who liked to have a little 
more politics in their internationalist campaigns. Harper had formerly worked with Oxfam for 
eighteen years, but had decided to take up the directorship of UNA because he ‘wanted to get 
more involved in the politics of development and disarmament than Oxfam could’.32    
Nevertheless, UNA still found it necessary to work with such NGOs in order to bring 
attention to their causes. In 1975 it established the Human Rights Network, an informal 
coordinating committee that included Amnesty International, the National Council for Civil 
Liberties and the Anti-Slavery Society.33 Of course, this had precedent in UNA’s coordination 
of Britain’s response to the UNICEF and Freedom from Hunger campaigns in the 1950s 
among others. However, they now acquired a greater urgency. New World noted in its 
postscript of ‘the selfish election’ of October 1974 that ‘in the present chauvinist climate we 
will probably only make a worthwhile impact...in conjunction with other like-minded 
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organisations’.34 If we fast forward to 2011, in a four year strategic plan, UNA stressed the 
need to ‘work with partners on high-visibility campaigns’ to increase UNA and the UN’s 
profile in Britain.35   
Today, in a direction that Nigel Nicolson might have approved of when he 
recommended that UNA ought to become a think-tank, UNA publicises itself first as ‘the 
UK’s leading source of independent analysis on the UN’ and then second as ‘a UK-wide 
grassroots movement’.36 Presumably UNA’s apparent greater focus on policy analysis by its 
policy committees is the result of its now small membership. However, UNA contends that 
‘UNA-UK was unique among NGOs in that it gathered grassroots opinion on its policy work 
which gave it legitimacy in undertaking advocacy and campaigning.’37 UNA still engages in 
educational work and since the closure of the UN Information Centre in London, it has 
absorbed much of its work. New World still attracts some high profile contributors, including 
the former Foreign Secretary William Hague. Reassuringly, the aforementioned strategic plan 
seeks to boost its membership with a special focus on young people from under-18s to young 
adults, university students and young professionals. Retired people are still a target and given 
the contribution of that demographic to the continued survival of UNA in the past, they are 
rightly so.38   
Chatham House and UNA live on. In the 2015 general election campaign, a campaign 
that bewildered international observers in its parochialism, Chatham House (ranked number 
one think-tank outside the USA) was the venue for one of the very few speeches on foreign 
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policy and UNA launched its own manifesto in an attempt to make foreign policy a priority.39 
Nevertheless, after 1945 their influence among elite and public opinion declined. The two 
organisations were by no means faultless, but they struggled against adverse conditions that 
were exacerbated by the practices of the state, the party political machine and the media. 
Things appear to have only got worse with the rise of neoliberalism, which undermined the 
internationalist and corporatist foundations of collectivism that new liberalism had helped lay. 
So has liberal internationalism now departed Britain? Certainly, the interwar and indeed 
postwar faith in international integration and international political cooperation has suffered a 
heavy blow. But many liberal internationalists found new homes away from the old bastion of 
the LNU; homes that made internationalism appear less political and homes that were less 
quiet and more exciting. There were also homes for those internationalists who recognised 
that there were plenty of problems within Britain that deserved their support. With so much 
internationalist activism in postwar Britain and while elites still at the very least pay lip-
service to liberal internationalist institutions such as the UN and the EU, it would be churlish 
and inaccurate to proclaim that liberal internationalism had at some point fractured beyond 
recognition. When analyses go beyond treating liberal internationalists as mere ‘minority 
sects’ their expansive influence becomes much more discernible.40  
The same can be said for the politics of foreign policy when examined more as a 
whole rather than in terms of individual structures. What is discernible from such a 
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perspective, however, is a bleak picture for internationalists, be they socialist, liberal or 
conservative. It is evident that in both collectivist and neoliberal systems, the politics of 
foreign policy handicaps the popular and elite purchase of internationalism. Furthermore, it is 
part of a broader political system in Britain, also apparent in domestic politics, which has 
continually failed to engage the public and presided over a historic disconnect between elites 
and the public.41 The questions that arise from this disconnect go right back to those 
nineteenth century anxieties over the need to direct increasingly empowered citizens to the 
‘right’ thinking that had helped establish Chatham House and LNU/UNA. In 1879, the social 
critic Matthew Arnold whose ideas would help inspire the formation and work of the WEA 
concluded: ‘The difficulty for democracy is, how to find and keep high ideals’.42 Democracy 




There are perhaps three broader implications for the study of modern British politics that 
might be extrapolated from this thesis. Firstly, the bifurcation of domestic and foreign policy 
is illusory. There was a strong domestic context to the foreign policy process. Chatham 
House, UNA, other NGOs, the media and public opinion (be it at a localised level or on a 
national scale) played a significant role in that process especially in terms of agenda-setting. If 
the politics of foreign policy in Britain, and by extension its international policy, was 
ultimately reactionary it was a result of domestically imposed structures in addition to 
external ones. Small and medium sized powers can still practise innovative foreign policy. 
Britain’s relative decline in power did not necessitate a reactionary foreign policy. However, 
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the inability and lack of willing among policy makers to mobilise public opinion to ensure 
that innovations were sustainable or could be properly exploited for the benefit of the people 
certainly helped to ensure a reactionary foreign policy. The rise of a mass society and its 
interdependent accompaniment globalisation prevented the primacy of foreign policy.  
It also prevented the primacy of domestic policy. There was a strong foreign context to 
the domestic policy process. This is especially apparent in the relationship between 
internationalism and collectivism and later neoliberalism. More work is required to 
complement existing studies to assess the suppositions made at Chatham House in the 1970s 
and 1980s by Andrew Shonfield and fellow economist Susan Strange that held that 
Keynesianism was undermined because of a neglect of the importance of international issues 
by both the Left and Right in a variety of countries.43 The evidence amounted here would 
suggest that given the general neglect of international affairs in British political discourse that 
the international elements of Keynesian thought, like many other aspects, were neglected. 
Was it so elsewhere? The Bretton Woods system required maintenance that Britain and 
crucially other countries appear to have been reluctant or uninterested in providing. The 
agency of the international sphere must be properly appreciated. Unfortunately, British 
political historians, like policy-makers, have been guilty of assuming the bifurcation of the 
international and domestic. This appears to be especially the case in the manner it is practiced 
within Britain where many works, including this one, shy away from comparative analysis 
with other countries.44 Furthermore, attempts to synthesise the international and domestic 
spheres inevitably leads to the question of how to attribute the correct balance of significance 
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to domestic and transnational cultural processes and internal and external structural 
conditions.45 This is no easy task and requires expansive analytical frameworks.  
 A second extrapolation is that NGOs, no less those with transnational connections, 
provide useful and flexible historical subjects for filling the space within such an analytical 
framework. Their interactions with both elites and the public can help us to appreciate the 
purchase of ideas among both spheres and enable one to assign a more definite balance to the 
reaches of cultural processes and structures within political culture. Examination of NGOs 
also provides opportunities to examine elites outside of their more formal surroundings, 
providing greater and more nuanced insights into individuals’ ideological position. 
Furthermore, as Matthew Hilton et al have shown, when examined in detail NGOs do not 
necessarily represent the depoliticisation of society, rather the ‘privatisation of politics’ 
beyond the traditional spaces of political participation in parties and Parliament.46 Chatham 
House and UNA were very much part of this but they can be distinguished from the many 
NGOs that came into existence in the 1960s in that they were concerned with multiple issues, 
but also kept a strong faith in the utility of traditional political institutions. The successes of 
UNA, particularly in the 1940s and 1950s could be understood to be representational of a 
number of NGOs that rose in this period both due to the internationalist spirit that inspired the 
formation of international aid and development organisations such as the British and Foreign 
Anti-Slavery Society, but also in terms of a greater faith that was held in traditional political 
institutions before NGOs experienced a much faster rate of growth from the 1960s onwards.47  
 Finally, this thesis has shown the value of examining postwar liberal thought and 
activism. Although its political representatives in Westminster did not enjoy a significant 
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increase in their number of seats until the 1980s and 1990s or a significant increase in their 
popular vote until the 1970s, liberal ideas lived on. There was ‘Liberalism without the 
Liberals’ after the Second World War.48 It is important to not define British politics solely in 
terms of the Labour-Conservative paradigm or indeed to suggest that there are monolithic 
Conservative and Labour attitudes. The first-past-the-post electoral system provides a much 
skewed representation of the ideological breadth of British political opinion. It is particularly 
important in light of significant distinctions between new liberal and classical liberal thought 
that have too often simply been grouped together. David Coates congratulated Harold 
Perkin’s The Rise of Professional Society for providing ‘a social history of the rise of the New 
Liberalism that approaches it on its own terms, one that does not treat it either as some poor 
quality socialism adopted by a myopic working class or as a ruling class strategy for 
proletarian containment’.49 It is imperative that new liberalism be treated in this fashion. As 
has been shown here such distinctions also have important implications further down the line 
when we visit neoliberalism. Additionally, if such an approach should be taken with regard to 
liberalism, so should it be taken with regard to the ideological lineages (and their popular 
purchase) of other political groups that have smaller political representation than the two 
heavyweight parties, such as the national parties in Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
Furthermore, liberalism’s emphasis on the merits of social harmony as opposed to 
social conflict affords a valuable perspective regardless of whether one agrees with it or not. 
Chatham House and UNA and other such liberal groups tended to emphasise the importance 
of building consensus across mainstream politics. Analysis of such groups can thus afford 
valuable insights into a broad section of political opinion. Their quiet methods that sought not 
to offend the political establishment (at least not too deeply) and the importance they 
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attributed to institutions both old and new also readily enables exploration of how structures 
condition cultural processes.  
Moreover, the contribution of liberalism to international thought is expansive. Michael 
Freeden may have dismissed it as a mere extension of domestic ideas to solve international 
problems.50 However, the organicism and theories of social evolution that much of it was 
based upon, for all of their many flaws, provided a valuable thinking tool for liberals that 
placed the domestic and the foreign within the same framework, enabling a strong 
appreciation of international affairs.51 Economic globalisation may have come as a shock to 
many in the 1970s, but it is apparent that it came as much less of a shock to Chatham House 
and UNA.52 That understanding of and subsequent enthusiasm for international affairs 
motivated the organisations to engage both elites and the general public and they helped, if 
not to the extent that their founders had hoped, to democratise foreign policy. Their vision 
was and is laudable. In twenty-first century Britain, foreign policy must be perceived to be a 
lot less foreign. 
 
 
                                                             
50 M. Freeden, Liberalism Divided: A Study in British Political Thought, 1914-1939 (Oxford, 1989), 363-364. 
51 See J. Morefield, Covenants without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of Empire (Oxford, 2004), 
ch.1; C. Navari, ‘Chatham House and the Broad Church View of British Foreign Policy’ in Bosco & Navari, 
Chatham House, 345-47; C. Navari, Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century (London, 2000), 
231-2; M. Carter, T.H. Green and the Development of Ethical Socialism (Exeter, 2003), 142-144. 





Appendix: Chatham House and UNA’s  
Principal Officers, 1945-1975 
 
 
Chatham House Directors 
 
1929-1955 Ivison Macadam 
1955-1959 Christopher Montague Woodhouse 
1959-1971 Kenneth Younger 
1971-1975 Andrew Shonfield 
 
Chatham House Directors of Studies 
 
1929-1956 Arnold J. Toynbee 
1956-1959 Christopher Montague Woodhouse (concurrently with directorship) 
1959-1961 Kenneth Younger (concurrently with directorship) 
1961-1968 Andrew Shonfield 
1969-1973 J.E.S. Fawcett 
1973-1978 Ian Smart 
 
UNA Chairs of the Executive Committee 
 
1945-1949 Donald Bennett 
1949-1951 Kathleen Courtney 
1951-1957 Lewis Owen Lyne 
1957-1960 Ronald Adam 
1960-1966 Nigel Nicolson 
1966-1970 Humphry Berkeley 
1970-1972 Eric Price Holmes 
1972-1973 Lord Chalfont 
1973-1974 Colin Crowe 




1945-1964 Charles Judd 
1964-1965 Geoffrey Nunn 
1965-1970 John Ennals 
1969-1970 Hugh Walker (acting Director while John Ennals was on sabbatical) 
1970 No Director 
1971-1973 Donald Tweddle 








1945-1953 Charles Judd (concurrently with Directorship) 
1953-1957 David Ennals 
1957-1959 R.J.F. Lorimer 
1959-1961 R.J.F. Lorimer and Donald Tweddle 
1961-1963 R.J.F. Lorimer 
1963-1965 T.A.M. Twaddle 
1965 No Secretary 
1966-1969 Hugh Walker 
1969-1971 Ian Henderson 
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